Coming to Terms with the Past Marked by Collective Crimes: Collective Moral Responsibility and Reconciliation

2012 ◽  
pp. 235-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabina Čehajić-Clancy
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-122
Author(s):  
Nina A Tsyrkun

The article explores the balance of the two basic cultural constructs - individualism and collectivism - and the way it is represented in the American cinema of 2015-2016 as exemplified by a number of films set in the past, present and future. The author comes to the conclusion that in the face of a global peril the idea of individual moral responsibility inevitably leads to the role of collectivism as the essential survival condition.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-243
Author(s):  
Deana Jovanovic

The main question the article discusses is how and why feminism can reflect upon multiple differences in Serbia through the idea of solidarity in the discourse of facing the past. The article pays attention to the connection between feminist practices and theories, solidarity, and the idea about moral responsibility. The article opens discussion about (feminist) solidarity seen as a strategic notion and points out to the politics of exclusion/inclusion of multiple Others. Attention is devoted to gender categories and construction of differences, as well as to the potential possibility and the importance of reflecting upon solidarity with gender diversities. The latter are briefly depicted through research results of analysis of women?s memory narratives - nurses and antiwar activists - whose subjectivities, experiences and gender positions, in their interaction, influenced construction of their narratives, differences, but also their relationship with the past.


Author(s):  
Jameel Jaffer

The legal, political, and technological developments of the past twenty years have rendered us more reliant on whistleblowers even as the developments have made whistleblowing more difficult and more hazardous. To promote informed public debate about national security and to preserve the connection between democratic consent and government policy in this sphere, we should extend legal protection, in some circumstances, to government insiders who responsibly disclose official secrets without authorization. Affording leakers a “public value” defense against prosecution would have benefits beyond those usually cited. It would, among other things, reduce the disincentive to socially beneficial leaks, lend legitimacy to Espionage Act prosecutions, more closely align our legal regime with widely shared intuitions about moral responsibility, and restore the courts to an appropriately central role in protecting the public’s access to an essential channel of information.


Author(s):  
Daniel Statman

The recent development of unmanned technology—drones and robots of various types—is transforming the nature of warfare. Instead of fighting against other human beings, combatants will soon be fighting against machines. At present, these machines are operated by human beings, but they are becoming increasingly autonomous. Some people believe that, from a moral point of view, this development is worrisome, especially insofar as fully autonomous offensive systems (‘killer robots’) are concerned. I claim that the arguments that support this belief are pretty weak. Compared with the grand battles of the past, with their shockingly high toll of casualties, drone-centered campaigns seem much more humane. They also enable a better fit between moral responsibility and vulnerability to defensive action. Drones and robots may well be recorded in the annals of warfare as offering real promise for moral progress.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe

Free will is a perennial issue in philosophy, both in terms of the history of philosophy and in contemporary discussions. Aspects of free will relate to a wide range of philosophical issues, but especially to metaphysics and ethics. For roughly the past three decades, the literatures on free will and moral responsibility have overlapped to such a degree that it is impossible to separate them. This entry focuses on contemporary discussions about the nature and existence of free will, as well as its relationship to work in the sciences and philosophy of religion.


AmeriQuests ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Angenot

Law and historiography share several fundamental paradigms: the search for truth based on facts from the past; investigation; the presentation of “exhibits;” testimony and the evaluation of witnesses (according to the kind of jurisprudence that forms source criticism); the use of “pieces of evidence,” etc. If it is true that “legal principles cannot be transferred as-is into historical research,” that the demands in terms of evidence are not of the same nature, and that—and this is a decisive difference, but one that is not always observed, far from it, and it’s precisely this difference that will be the theme of my reflections today—the historian is not supposed to, having reconstructed the facts, regardless of how incriminating they are, pass judgement on, nor present a prosecutor’s charge against (nor plea for the acquittal of) figures from the past.With a belated but exceptionally violent spurt, the 1997 publication of The Black Book of Communism in France rekindled the long-lasting debate on the role and record of communism, mobilizing the press as a whole and every essayist in sight, with no signs that controversy is about to die down. Un pavé dans l’histoire, by Pierre Rigoulot and Ilios Yannakakis, recounts the first months of the polemic surrounding the “memory of communism” in France, positioning itself from the accusatory point of view of the book’s contributors. Several years later, the collective text Du passé faisons table rase! introduced French readers to the contrasting receptions The Black Book’s translations met in all of Europe’s countries and languages: very favourable in the East, reticent in the West—with intellectual France, as always, a clear exception, diverging from the countries who had known “real socialism,” despite the reluctance of a rearguard of prudently recycled apparatchiki who had preferred not to “stir up the mud” of the past.


Author(s):  
Robert Barnard ◽  
Joseph Ulatowski ◽  
Jonathan M. Weinberg ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb

In the past, experimental philosophers have explored the psychological underpinning of a number of notions in philosophy, including free will, moral responsibility, and more. But prior to this chapter, although a number of philosophers have speculated on how ordinary folks might, or should, think about the liar paradox, no one had systematically explored the psychological underpinnings of the Liar itself. The authors take on this task. In particular, the chapter investigates the status of a liar sentence, L = ‘Sentence L is false’. The thesis, arrived at by interpreting the data the authors have accrued, is that reflective thinkers (some of whom possess a modicum of philosophical expertise) judge L to be neither true nor false (as opposed to false or true), and the authors see this as some evidence for the claim that L is neither true nor false.


The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.


Existentialism is a concern about the foundation of meaning, morals, and purpose. Existentialisms arise when some foundation for these elements of being is under assault. In the past, first-wave existentialism concerned the increasingly apparent inability of religion and religious tradition to provide such a foundation, as typified in the writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Second-wave existentialism, personified philosophically by Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, developed in response to the inability of an overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of reason and the common good to provide such a foundation. There is a third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism, developing in response to advances in the neurosciences that threaten the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self. With the increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and some responses to it. It brings together some of the world’s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.


Author(s):  
Keith Dowding

Gun crime in the USA is wildly out of line with other nations. Obesity has taken off as a growing problem around the world in the past forty years. Homelessness is increasing, whilst the average age of home owners is rising. Governments tell their citizens that they ought to eat healthy food, tell the young to get good jobs to buy houses, and blame the bad guys for gun crime. In all cases, the problem lies with government regulation and government policy. This chapter looks at how governments blame citizens for failures which are caused by government. They have been encouraged by political philosophers who concentrate upon individual moral responsibility, freedom and autonomy, whilst ignoring the fact that governments no longer seem to want to legislate for the welfare of their citizens. This chapter sets up the argument of the book. Individuals are responsible for the choices they can reasonably make given the menu of opportunities available to them. That menu is the responsibility of government – and the menu is poor fare.


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