The authors marked and characterized four sets of criteria:
1) the criteria for scientific knowledge, 2) the criteria for the
truth of knowledge, and 3) the criteria for cultural research, 4) the
criteria for independence of science. All these four sets of criteria
related to each other and partially overlap. The mixing of these
criteria makes it difficult to develop the problems of the philosophy
of science. The existing trend of rejection of the category of truth
manifests itself in proposals to replace it with the concepts of reliability,
credibility, sense. Such position creates a paradoxical situation
of self-referencing: if there is no truth, then what is approved
by postmodernists and domestic authors, is also not truth. Therefore,
the consistent implementation of the provisions of the postmodern
leads them to self-destruct. The leading criterions of truth have the
empirical evidence. Its base component is a statistically significant
observation. It operates as a pure supervision or as supervision in
the composition of practices, including experiment. Derivative of
empirical verification by criteria of truth are logical provability,
heuristic, simplicity and beauty. The criteria for scientific knowledge
are conclusiveness (rationality), noncontradiction, empirical verifiability,
repeatability of empirical material, general meaning, systematicity
(coherence), essentiality, uniqueness of terms, developmental
potency. On the basis of these criteria the authors give the
generalized definition of scientific knowledge.