scholarly journals Neoliberalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and EU–Turkey Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-61
Author(s):  
Dimitris Tsarouhas

AbstractThis chapter investigates and explains EU–Turkey relations from the perspective of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). After setting out the main premises of neoliberalism in International Relations (IR) and the three-step approach to integration espoused by LI, the chapter focuses on EU–Turkey relations over time, and by the use of concrete forms of cooperation, ranging from the Customs Union to Turkey’s membership application and the EU–Turkey Statement on migration. Based on this analysis, I argue that the transactional, issue-specific character EU–Turkey relations have assumed are unlikely to go away any time soon. Neither Turkey’s full EU accession nor a complete breakdown of relations is likely to happen, given the set of powerful economic interests binding the two sides, as well as the diversity of member states’ preferences regarding Turkey’s EU vocation.

Significance Turkey's faltering EU accession process looks more at risk than ever, following Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn's warning that Ankara had "clearly chosen to move away from Europe, not closer to it". Hahn was presenting the European Commission's 2016 Enlargement Package, which is much more critical of Turkey than of the six Western Balkans countries that are either accession candidates like Turkey or potential candidates. Yet when it comes to terminating Turkey's candidacy, both the Turkish and EU authorities want the other to make the move. In the short term, some EU capitals fear a wave of migrants should Ankara stop cooperating in policing the Aegean; in the longer term, Turkey's economy could suffer. Impacts The EU's interest in Western Balkan security, stability and prosperity will keep enlargement to these countries on track, at least formally. However, the Dutch referendum vote against Ukraine's association agreement shows popular feeling spreading in the EU against enlargement. Turkey's customs union with the EU underpins its recent economic upturn; it is hard to see it continuing without the prospect of membership. Resumed use of the East Mediterranean route depends on Turkey but also on migrants' hopes of being able to cross borders further north.


Subject The prospects for Turkey's EU membership bid. Significance Trading and investment links between Turkey and the EU will continue to be strong. The economy of Turkey looks much healthier than those of EU Mediterranean states. Its leverage is much greater than a decade ago, while the EU now also regularly acknowledges Turkey's geo-strategic importance as an ally. The way is open for further economic integration beyond the Customs Union in primary agricultural products and services. A sign that Turkey's accession aspirations are still alive is that 2015 marks the first phase of an EU accession plan. Nevertheless, a leading Brussels think-tank, the Centre for European Policy Studies, has forecast that the hobbled accession negotiations will be "halted" on their tenth anniversary in October. Impacts With the rise of Islamic State, the United States and NATO will try hard to keep Turkey on side and avert outright rupture with the EU. Turkey's attraction as a destination for trade, direct investment and the money markets will persist despite the EU membership stand-off. Tighter control of the judiciary and restrictions on freedom of expression will increase the country's isolation from EU public opinion. Defining itself more along Islamic lines, Turkey will have less interest in pro-EU symbolism or gestures implying a Western orientation. Turkey will vociferously attack perceived Islamophobia in the EU, sometimes damaging bilateral relations with EU member states in so doing.


Author(s):  
Yontem Sonmez

Among the EU candidate countries of Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey, Turkey is the candidate country with the largest population and size as well as the one who has spent the longest time on the way to EU accession. It also has a closer economic relationship with the EU, as it has been participating in a Customs Union (CU) with the existing EU members since 1996. Turkey's potential EU candidacy has become a matter of controversy in recent years. The possibility of Turkish accession to the EU has reignited fears in the ‘old' EU. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the recent developments in Turkey-EU relations and to evaluate the recent performance of Turkey on the way to EU accession by focusing on economic and mainly trade implications of a Turkish EU accession.


Subject Implications of the Icelandic government's EU missteps for its planned exit from capital controls. Significance The government has sought to make more definite the halt to Iceland's EU accession process, without seeking either parliamentary or popular endorsement of its formal withdrawal of the membership application. It has succeeded in damaging its domestic standing, while still leaving Iceland's EU status unclear. It has also made the political environment more volatile, when stability is needed to facilitate the government's planned exit from the capital controls imposed in the 2008 crisis. Impacts The EU is still seeking clarity on whether Iceland is formally withdrawing its membership application. Strains over the handling of the exit from capital controls could exacerbate other differences within the government. The government's side-stepping of parliament has triggered a broader debate on executive-legislative relations which will continue.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-206
Author(s):  
Dacian C. Dragos

Romanian administrative law has undergone transitory challenges, both following the changing of the political regime in 1989 and following the EU accession in 2007. The transplanting of international models of legal institutions has been strenuous at times has been strenuous. This paper showcases the trials and tribulations of a novel institution for the Romanian system: the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman was meant to mediate between the administration and citizens, to issue recommendations, and to foster good administrative practices. Over time, however, its role has been diverted to that of a constitutional mediator between the powers of the state.


Author(s):  
Stelios Stavridis ◽  
Charalambos Tsardanidis

The Republic of Cyprus (or Cyprus) joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 and adopted the single currency (the euro) in 2008. This article consists of three parts: it begins with a historical contextualization, explaining the reasons for Cyprus’ application for an Association Agreement with the (then) European Economic Community (EEC), and also examining the latter´s reaction and policy towards the 1974 Turkish invasion following a failed coup d´état against the Makarios Presidency that has led to a divided island since then (Part 1). In brief, what is known as the “Cyprus Problem.” This part also looks at the evolution of the Association Agreement during the period since 1975 which ended with the conclusion of a customs union Agreement between Cyprus and the European Community in 1987. The article next turns to an analysis of the Republic of Cyprus´ EU accession negotiations process (Part 2). It also covers the impact (or lack thereof) of various reunification plans, and most notably what is seen as the culmination of such efforts in the so-called 2002–2004 Annan Plans. The following section presents an assessment of how Cyprus has fared as a member state since it joined the EU (Part 3). It covers several key questions regarding the EU–Cyprus relationship. Whereas this article is not about the Cyprus problem itself, but as will be made clear throughout this study, it remains the dominant issue for the island. Others issues encompass EU relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community, the question of Turkey´s EU accession, the impact of the economic crisis of 2013, as well as energy security considerations following the discovery of gas in the region. The study concludes that being in the EU offers better perspectives for the Republic of Cyprus than if it had been kept outside it. If only because as the Accession Treaty makes it clear: it is the whole island that has joined the EU albeit the acquis communautaire cannot apply to the north, occupied, part of the Island following the invasion by Turkey. But all Cypriots are EU citizens. Yet, to a large extent, the experience of Cyprus prior to and after EU membership also reflects the kind of specific problems that a “small state” is facing in its international relations.


Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

This chapter introduces a benchmark theory of public opinion towards European integration. Rather than relying on generic labels like support or scepticism, the chapter suggests that public opinion towards the EU is both multidimensional and multilevel in nature. People’s attitudes towards Europe are essentially based on a comparison between the benefits of the status quo of membership and those associated with an alternative state, namely one’s country being outside the EU. This comparison is coined the ‘EU differential’. When comparing these benefits, people rely on both their evaluations of the outcomes (policy evaluations) and the system that produces them (regime evaluations). This chapter presents a fine-grained conceptualization of what it means to be an EU supporter or Eurosceptic; it also designs a careful empirical measurement strategy to capture variation, both cross-nationally and over time. The chapter cross-validates these measures against a variety of existing and newly developed data sources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
Lise Esther Herman ◽  
Julian Hoerner ◽  
Joseph Lacey

AbstractOver the last decade, the EU’s fundamental values have been under threat at the national level, in particular among several Central and Eastern European states that joined the EU since 2004. During this time, the European People’s Party (EPP) has been criticized for its unwillingness to vote for measures that would sanction the Hungarian Fidesz government, one of its members, in breach of key democratic principles since 2010. In this paper, we seek to understand how cohesive the EPP group has been on fundamental values-related votes, how the position of EPP MEPs on these issues has evolved over time, and what explains intra-EPP disagreement on whether to accommodate fundamental values violators within the EU. To address these questions, we analyse the votes of EPP MEPs across 24 resolutions on the protection of EU fundamental values between 2011 and 2019. Our findings reveal below-average EPP cohesion on these votes, and a sharp increase in the tendency of EPP MEPs to support these resolutions over time. A number of factors explain the disagreements we find. While the EPP’s desire to maintain Fidesz within its ranks is central, this explanation does not offer a comprehensive account of the group’s accommodative behaviour. In particular, we find that ideological factors as well as the strategic interests of national governments at the EU level are central to understanding the positions of EPP MEPs, as well as the evolution of these positions over time. These results further our understanding of the nature of the obstacles to EU sanctions in fundamental values abuse cases, and the role of partisanship in fuelling EU inaction especially.


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