scholarly journals A European vision for addressing global security threats

European View ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Sabathil
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
External Action ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Cooperative Management ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Robust Consensus ◽  
The Way

There is a robust consensus among EU Member States about the need to identify the complex links between the threats and challenges to the EU's security. The new institutional framework for the EU's external action will allow it to make further progress in developing a comprehensive security policy, integrating both internal and external dimensions of security and mobilising the policies and instruments required to effectively respond to security threats. New initiatives could pave the way for a more cooperative management of ‘global home affairs’.

scholarly journals Euroscepticism 's Impact upon European Union's Foreing Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-14
Author(s):  
Maryna Yakymchuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
External Action ◽  
The United States ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

In the article, the author overviews and analyzes the impact of Euroscepticism on EU foreign policy. In particular, we identify the key actors involved in implementing the European common foreign policy and level of their affiliation with the ideas of Euroscepticism. EU Commissioners, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the staff of the European External Action Service are not eurosceptic. However, they do not have sufficient political influence decision making process. Thus, the European Council faces some obstacles achieving a compromise on international relations' issues. The European Parliament is more dependent on the Member States. Positions of the Member States are also different. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a much higher level of opposition to strengthening internal integration in foreign policy, but they support EU enlargement. The Nordic countries support the deepening of foreign policy cooperation but are wary of the accession of new members. Therefore, the biggest opposition to the common foreign policy observed in the EU member states. Under the influence of Eurosceptic ideas, they slow down the process of integration. The population supports the common foreign policy with hopes to resolve the migration problem. Besides, citizens believe that common foreign policy can prevent the economic intervention of third countries. Excessive interference in the EU by Russia, China and the United States is also an obstacle to deepening integration. Despite this, European officials and citizens of EU member states support of strengthening cooperation in this area. To sum up, it is difficult to realise a common foreign policy without decreasing level of eurosceptism.

scholarly journals Legal Regulation of Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine on the Way to European Integration

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 406
Author(s):  
Sergiy Dubchak ◽  
Valentyna Goshovska ◽  
Volodymyr Goshovskyi ◽  
Oleksandr Svetlychny ◽  
Olena Gulac
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The article is devoted to the analysis of legal regulation of the sphere of nuclear safety and security of Ukraine on the way to European integration. The authors drew attention to the importance of Ukraine achieving the necessary level of and nuclear sefaty and security adopted in the EU member states. The emphasis was placed on the fact that the prospects for fulfilling national obligations in the field of nuclear safety in accordance with European standards directly depend on solving the problems of ensuring the functioning of nuclear facilities, the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations as well as radioactive waste management. The main directions of ensuring the nuclear safety and secutiry in the world within the international law are considered. The role and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in setting up a regulatory framework for nuclear safety and security are analyzed. The international legal framework for nuclear safety and security was discused.The legislative basis for nuclear safety and secutiry in the EU IS characterized. The issue of legal norms unification in the field of nuclear safety regulation of EU member states was considered. The principles of legal regulation of nuclear a safety and security in Ukraine are characterized. Key words: nuclear safety, nuclear security, public administration of nuclear safety and security, legal regulation of nuclear safety and security, European integration, sustainable development in the field of ensuring nuclear safety and security. UDC 35:574:339.9:349.6        JEL Classification: K 23, K 32, K 33,  Q 5

scholarly journals Analysing the Power of the European Union’s Diplomatic Service: Do the eu Member States Control the European External Action Service?

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hrant Kostanyan
Keyword(s):  
External Action ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
European Union Member States ◽  
The Eu

By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service (eeas) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the eeas. These mechanisms aim to ensure the eeas’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the eeas is tightly controlled by the eu member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the eeas. The application of the principal–agent model to control the eeas is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.

Kosovo and the European Union

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Economides
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s involvement with and in Kosovo is of three main types. First, it participated in war diplomacy in the late 1990s in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict between Kosovar Albanians and the Serb forces of the former Yugoslavia. This demonstrated of the Union’s limited ability to influence less powerful actors in its backyard through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This resulted from the difficulty the EU found in attempting to forge a consensus among its member states on a significant matter of regional security with humanitarian implications, the limitations in effectiveness of the EU’s civilian instruments of foreign policy, and the low credibility and influence stemming from the lack of an EU military capability. Second, the EU took a leading role in economic reconstruction and state-building in Kosovo following the end of the conflict. Initially, this was in tandem with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Subsequently, the EU became the lead organization, focusing its efforts not only on the physical and economic reconstruction of the territory but also on building human and administrative capacity and democratic institutions and establishing good governance and the rule of law, especially through its EULEX mission. Third, the EU attempted to help transform Kosovo beyond democratization toward EU integration through instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). A significant part of this process has also been linked with EU-led mediation attempts at resolving outstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia through a process of normalization of relations without which EU accession cannot be envisaged. Throughout the post-war phases of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo, its efforts have been undermined by the most important outstanding issue, the disputed status of Kosovo. Kosovo was set on the path to increasing self-government and autonomy at the end of the conflict in 1999, but it was still legally part of sovereign Yugoslavia. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. While over 100 states recognized Kosovo, it never acquired enough recognitions to be eligible for UN membership: Serbia does not recognize it and, most importantly, neither do five EU member states. This status issue has seriously complicated the EU–Kosovo relationship in all its aspects and slowed down the prospect of “Euro-Atlantic integration” for Kosovo.

scholarly journals European Defence: a puzzle with many unknowns

2020 ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Tatyana Arzamanova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
The Usa

Under the pressure of the growing turbulence of EuroAtlantic space due to the increasing isolationism of the United States and the fact that Global security is now determined by the confrontation between the two centers of power – the United States and China, as well as the shift of strategic decision-making into the USA-Russia-China triangle, Europe is forced to admit that the period of solidarity of the collective West is over. If earlier differences between the allies were exclusively tactical, now they affect already fundamental foundations. In the current situation, Europe will try to intensify the development of the European defence component and strengthen integration in the field of security policy in order to achieve full strategic sovereignty. This process is complicated by the low level of European defence capacity, the shortage of funds of the European defence budget, weak strategic planning, and the unresolved issue of limits of supranational competences of the command of the European Armed Forces. With the use of comparative, event and content analysis, it is concluded that the key problem is that EU member states have a different scale of assessment of risks and security threats, they find it difficult to reach a common understanding, without which the development of a strategic concept of European defence will be largely decorative. The author cosiders that it is first and foremost necessary to establish a Pan-European consensus on basic points, including a set of definitions. A serious challenge for the European defence project was coronavirus COVID-19. The pandemic revealed a global crisis of leadership, a lack of solidarity, and the world's lack of preparedness for a large-scale biological threat. In the near future, states will consider biological attacks among the priority security threats, and this seems to the author to be a promising field for cooperation within the framework of European defence. It is about the development of a Pan-European system of recognition, warning and opposition to the bacteriological threat using developments in the field of artificial intelligence.

scholarly journals Is the “show-the-flag” strategy relevant for Visegrad countries in securing the EU?

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.

The Constitutional Price for International Unilateralism in the European Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 320-360
Author(s):  
Adrian Dumitrescu-Pasecinic
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In order to enter the Banking Union, non-euro EU Member States must ‘step outside’ the EU legal order and the Union’s institutional framework, and resort to unilateral instruments of public international law. If the intergovernmental method has advanced the alternative project of integration based on voluntary policy, international unilateralism is seen as a similar integration technique based on the voluntary action of non-euro Member States, ie a tool for deeper integration that appears as a variation of intergovernmentalism. This article focuses on the constitutional deficiencies caused by the choice of unilateral instruments in the institutional set-up of a close cooperation arrangement in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. At first sight, leaving the EU legal order and entering the world of international law opens entirely new perspectives for the participating Member States. The possible attraction is escaping the constraining institutional framework of EU law. However, the international law route poses significant constitutional challenges vis-à-vis compatibility with the EU law.

scholarly journals The launch on the way to development or the „revival”... (Comparisons of theoretical and practical approaches apropos of the change and crisis management process of smes and mature companies) .

2009 ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Erszébet Noszkay
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Management Process ◽  
Problematic Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Crisis Managers ◽  
The Way

Hungarian SMEs, just like those in other EU member states, often cease for various reasons. Among these factors are many, which should not necessarily turn out this way. These factors are studied in numerous countries while the attempt is also made to create the systems of conditions for these enterprises to recover – often through various aids and supports (from public supports to non-governmental initiatives). Among other things they are tryingto organize those services with the help of which – if there is the slightest hope for survival – those SMEs in trouble or having serious difficulties could avoid going down by recovering fromtheir problematic situation and getting improvements.These days this issue comes up more and more urgently in Hungary, as well. It has quite a few signs indicating that – among other things – the reports, the enquiries and commissions of theNational Association of Change and Crisis Managers (VOE), all of which – just like "thermometers" – reflect this tendency well. I have been doing research on this topic since 1993. As an expert I utilize them, and as a VOE member, vice president, then president I process the relevant Hungarian but mainly Frenchexperience on the subject. I intend to present those few theoretical and practical results and applicable experience I have reached this way in this presentation of mine.

scholarly journals THE PRESENCE OF NEWER EU MEMBER STATES IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE’S STAFF: THE CASE OF SLOVAKIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik PAJTINKA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Career Advancement ◽  
Statistical Data ◽  
Institutional Culture ◽  
External Action ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Factors Influencing

The article evaluates the representation of Slovakia within the selected categories of the European External Action Service (EEAS) staff in 2012-2019 and drafts possible factors influencing the representation of Slovakia in this EU institution. The evaluation is based on the analysis of statistical data available in EEAS official documents, as well as empirical data obtained from interviews with EU diplomats working for the EEAS. It is concluded, Slovakia’s representation within the EEAS’s staff between 2012 and 2019 is was inadequate. This may be due to the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ overall attitude toward the work of its diplomats in the EEAS, its career advancement system, and its institutional culture, and to the conditions under which applicants are selected to posts within the EEAS.

The Amsterdam Treaty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Vanhoonacker
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
External Action ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Heads Of State ◽  
Treaty Of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam was the result of the 1996–1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) among the then 15 EU member states (March 1996–June 1998). Its three core objectives were making Europe more relevant to its citizens, enabling it to work better and preparing it for enlargement, and giving it greater capacity for external action. It was the first IGC since the enlargement with Austria, Finland, and Sweden, who had joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. The negotiations took place in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, opening the prospect of an eastern enlargement. Shortly before the start of the IGC, the Madrid European Council (December 1995) had confirmed that the decisions on launching the accession negotiations would be taken within six months of the conclusion of the IGC. The Treaty was not the critical juncture in European-integration history, which the previous Maastricht Treaty had been. The 1996–1997 IGC tried to complete some of the unfinished work of its predecessor. This included the further extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) and codecision, the shaping of a European security policy and making further progress in dossiers such as energy, civil protection, and the hierarchy of norms. Still it would be erroneous simply to downplay the Treaty as a mere “leftover” text. Under the leadership of the successive Italian, Irish, and Dutch presidencies, the heads of state or government reached an agreement on an employment chapter, a strengthening of social policy, the creation of the position of a high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a partial communitarization of cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), provisions on flexible integration and the integration of Schengen into the Treaty. Highly sensitive issues such as the reweighting of the Council voting system and the size of the European Commission were postponed to the next IGC. After a relatively smooth ratification process, which raised little public attention, the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May1, 1999.

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