In Defense of Collective Consciousness

Within the repertoire of concepts that Emile Durkheim has forged to introduce sociology, none has attracted as much criticism or provoked more controversy as “collective consciousness”. This key concept has been accused of being at the same time absurd, inadequate, and dangerous. Having clarified to what extent the issue at stake concerns the social philosophy underlying sociology, the article reconstructs Durkheim’s perspective, in order to assess his central thesis: that there is no collective or social life without a collective or social consciousness. First, it clarifies the meaning of the “collective”, by analyzing the criteria of “constraint”: it thus brings out Durkheim’s reference to those obligations that give access to an irreducible collective being. Second, it elucidates the nature of “collective representations”, by examining Durkheim’s criticism of “consciousness”: it thus explains how the “representations” making up the collective are embedded into the dispositional “unconscious” of acting subjects. Finally, it analyzes the nature of “reflexive consciousness”, by reference to those practical situations that trigger a dynamic process allowing the members of a group to make collective representations explicit. The paper concludes by reassessing Durkheim’s argument: the concept of collective consciousness has a definite sociological meaning insofar as it allows us to grasp those crucial effervescent social phenomena that produce a conscious collective being, made of subjects able to say “we” in knowledge of the cause.

Durkheim and the Sociality of Space

This chapter explores the topic of space in Émile Durkheim’s writings. It shows that spatial formations play a key role in his theory of modernity. He assigns to social morphology the task of systematically investigating the material substratum of societies. Of major concern in this regard is how different types of societies relate to space in distinctive ways. His sociological approach encompasses both an epistemological and a social-theoretic perspective on “space.” In effect, it can be argued that Durkheim is not primarily concerned with a society’s dependence on space, but rather with how space is shaped socially. Space is not an abstract category of thought, but the collectively produced foundation for all social activity. Contrary to many subsequent conceptions of space, Durkheim does not differentiate between physical and social space, arguing that physical space is inherently shaped by social practices of classification and division. It is this theoretical notion which, in light of the renewed attention given to materiality and space by proponents of the material and the spatial turn, makes his work seem surprisingly contemporary.

Durkheim and Economic Sociology

Durkheim’s doctoral dissertation on the division of labor had an economic dimension, and his study on suicide rates put a strong emphasis on the professional group for the social reform he had in mind. Durkheim never entered into the technicalities of economic theory proper and limited himself to issues related to economic policy and economic reform, before he moved to study religious issues. Durkheim produced not only a personal work but also a collective one around L’Année sociologique. So, beyond Durkheim’s own achievement, this chapter considers the work of François Simiand and Maurice Halbwachs, who were at the head of the “economic sociology” section of L’Année sociologique, and Marcel Mauss for his work on gift-giving. Finally, the strength of the Durkheimian approach to economic sociology is illustrated through some contemporary inquiries.

Durkheim and the Philosophy of His Time

Durkheim was trained as a philosopher, taught philosophy, and never left the philosophical field. He started his career with standard philosophical equipment but also with a growing disenchantment about the eclectic and metaphysical mainstream that had survived the establishment of the Third Republic. Philosophy was too general to deal with the growth of scientific invention. Durkheim pursued simultaneously two goals: first, he established a firm demarcation line between philosophy and sociology, guaranteeing the full autonomy of the latter. Second, he benefited from his full membership in the philosophical institution. Rationalism remained his lifetime affiliation. It was largely based on a French version of neo-Kantianism. In the last part of his life, he engaged in a strong discussion with American pragmatism, as a way of clarifying his grasp of social practice.

Durkheim’s Team

This chapter examines the research team of sociologists that, beginning in 1896, collaborated with Émile Durkheim to create the journal L’Année sociologique. It explores the central place that Durkheim held in the group, as well as the vital roles that different collaborators such as Célestin Bouglé and Marcel Mauss played in making L’Année sociologique an initial success. The chapter then follows the development of this Durkheimian school and its historical legacy after Durkheim’s death in 1917. This development includes the Durkheimian school’s maintenance of a prominent position in the 1920s and 1930s, its relative post–World War II obscurity, and its rebirth beginning in the 1970s and 1980s through renewed academic interest in the work of members of the team. Beyond L’Année sociologique, special attention is given to specific members of Durkheim’s team, including collaborators such as Henri Hubert, François Simiand, Maurice Halbwachs, and Robert Hertz.

Sociology of the Sacred

This article analyzes three key stages in the development of the sociology of the sacred: the Durkheim school, the Collège de Sociologie, and the work of Hans Joas. First, it shows that the Collège de Sociologie was deeply influenced by the Durkheimians’ studies on religion and the gift but interpreted them in a very specific way. Whereas the Collège and the Durkheim school agree on the importance of the sacred for social cohesion, they disagree on other important theoretical, methodological, and political issues. Second, it compares Hans Joas’s studies on sacralization processes to the Durkheimian sociology of religion and the sacred sociology of the Collège. It argues that Joas’s analyses, even though they are inspired by Durkheim, in particular go beyond the Durkheim school and the Collège in three respects: (a) they provide an account of the articulation of the experience of the sacred; (b) they ground sacralization processes in a theory of action; and (c) they contextualize sacralization processes in terms of a sociology of institutions and power.

Durkheim and the New Sociology of Morality

Durkheim’s writings on morality are examined, distinguishing his earlier, more familiar account from later developments that advance new ideas relevant to present-day debates. The question is raised of the extent to which familiar criticisms of Durkheim’s sociology of morality are justified and ways are suggested in which sociologists and anthropologists can gain from reconsidering Durkheim on morality. His attempts to demarcate the scope of the sociology of morals against the claims of the philosophers and psychologists of his time are, it is argued, relevant to how sociologists of morality should view today’s philosophers and psychologists. Durkheim’s influence on current work by sociologists of morality is considered: positive influence, whether acknowledged or not, and negative, in response to what are seen as inadequacies of Durkheim’s approach. It is suggested that apparently non-Durkheimian studies of trust, collective action, and the evolution of social norms are nonetheless Durkheimian in their object of inquiry.

Emile Durkheim and the Modern Family

Emile Durkheim’s first specialized course in Bordeaux (in 1888) was on the sociology of the family. Although his work on the topic is not his best known, and is often rather misunderstood, it is still quite interesting. Durkheim was able to perceive the two leading characteristics of the European family under the first modernity (from the 1850s through the 1960s): the personalization of ties and the increasing intervention of the state in family affairs. Understanding this change did not lead Durkheim to approve of it, however, and he worried about the weakening of rules and discipline within the family.

Emile Durkheim and the Sociology of Religion

As religion has gained public and scholarly attention, sociologists have critically revised orthodox secularization theory. This article revisits Emile Durkheim’s sociologie religieuse and explores its potential and limitation for analyzing contemporary religious reconfigurations in the twenty-first century. First, it reviews how the “New Durkheim” as recovered by the recent historiography of classical sociology defined, explained, and assessed religion. It argues that Durkheim’s theory of the sacred, its relation to society, and its impact on morality and knowledge displays inherent tensions reflected in his quest for social bonds in secular society. Second, having acknowledged Durkheim’s ambivalent legacy in the sociology of religion and cultural sociology more broadly, the article shows that his theory of the sacred, while failing to grasp religio-political power configurations so central to the Weberian tradition, helps discern the persistence and production of collective religious forms in a global age, ranging from nationalisms to human rights.

The Dreyfus Affair and Durkheim’s Experience of Anti-Semitism

This article emphasizes the importance of the Dreyfus Affair in the manner in which Emile Durkheim approached the subject of anti-Semitism between 1897 and 1899, while the Affair was in full swing in France. Although Durkheim was the founder of positivist sociology, disconnected from preconceived notions, he nevertheless courageously entered the fight to defend Dreyfus, both as a scholar and as a Jew. In a series of articles and letters, he reflected on the causes of anti-Semitism and proposed an interpretation of Jews as scapegoats, because in his view society’s suffering was resolved by ostracizing Jews as pariahs. But this interpretation is unsatisfactory. Based on impressions rather than on a sociological analysis conducted in accordance with his Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim’s analysis of explanatory variables is not convincing and is oriented around psychological considerations rarely seen elsewhere in his work.