Quantum Core Affect. Process-Semantic Theory of Emotions

The paper describes model of human affect based on quantum theory of semantics. The model considers emotion as subjective representation of behavioral context relative to a basis binary choice, organized by cyclical process structure and an orthogonal evaluation axis. The resulting spherical space, generalizing well-known circumplex models, accommodates basic emotions in specific angular domains. Predicted process-semantic structure of affect is observed in the word2vec data, as well as in the previously obtained spaces of emotion concepts. The established quantum-theoretic structure of affective space connects emotion science with quantum models of cognition and behavior, opening perspective for synergetic progress in these fields.

Research methodology for the emotion concepts reproduction of the English artistic works in Ukrainian translations

The paper explores the distinctive features of the study related to the specific representation of the emotion concepts. Several well-known approaches to the analysis of concepts based on the implementation of different research material are highlighted. The paper proposes a comprehensive methodology for the study and analysis of the linguacultural emotion concept of HAPPINESS, its artistic dynamics, based on the principles of integration of various scientific methods. The study enabled us to carry out a multifold description of the analyzed linguistic expression of the concept and to identify the specific features of the concepts in the English artistic discourse as well as in the Ukrainian translations. The complex and systematic approach to the study of an emotional concept is justified to serve as a characteristic feature of this methodology that attempts to identify textual functioning, structural features, emotive and valuable features of the concept. The study demonstrates that the effective use of provided methodology for the study of an artistic concept requires a special algorithm for the application of scientific methods in order to isolate and characterize the verbal expression of the content of the emotion concept. We consider the implementation of general scientific and empirical methods based on the principles of verbalization, objectification and interpretation of the linguacultural emotional concept for a systemic study of the conceptualization features of the concept. The methodology is represented by the example of a complex analysis of the specific features of the key components of the concept HAPPINESS, a verbal embodiment in a Fr. Sc. Fitzgerald’s piece of art ‒ “The Great Gatsby”. The proposed methodology contributed to the identification of 6 dominant conceptual structures in percentage terms and distinctive features of their artistic translation.

Stuck on repeat: Why do we continue to ruminate?

An oft misattributed piece of folk-wisdom goes: “Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results.” In many cases, we don’t just do things repeatedly but think over the same topics repeatedly. People who ruminate are not often diagnosed as insane—most of us ruminate at some point in our lives—but it is a common behaviour underlying both depression and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema in J Abnorm Psychol 109(3):504, 2000). If rumination is something we all do at some time, what is it about ruminative thought that makes it ‘sticky’ and difficult to stop for the worst sufferers? In order to answer this question, I will present a plausible account of how ruminative behaviour becomes entrenched to the point where sufferers of anxiety and depression simply cannot make meaning from the world except in terms of the kinds of behaviours, actions and thoughts they have become reliant on. I develop my account from Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion (2006, 2011, 2014) using the work of Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of perception, Taylor and Francis Group. (Online), ProQuest Ebook Central, 2012. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ed/detail.action?docID=1433878. Accessed 29 Dec 2020) in order to bridge the gap between the explicit thought we experience—an important part of the lived experience of rumination. To conclude, I will apply my account to Wu and Dunning’s (Rev General Psychol 22(1):25–35, 2018; Hypocognitive mind: How lack of conceptual knowledge confines what people see and remember, 2019. 10.31234/osf.io/29ryz) theory of hypocognition to further illuminate the particular cognitive qualities that can be experienced by ruminators, i.e. a prohibited access to particular emotion concepts.

Evolution of emotion semantics

Humans possess the unique ability to communicate emotions through language. Although concepts like anger or awe are abstract, there is a shared consensus about what these English emotion words mean. This consensus may give the impression that their meaning is static, but we propose this is not the case. We cannot travel back to earlier periods to study emotion concepts directly, but we can examine text corpora, which have partially preserved the meaning of emotion words. Using natural language processing of historical text, we found evidence for semantic change in emotion words over the past century and that varying rates of change were predicted in part by an emotion concept's prototypicality - how representative it is of the broader category of "emotion". Prototypicality negatively correlated with historical rates of emotion semantic change obtained from text-based word embeddings, beyond more established variables including usage frequency in English and a second comparison language, French. This effect for prototypicality did not consistently extend to the semantic category of birds, suggesting its relevance for predicting semantic change may be category-dependent. Our results suggest emotion semantics are evolving over time, with prototypical emotion words remaining semantically stable, while other emotion words evolve more freely.

Facial movements have over twenty dimensions of perceived meaning that are only partially captured with traditional methods

Central to science and technology are questions about how to measure facial expression. The current gold standard is the facial action coding system (FACS), which is often assumed to account for all facial muscle movements relevant to perceived emotion. However, the mapping from FACS codes to perceived emotion is not well understood. Six prototypical configurations of facial action units (AU) are sometimes assumed to account for perceived emotion, but this hypothesis remains largely untested. Here, using statistical modeling, we examine how FACS codes actually correspond to perceived emotions in a wide range of naturalistic expressions. Each of 1456 facial expressions was independently FACS coded by two experts (r = .84, κ = .84). Naive observers reported the emotions they perceived in each expression in many different ways, including emotions (N = 666); valence, arousal and appraisal dimensions (N =1116); authenticity (N = 121), and free response (N = 193). We find that facial expressions are much richer in meaning than typically assumed: At least 20 patterns of facial muscle movements captured by FACS have distinct perceived emotional meanings. Surprisingly, however, FACS codes do not offer a complete description of real-world facial expressions, capturing no more than half of the reliable variance in perceived emotion. Our findings suggest that the perceived emotional meanings of facial expressions are most accurately and efficiently represented using a wide range of carefully selected emotion concepts, such as the Cowen & Keltner (2019) taxonomy of 28 emotions. Further work is needed to characterize the anatomical bases of these facial expressions.

Colour-emotion associations in individuals with red-green colour blindness

Colours and emotions are associated in languages and traditions. Some of us may convey sadness by saying feeling blue or by wearing black clothes at funerals. The first example is a conceptual experience of colour and the second example is an immediate perceptual experience of colour. To investigate whether one or the other type of experience more strongly drives colour-emotion associations, we tested 64 congenitally red-green colour-blind men and 66 non-colour-blind men. All participants associated 12 colours, presented as terms or patches, with 20 emotion concepts, and rated intensities of the associated emotions. We found that colour-blind and non-colour-blind men associated similar emotions with colours, irrespective of whether colours were conveyed via terms (r = .82) or patches (r = .80). The colour-emotion associations and the emotion intensities were not modulated by participants’ severity of colour blindness. Hinting at some additional, although minor, role of actual colour perception, the consistencies in associations for colour terms and patches were higher in non-colour-blind than colour-blind men. Together, these results suggest that colour-emotion associations in adults do not require immediate perceptual colour experiences, as conceptual experiences are sufficient.

Age-related differences in valence and arousal of emotion concepts

Emotion concepts are representations that enable people to make sense of their own and others’ emotions. The present study, theoretically driven by the conceptual act theory, explores the overall spectrum of emotion concepts in older adults and compares them with the emotion concepts of younger adults. Data from 178 older adults (⩾55 years) and 176 younger adults (20–30 years) were collected using the Semantic Emotion Space Assessment task. The arousal and valence of 16 discrete emotions – anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust, hope, love, hate, contempt, guilt, compassion, shame, gratefulness, envy, disappointment, and jealousy – were rated by the participants on a graphic scale bar. The results show that (a) older and younger adults did not differ in the mean valence ratings of emotion concepts, which indicates that older adults do not differ from younger adults in the way they conceptualise how pleasant or unpleasant emotions are. Furthermore, (b) older men rated emotion concepts as more arousing than younger men, (c) older adults rated sadness, disgust, contempt, guilt, and compassion as more arousing and (d) jealousy as less arousing than younger adults. The results of the present study indicate that age-related differentiation of conceptual knowledge seems to proceed more in the way that individuals understand how arousing their subjective representations of emotions are rather than how pleasant they are.

Learning Emotion Concepts

This paper reveals the importance of learning emotion concepts due to the efficiency of emotional granularity during the categorization of emotions. There are two ways of learning emotion concepts that can contribute to emotional granularity. First, we can learn emotion words. Second, we can learn the implicit content of our emotion concepts, i.e. how emotions feel to us. In order to complete the second task, we need to acquire vivid awareness and vivid memory of the implicit content of our emotion concept. I claim that only after completing the second task can we learn emotion words in a way that is efficient for the categorization of emotions. The problem with that claim is that we do not know how to study the implicit content of our emotions, and how to obtain vivid awareness of it. In this article, I sketch a basic solution to this problem. The article has three parts. In the first part, I outline Lisa Barrett’s Conceptual Act View in order to reveal the functional role of emotion concepts in our brains. In the second part, I explain Anna Wierzbicka’s classical attempt to define emotion concepts. In the third part, I suggest how it is possible to study the fine-grained details of our emotional experience in a scientific way. The goal of developing the integrative model is to realize the learner's potential in personalized knowledge formation in an intelligent learning environment and to enhance the efficiency of learning.

Emotional Ideologies

Chapter 1 argues that there are two dominant strands of emotion theory in Germany in the modern period, one of “Enlightened,” one of “Romantic” character, which exist side by side and are mobilized in sometimes paradoxical ways. These heuristic categories aim to organize the vast stores of knowledge about emotions, and what implications it has for judgments about emotional practice. They are philosophical and aesthetic traditions which intertwine with emotional styles and theological orientations, and both underlie the development of psychology as a natural-science discourse in the mid-nineteenth century. By virtue of the influence of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy and social theory, they still undergird scholarly and everyday discourse on emotions and conviction to this day, even beyond the strictly German context. This argument is built on an analysis of emotion concepts stored in German encyclopedias from the eighteenth to twenty-first centuries, which document shifts in the location of “real” emotion as well as normative stances on what “real” emotion is. Understanding the historical trajectory of knowledge about emotion more generally helps situate the analysis of debates on enthusiasm in the following chapters.