scholarly journals Scientific explanation, laws of nature and counterfactuals

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Sceptical View

This paper will discuss the theoretical foundations and interconnections of several philosophical concepts which are indispensable for the definition of scientific practice and logic of counterfactuals. Three concepts will be in the focus of the examination: scientific explanation, laws of nature and couterfactuals. In the exploration of the possibility of their independent foundation we will start with empiricist attempts to define scientific practice in accord with Hume's sceptical view of necessity which we will critically assess. Reached conclusions will point to the existence of unjustified practice to circulary define these basic concepts and to the fact that one philosophical discipline sometimes uncritically adopt the results of the other (we focus on philosophical logic and philosophy of science) which leads to vague definitions. Successful definition of the concepts in question asks for several answers to the questions which will be raised at the end of this paper.

Causal Powers

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Metaphysics Of Mind

This collection brings together new and important work by both emerging scholars and those who helped shape the field on the nature of causal powers, and the connections between causal powers and other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Contributors discuss how one who takes causal powers to be in some sense irreducible should think about laws of nature, scientific practice, causation, modality, space and time, persistence, and the metaphysics of mind.

scholarly journals Scientific Practice and the Epistemology of Governing Laws

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
TYLER HILDEBRAND
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.

Emergence as a Metaphysical Fact

KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Hervé Barreau
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
Anthropic Principle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Teleological Explanation ◽  
Cosmic Evolution ◽  
Modern Cosmology ◽  
The One

Abstract A metaphysical fact is a fact, clearly recognizable in the course of time, for which there is no scientific explanation, that is, no legal explanation or explanation deduced in the manner recommended by modern science. I contend that life’s emergence and human thought’s emergence are metaphysical facts in this sense. These emergences are not to be explained by Darwinian principles which themselves do not seem adequate to explain genetic evolutionism. But modern cosmology has given us leave to reflect on cosmic evolution in a manner which gives sense to overall finality. There is an anthropic principle which has two forms: in the weak form, it can help science discover new legal explanations; in the strong form, it offers a teleological explanation of the laws of nature. As F. Dyson noted, we have two styles of explanation: the one is scientific; the other is metascientific (or metaphysical). We have no reason to reject teleological explanations about ontological questions.

Concepts, History and the Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons: A Defense of Conceptual History

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 426-452
Author(s):  
D. Timothy Goering
Keyword(s):  
Basic Concept ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Conceptual History ◽  
Historical Sources ◽  
Abstract Entities ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Semantic Transformation ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Abstract This article offers a defense of the theoretical foundations of Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte). While Conceptual History has successfully established itself as an historical discipline, details in the philosophy of language that underpin Conceptual History continue to be opaque. Specifically the definition of what constitutes a “basic concept” (Grundbegriff) remains problematic. Reinhart Koselleck famously claimed that basic concepts are “more than words,” but he never spelled out how these abstract entities relate to words or can be subject to semantic transformation. I argue that to clarify the definition of what constitutes a basic concept we should turn to the functionalist and inferentialist philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars. By viewing historical sources as partaking in what Sellars calls the ‘game of giving and asking for reasons,’ Conceptual History can accurately trace the semantic changes of basic concepts and thus offer an important tool to the historical discipline.

scholarly journals Scientific Representation, Causality and Induction in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Eduardo Simões
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Geometric Representation ◽  
Logical Basis ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Proper Context

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein Tractatus deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the Tractatus in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the Tractatus, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

scholarly journals O Diálogo entre saberes a partir de filmes: contribuições para a ciência, sociedade e o ensino

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-400
Author(s):  
Fábio Gabriel Nascibem
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Science Society ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Popular Knowledge ◽  
The World ◽  
Education And Society

Resumo: Verificamos que as discussões na sociedade têm tendido a extremos: há visões em que negam totalmente a primazia da explicação científica e, por outro lado, visões que centram toda validade na ciência. Defendemos uma que se estabeleça diálogo entre saberes. Levantamos algumas questões: Como pode ser abordado o tema do diálogo entre saberes? Quais potencialidades? Quais contribuições para o ensino e para a sociedade tais discussões podem trazer? Nosso objetivo neste artigo é esclarecer temas relacionados ao diálogo entre saber científico e saber popular à luz de teorias da filosofia da ciência a partir de duas obras cinematográficas. As obras que analisamos foram: o “Escolarizando o Mundo - O último fardo do homem branco” e o filme “1984”. Ambos fornecem subsídios para uma discussão madura do tema, com potencialidades para a sociedade, por meio de uma postura que privilegie diálogos, bem como para o Ensino de Ciências.Palavras-chave: Saber Científico. Saberes Populares. Obras Cinematográficas. The dialogue between knowledges from films: contribu-tions for science, society and educationAbstract: We note that discussions in society have tended to extremes: there are views that totally deny the prima-cy of scientific explanation and, on the other hand, views that focus all validity in science. We support a dialogue to be established between knowledge. We raise some questions: How can be addressed the issue of dialogue between knowledge? What potential? What contributions to education and society can such discussions bring? Our objective in this article is to clarify themes related to the dialogue between scien-tific knowledge and popular knowledge in the light of theories of the philosophy of science from two cinematographic works. The works we analyzed were: the “Schooling the World - The White Man’s Last Burden” and the film “1984”. Both provide subsidies for a mature discussion of the theme, with potential for society, through a posture that favors dialogues, as well as for Science Teaching.Keywords: Cinematographic Works. Scientific Knowledge. Popular Knowledge. 

Some Remarks on the Logic of Explanation in the Social Sciences

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Practical Consequence ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.

THE MULTIAGENT TECHNOLOGY AND PARADIGM WITHIN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 219-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCESCO AMIGONI ◽  
VIOLA SCHIAFFONATI
Keyword(s):  
Computer Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Research Activity ◽  
Scientific Results ◽  
The One

Scientific practice has been rapidly evolving in the last years under the pressure of developments in computer science and technology. In this paper we present some of the results of our research activity at the boundary between computer science and philosophy of science started in 1997 under Marco Somalvico's impulse and guidance. In particular, we discuss two roles that multiagent systems can play in scientific discovery. From the one hand, they can support scientific practice; from the other hand, they can represent scientific results. The theoretical framework presented in this paper is exemplified in concrete by illustrating specific implemented systems, both taken from the literature and developed by ourselves.

scholarly journals CDESACL Conception and Development of Educational Scenarios for an Adaptive Online Training Device Based on Collaborative/Cooperative Learning: Work Methodology

2021 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zargane Kawtar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Learning ◽  
Online Training ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Training Device ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
E Learning ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

The objective of this work is twofold, on the one hand, it concerns the definition of the basic concepts of our theoretical framework which touches the adaptive e-learning, the pedagogical scenario, and collaborative/cooperative learning. On the other hand, it concerns the proposal of a work methodology to lead to the design and realization of educational scenarios based on collaboration for adaptive online training.

scholarly journals Simplicity of what? A case study from generative linguistics

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Terzian ◽  
María Inés Corbalán
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Minimalist Program ◽  
The Other ◽  
Language Faculty ◽  
Generative Linguistics ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

Abstract The Minimalist Program in generative linguistics is predicated on the idea that simplicity is a defining property of the human language faculty, on the one hand; on the other, a central aim of linguistic theorising. Worryingly, however, justifications for either claim are hard to come by in the literature. We sketch a proposal that would allow for both shortcomings to be addressed, and that furthermore honours the program’s declared commitment to naturalism. We begin by teasing apart and clarifying the different conceptions of simplicity underlying generative inquiry, in both ontological and theoretical capacities. We then trace a path towards a more robust justification for each type of simplicity principle, drawing on recent work in cognitive science and in philosophy of science, respectively. The resulting proposal hinges on the idea that simplicity is an evolved, virtuous cognitive bias—one that is a condition of our scientific understanding and, ultimately, of successful scientific practice. Finally, we make a case for why minimalists should take this proposal seriously, on the one hand; and for why generative linguistics would make for an interesting case study for philosophy of science, on the other.

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