scholarly journals Scientific Practice and the Epistemology of Governing Laws

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
TYLER HILDEBRAND
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.

Causal Powers

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Metaphysics Of Mind

This collection brings together new and important work by both emerging scholars and those who helped shape the field on the nature of causal powers, and the connections between causal powers and other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Contributors discuss how one who takes causal powers to be in some sense irreducible should think about laws of nature, scientific practice, causation, modality, space and time, persistence, and the metaphysics of mind.

scholarly journals Scientific Representation, Causality and Induction in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Eduardo Simões
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Geometric Representation ◽  
Logical Basis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Proper Context

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein Tractatus deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the Tractatus in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the Tractatus, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

scholarly journals PROPRIETÀ E LEGGI DI NATURA

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian Mariani
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Major Focus ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Relationship

The notion of law of nature has been a major focus on the recent philosophical debate on science. In the attempt of determining what is the modal status of laws, whether they are necessary (as for necessitarianism) or contingent (as for contingentism), the recent debate has largely focused on the relationship between laws and natural properties. This contribution aims at defending a particular view on property individuation known as structuralism. According to structuralism, roughly, properties are individuated by their nomological/causal roles, and so by their relationships with the other properties and with the laws. In specific, I will defend a version of structuralism as a counterpart theory of property. Structuralism implies necessitarianism on laws of nature, and so this paper can be seen as a defense of this view as well.

scholarly journals Scientific explanation, laws of nature and counterfactuals

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Sceptical View

This paper will discuss the theoretical foundations and interconnections of several philosophical concepts which are indispensable for the definition of scientific practice and logic of counterfactuals. Three concepts will be in the focus of the examination: scientific explanation, laws of nature and couterfactuals. In the exploration of the possibility of their independent foundation we will start with empiricist attempts to define scientific practice in accord with Hume's sceptical view of necessity which we will critically assess. Reached conclusions will point to the existence of unjustified practice to circulary define these basic concepts and to the fact that one philosophical discipline sometimes uncritically adopt the results of the other (we focus on philosophical logic and philosophy of science) which leads to vague definitions. Successful definition of the concepts in question asks for several answers to the questions which will be raised at the end of this paper.

scholarly journals Bingkai Kurus Realisme Struktural Epistemik

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-190
Author(s):  
Karlina Supelli
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mathematical Structure ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Unobservable Entity ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
History Of

Abstrak: Di tengah-tengah perdebatan panjang antara realisme dan anti realisme dalam filsafat ilmu, realisme struktural (RS) diajukan sebagai gagasan yang terbaik dari keduanya. Versi epistemik RS (RSE) berpendapat bahwa kita memiliki alasan yang baik untuk percaya bahwa teori memiliki struktur yang tepat, yaitu bahwa wujud dan struktur yang dipostulatkan oleh teori betul-betul ada. Namun demikian, RSE tidak mengajukan dakuan epistemik menyangkut hakikat wujud yang melandasi struktur. Semua pengetahuan mengenai dunia fisis adalah pengetahuan tentang struktur. Dalam tulisan ini penulis memberi tinjauan tentang RSE dan beberapa argumen yang menolak RSE. Belajar dari sejarah fisika zarah, penulis akan memperlihatkan bahwa struktur menunjuk ke sifat-sifat mendasar yang dimiliki oleh komponen-komponennya dan dengan demikian menyediakan jalur epistemik bagi wujud yang relasi-relasinya mendefinisikan struktur. Meski demikian, struktur matematis sebuah teori hanya memungkinkan kita membangun pengetahuan tentang wujud-wujud yang tidak teramati sebagai “objek” dan bukan objek-objek partikular. Kata-kata Kunci: Realisme, anti-realisme, realisme struktural epistemik, argumen tanpa keajaiban, meta-induksi pesimistik, wujud takteramati. Abstract: In the lengthy debate between antirealism and realism in the philosophy of science, structural realism (SR) has been suggested as “the best of both worlds.” The epistemic version of SR (ESR) holds that we have good reason to believe that our most successful scientific theories are structurally correct—that the entities and structures postulated by a theory actually exist, and yet it makes no epistemic claim about the nature of the underlying entities. All that we can know is the structure of the physical world. In this article I present an overview of ESR and a number of arguments that have been brought up against it. Drawing lessons from the history of contemporary physics, I will show that “structure” points to the fundamental properties of its constituents and thus provides an epistemic access to the nature of those entities whose relations define structure in the first place. Nevertheless, the mathematical structure of a theory enables us only to construe knowledge of an unobservable entity as “object,” and not this or that particular object. Keywords: Realism, anti-realism, epistemic structural realism, no miracle argument, pesimistic meta-induction, unobservable entity.

A ciência e a superação das desigualdades

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
Galileu Galilei Medeiros de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
São Paulo ◽  
Isaac Newton ◽  
Positive Science ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Science Philosophy

Resumo: O artigo é um ensaio sobre como a atividade científica poderia ser influenciada por uma proposta ética voltada para a superação das desigualdades. A questão subjacente a este estudo tematiza a possível contraposição entre a ética, que parece ser inteiramente vinculada à liberdade humana e seus processos de escolha, e a lógica da pesquisa científica, que ainda, pelo menos em visão popular, parece se basear na posse de informações objetivas e na descoberta de leis de regulação da natureza. Será feita uma breve contextualização das aquisições teóricas sobre o sentido da ciência positiva dos últimos séculos, procurando extrair daí as indicações de uma estreita dependência dessa em relação às escolhas humanas, em virtude de sua metodologia dialética.   Palavras-Chave: Ciência positiva. Filosofia da ciência. Dialética. Ética.      Abstract: The article is an essay on how scientific activity could be influenced by an ethics proposal aimed at overcoming inequalities. The question underlying this study discusses the possible contrast between ethics, which seems to be entirely linked to human freedom and choice processes, and the logic of scientific research, which still, at least in a popular view, seems to be based on possession of objective information and discovery of regulatory laws of nature. Will be presented a brief background of theoretical acquisitions on the meaning of positive science of the last centuries, looking to extract the indications of a close dependence of this in relation to human choices, because your dialectic methodology.  Keywords: Positive Science. Philosophy of Science. Dialectic. Ethics. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. In: _______. Órganon. 2.ed. São Paulo: EDIPRO, 2010, p. 347-543.BLONDEL, M. L’Action (1893): essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique, Paris: Quadrige, 1993.CARNAP, R. A superação da metafísica por meio da análise lógica da linguagem. In: Cognitio, São Paulo, v. 10, n. 2, jul./dez. 2009, p. 293-309.DESCARTES, R. Discurso do Método. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001.DILTHEY, W. Introdução às ciências humanas. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010.FANNING, P. A. Isaac Newton e a transmutação da alquimia: uma visão alternativa da revolução científica. Balneário Camboriú (SC): Livraria Danúbio, 2016.GALILEI, G. Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Galileo Galilei. Antonio Favaro (ed.) Florença: Barbéra, 1928-38, 19 Vols.HESSE, Mary. Revolutions and Reconstruction in Philosophy of Science. Brighton, 1980.HUME, D. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. In: BERKELEY, G.; HUME, D. Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano; Três diálogos entre Hilas e Filonous em oposição aos Céticos e Ateus; Investigação sobre o entendimento humano; Ensaios morais, políticos e literários. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.KUHN, T. La strututtura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche. Torino: [s.n], 1978.LEVINAS, E. Totalité et Infini. [sl]: The Hague, 1971.MACINTYRE, A. Dopo la virtù: Saggio di teoria morale. Milano: Feltrino, 1988.NEIMAN, S. O mal no pensamento moderno: uma história alternativa da filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: DIFEL, 2003.NIETZSCHE, F. Assim falou Zaratustra. 2.ed., Petrópolis: Vozes, 2008.ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. O que é Filosofia? Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2016.PAGANI, S.M.; Luciani, A. (org.) Os Documentos do Processo de Galileu Galilei. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994.PLATÃO. Teeteto. Tradução de Edson Bini, Bauru/SP: EDIPRO, 2007.POPPER. K. A lógica da descoberta científica. São Paulo: Cultrix, 2001.WHITE, M. O grande livro das coisas horríveis: a crônica definitiva da história das 100 piores atrocidades. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2013. 

How the Explanations of Natural Laws Make Some Reducible Physical Properties Natural and Explanatorily Powerful

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Lange
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Center Of Mass ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Fundamental Properties

Some philosophers regard no reducible physical properties as perfectly natural. However, in scientific practice, some but not other reducible physical properties (such as the property of having a given center of mass) denote genuine, explanatorily potent respects in which various systems are alike. What distinguishes these natural reducible physical properties from arbitrary algebraic combinations of more fundamental properties? Some philosophers treat naturalness as a metaphysical primitive. However, this chapter I suggests that it is not—at least, not as far as the naturalness of reducible physical properties is concerned. Roughly speaking, it is argued here that a reducible physical property’s naturalness is grounded in its role in the explanation of laws.

Laws of Nature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Universe

The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.

scholarly journals Geocomputing, New Technologies and Historical Analysis: Tools for a Changing Planet

Proceedings ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Sebastiano Trevisani
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Research Topic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Records ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Relationship

Modern Earth Scientists need also to interact with other disciplines, apparently far from the Earth Sciences and Engineering. Disciplines related to history and philosophy of science are emblematic from this perspective. From one side, the quantitative analysis of information extracted from historical records (documents, maps, paintings, etc.) represents an exciting research topic, requiring a truly holistic approach. On the other side, epistemological and philosophy of science considerations on the relationship between geoscience and society in history are of fundamental importance for understanding past, present and future geosphere-anthroposphere interlinked dynamics.

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