scholarly journals School education reform in the party discourse (based on the materials of the election to the State Duma of the 7th convocation)

2021 ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Leonidovna Timshina

In recent years, the reforms of the educational system have become a pressing public concern. The subject of this research is the proposals of the political parties pertaining to school education. The article considers the election programs of political parties with the federal lists of candidates officially registered for the 2016 State Duma Elections. The author explores reference to the problems of public education in the election campaign, attitude of the parties to such topical aspects as the implementation of the Unified State Exam, social status and salary of the pedagogues, and future trends in the education reforms. With the exception of the “United Russia”, which noted a number of positive trends, the parties criticized the current situation in education. Most criticism was expressed towards drawbacks of the Unified State Exam procedure; therefore, the parties demonstrated different approaches – from its cancellation to modification. Instead of submitting new comprehensive proposals, the political actors suggested focusing on the Soviet system of education or the Russian system of education formed after 1991. The problem of school education will remain relevant in the next election cycle; however, the priority topic of discussion may change to distant education.

Author(s):  
V. Е. Mamedova

The paper proposes the author’s understanding of responsibility of members of political parties provided by the political parties’ constitutions and other intraparty documents (intraparty responsibility). Also, the paper demarcates intraparty responsibility, legal and other types of social responsibility. It is concluded that the responsibility of members of political parties is a subspecies of social and statutory responsibility. The study has determined the tendency of convergence (diffusion) of internal party and legal responsibilities; the analysis has been carried out concerning perspectives of treating the responsibility of members of political parties as positive; the author substantiates the conclusion about the need to study intraparty responsibility exclusively in retrospective aspect. The author elucidates the thesis concerning expediency of enforcement of intra-party penalties as the subject matter of responsibility of members of political parties. Also, the basic properties of intra-party responsibility are revealed and analyzed. The study has investigated the influence of ambivalent nature of political parties and peculiarities of intra-party relations regarding the properties of responsibility of members of political parties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Iswandi Iswadi

  The ideology contestation is basically a classic polemic, where after independence the ideology of Islam was confronted with nationalism and took root until now (reform). However, the momentum of the 2019 election political contestation was again marked by the struggle of ideology namely ideology of Islamism and nationalism. The polemic began with the emergence of religious issues that were raised on the surface of political actors as a hegemony in taking the sympathy of voters. The existence of religion as a central issue began in 2016-2017 related to the prosecution of Ahok who insulted religious values ​​(Islam), and among the political parties involved in the demonstrations namely PPP, PKS, PBB, and PKB. In that momentum the beginning of the revival of Islamic ideology as the power in defending Islamic sovereignty. Judging from the ideology of political parties in Indonesia in the 2019 election political contestation, the ideology of political parties based on the statutes and bylaws (AD / ART) that the ideology applied can be classified into three parts namely ideology Nationalism, Islamism, and Nationalist-Religious, and the three ideologies. This can be proven based on the results of a survey from Australia 2017-2018 based on the voters. However, political parties based on multiple ideologies, PAN, PKB and Democrats, each have priority orientation. PAN and PKB tend to polarize the values ​​of Islamism (religious), while Democrats are more dominated by nationalist issues. The concept of Islamic political ideology, in the context of political contestation in political party elections, is basically a necessity to implement the values ​​of ri'ayah, taqwin, irshad and ta'dib through political education, or campaign in elections to achieve mutual benefit, both parties whose ideology Islamism, nationalism and nationalist-religious, so as to build the moralistic side of society, and intelligence in responding to the issues that exist in the election apart from that, political parties in confronting political contestation the emphasis of the movement must reflect the value of poverty, the three ideologies have been packaged in the values ​​of Pancasila in the third principles of Indonesian unity.         Asbtak Kontestasi ideology pada dasarnya polemik klasik, dimana pasca kemerdekaan ideologi islam dihadapkan dengan nasionalisme dan mengakar sampai sampai saat ini (reformasi). Akan tetapi momentum pemilu 2019 kontestasi politik kembali diwarnai pergulatan ideology yakni ideology islamisme dan nasionalisme. Polemik tersebut berawal dengan mencuatnya isu keagamaan yang dimunculkan dipermukaan pelaku politik sebagai hegemoni dalam mengambil simpati  pemilih. Eksistensi agama sebagai sentral isu berawal tahun 2016-2017 terkait penuntutan terhadap ahok yang melecehkan nilai-nilai agama (islam), dan diantara partai politik yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi yakni PPP, PKS, PBB, dan PKB. Dalam momentum tersebut awal mencuatnya kembali ideologi islam sebagai of the power dalam mempertahan kedaulatan Islam. Menilik ideologis partai politik di Indonesia pada konstestasi politik pemilu 2019, ideology partai politik berdasarkan anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga (AD/ART) bahwa ideologi yang diterapkan dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi tiga bagian yakni ideology Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Nasionalis-Religius, dan ketiga ideology tersebut dapat dibuktikan dengan berdasarkan hasil survey dari asutralia 2017-2018 berdasarkan pemilih. Namun demikian partai poltik yang berasaskan ideologi ganda, PAN, PKB dan Demokrat, masing-masing memiliki kiblat prioritas. PAN dan PKB condong polarisasi nilai-nilai islamisme (religious), sedangkan Demokrat lebih didominasi oleh isu-isu nasionalis. Konsep ideology politik islam, dalam konsteks kontestasi politik dalam pemilu partai politik pada dasarnya sebuah keharusan mengimplementasikan nilai-nilai ri’ayah, taqwin, irsyad dan ta’dib melalui pendidikan politik, ataupun kampanye dalam pemilu guna mencapai kemaslahatan bersama, baik partai yang berideologi islamisme, nasionalisme dan nasionalis-religius, sehingga terbangun sisi moralistik masyarakat, dan kecerdasan dalam menanggapi isu-isu yang ada dalam pemilu. selain dari itu partai politik dalam menghadapi konstestasi politik penekanan gerakannya harus mencermikan nilai kemaslahan, ketiga ideology tersebut telah kemas dalam nilai-nilai pancasila pada sila ketiga persatuan Indonesia. 


2019 ◽  
pp. 1222-1236
Author(s):  
Flaminia Saccà

In the last decade, Italy has gone through some deep changes in the political sphere. The fall of the Berlin Wall had forced political parties from opposite sides to re-organize themselves: their targets, ideologies and projects. At the same time, these historical events have been shortly followed by a major national bribe scandal that invested the main political leaders who had governed the Country for half a century. As a result, the last turn of the past Millennium has left a strongly politicized Country with no acknowledged leaders, no clear ideologies, no traditional, recognizable parties. It is in those years that Berlusconi's new venture gained votes and success. The fracture between political organizations, leaders and citizens though, became unhealable. The younger generations seemed to be the ones who suffered the most from political apathy or, worse, distrust. So we wanted to investigate who were the young politicians who, in these times of crises, had chosen politics as an important part of their lives. We have carried out two different surveys in different years and we found that political parties were changing deeply and radically. That their role in the political socialization of young political actors had become very thin. That candidates began to be chosen amongst the affluent few or, at least, amongst those whose personal fame and social/professional/family network would guarantee their party at least a dowry of votes that could make the difference in times of elections. But this method would not guarantee cohesion nor government stability.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein

In addition to summarizing the book’s main themes as described, this Introduction places special emphasis on connecting the problem animating the book—the apparent incapacity of contemporary parties to mediate between citizens and the state—to current political developments in established Western democracies, showing that the issues the book addresses are not only of academic interest but also directly relevant to ongoing public debates about the state and health of representative democracy. Chief amongst the themes foregrounded here is the rise of so-called ‘populist’ parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, as well as the re-branding of established political actors as ‘movements’ (think, e.g. of Emmanuel Macron’s La République en Marche). These phenomena are interpreted as part of a larger ‘revolt against intermediary bodies’—meaning first and foremost a rebellion against political parties. The Introduction suggests that this ‘revolt’ brings with it only a temporary shift in how representative politics looks, without actually reversing the disconnect between parties and voters or compelling established political parties to give up their privileges and de-colonize the institutions of the state. This argument sets the stage for the book’s core contention that more thought has to be put into finding ways to reconnect political parties with society.


Subject The weakness of state and local level institutions is encouraging more intervention from Mexico City. Significance With twelve Mexican states set to go to the polls on June 5, and a thirteenth holding elections on July 3, longstanding concerns regarding the risk of criminal infiltration in local governments have returned to the fore. Beyond the political manipulation of alleged political-criminal links, political actors appear increasingly aware of their vulnerability to threats, intimidation and physical attack. Impacts How federal and local authorities manage criminal threats will be central to the outcome of the forthcoming elections. Candidate screening will be ineffective as long as federal authorities and political parties are both reluctant to lead the process. Politically motivated intervention will worsen, with all parties using criminal accusations to smear or disqualify other candidates.


1971 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald D. Feldman

The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, hastily begun on March 13, 1920, and ingloriusly ended with the resignation of Dr. Wolfgang Kapp on March 17, has already been the subject of significant study. The details of the putsch itself, the character of the conspirators, and their motives, the positions taken by the political parties and leaders, and the reasons for its failure are fairly Well known. It is generally agreed that the circle of conspirators had too narrow a social base and was too divided in its purposes to be successful. In essence, it was a revolt of unemployed reactionary East Elbian officials like Kapp himself and his “Minister of the Interior,” Traugott von Jagow, disgruntled conservative military officers, the most important of whom was Freiherr von Lüttwitz, and military adventurers like Colonel Max Bauer, Major Pabst, and Captain Ehrhardt. Where Kapp sought far-reaching constitutional and political changes, Lüttwitz strove for more short-term goals, i.e., reconstruction of the cabinet to give it an “expert” character, new elections, and a larger army. The Kapp regime was doomed because of the refusal of the government bureaucracy to serve it and because of the general strike called by the trade unions on March 14.


Author(s):  
Aleksander Vilkov ◽  
◽  
Nikolaj Shestov ◽  
Andrei Abramov ◽  

Introduction. The purpose of this article is to find out to what extent the “social state” concept, brought to the fore of domestic political, social, and economic agendas by amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is able to satisfy the demand of the mass political consciousness in Russia for the image of the country’s future. Methods and materials. To solve this problem, a wide range of general scholarly and specific political science approaches and methods were used. The conclusions are based on the results of opinion polls conducted by the largest social surveys research organizations of Russia (i.e. “Russian Public Opinion Research Center”, “Levada-Center”, and “Public Opinion Foundation”), analysis of the programs of political parties, speeches of Russian politicians, as well as on the observation over the Russian political process. Analysis. The views of citizens on the prospects for the development of relations between the state and society in Russia are analyzed in relation to the political projects of leading Russian political actors; the prospects of key projects of the existing political, social, and economic system optimization in the context of their compliance with the needs of various social groups in modern Russia are considered; estimation of social risks of their implementation is given. Results. An inference is made that formation of a socially desired image of the future of Russia requires a significant adjustment of the main Russian political actors’ activities. Domestic political parties need a renewal of their leadership and relevant institutional and ideological reformatting; the highest bodies of state power need to adjust the political course – first of all, it is necessary to establish control over the use of natural resources, introduce a differentiated taxation system, and stimulate production. The lack of a clear response from government bodies and party structures to society’s requests for a just, socially responsible state creates risks for the stability of the domestic social and political system, and can be used by destructive political forces to implement the scenario of a “colour revolution” in Russia.


Author(s):  
Laura Cervi ◽  
Carles Marín-Lladó

TikTok, already widely used before the pandemic, boomed during the quarantine that locked down large parts of the world, reaching 2 billion downloads and 800 million monthly active users worldwide by the end of 2020. Of these 800 million users, 41% are aged between 16 and 24 years. This social network, widely known for its entertainment videos, is increasingly becoming a place for political discussion and therefore a unique opportunity for political actors to (re)connect with young people. Acknowledging that the political uses of TikTok are still understudied, this paper aims to explore whether and how Spanish political parties are including TikTok as part of their communication strategy. Through an affordance-centered content analysis of all the posts published by the five most important Spanish political parties (PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos, Podemos, and Vox), the current results show that, although all Spanish political parties have adopted this platform, their usage is unequal. From a quantitative perspective, PP was the first party to open a TikTok account, but its usage has been discontinuous; Podemos and Ciudadanos are the parties that publish the most and most constantly, while Vox has only published nine posts and the PSOE one. Nonetheless, from a qualitative perspective, Podemos and Vox generate more engagement and seem to understand and exploit TikTok’s specific affordances better. The findings allow it to be concluded that, although globally Spanish political parties do not fully exploit the platform’s affordances and tend to use it as a unilateral tool for promotion, the most engaging posts are those favoring interaction and geared toward politainment.


Teisė ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 119-135
Author(s):  
Elena Masnevaitė

Pastaraisiais metais Lietuvoje vis labiau diskutuojama dėl politinėms partijoms skiriamų valstybės biu­džeto lėšų, jų didinimo, kontroliavimo ar... areštavimo. Politinės partijos yra tas subjektas, kuris atlieka mediaciją tarp valstybės ir visuomenės. Valstybė yra tuo suinteresuota, todėl skiria joms tam tikrą finan­sinę paramą, tarsi laikydamasi romėniškos maksimos do ut des. Korupcinių grėsmių požiūriu valstybės biudžeto lėšos yra patikimiausias politinių partijų finansavimo šaltinis, tačiau čia taip pat slypi pavojus, jog politinės partijos praras savo prigimtį ir taps kvazivalstybinėmis organizacijomis, atitrūkusiomis nuo visuomenės grupių ir jų „natūralaus“ suinteresuotumo finansiškai paremti joms priimtinas politines pro­gramas ir jų įgyvendintojus. Turint tai omenyje, šiame straipsnyje analizuojami Lietuvos politinių partijų finansavimo iš valstybės biu­džeto būdai ir formos. Remiantis kitų Europos valstybių patirtimi, atskleidžiami diskutuotini pasirinkto valstybinio politinių partijų finansavimo modelio aspektai, neproporcingos viešosios paramos proble­matika. Be to, pateikiamos rekomendacijos tobulinti reglamentavimą, kurio inicijuotos pataisos „įstrigo“ parlamentinėje procedūroje arba po priėmimo netapo reikiamai veiksmingomis. In Lithuania the funds from the state budget assigned to political parties, its growth, control and... arrest have become a topic of increasing debate over the last years. Political parties are the subject who performs mediation between the state and the society. The state is interested in the abovementioned function and therefore it assigns particular financial support to political parties as if conferred with the Roman maxim do ut des. At the standpoint of threats of corruption the state budget allocations are the most reliable source of funding for political parties, however, there is a risk that political parties will be deprived of their nature and turn into quasi governmental organisations that have lost touch with groups of the society and their „genuine” interest to support beneficial political programmes and their executers financially. While taking this into account the article deals with the ways and forms of financing the political parties from the state budget. Arguable issues of the model chosen by the state to fund political parties and the proble­matics of non proportionate public support are revealed in the article with reference to the experience of Eu­ropean states. Moreover, recommendations how to improve legal regulation whose initiated amendments „stuck“ in the parliamentary procedure or did not become due effective after their adoption are provided.


Significance New Zealand's main political parties are divided on TPP ratification, which marks the first such division on a trade agreement in 40 years. The main opposition Labour party has opposed the agreement on the basis of 'sovereignty' issues. The political split reflects a wider public concern than there was about past free trade agreements about the degree to which the inclusion of an investor-state dispute clause in the TPP could constrain the ability of the New Zealand government to formulate national policy. Impacts A housing boom in Auckland has fuelled construction, but the rebuild of earthquake-devastated Christchurch has peaked. Early ratification of the TPP by New Zealand may expose acceptable concessions should US rejection lead to renegotiation of the pact. New Zealand's dairy sector may benefit from a 2017 price rebound should EU oversupply retract in the second half of 2016.


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