scholarly journals The Problem of Unilateralism in Agency Theory: Towards a Bilateral Formulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sareh Pouryousefi ◽  
Jeff Frooman
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Behaviour ◽  
Cautionary Tale ◽  
Economic Interactions ◽  
Normative Argument

ABSTRACT:Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale—a proof that it is impossible to carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but itsunilateralfocus betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for abilateralcautionary-tale view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships and argue that the norm of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our bilateral cautionary-tale formulation extends the normative boundaries of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact.

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

scholarly journals A Student of Year 12 in Harrow International School Hong Kong

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 260
Author(s):  
Nanqi Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
International School ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
The Government

<p class="BodyA">George Akerlof introduced the idea that due to asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller in the lemons market, the market for second-hand vehicles will eventually go on the wane. Parallel to this argument, this essay discusses the extent of problem caused by information asymmetry in the financial market, with the most prominent issues being adverse selection, moral hazard and principal agent problem. Yet, with more regulation from the government and the market, some of these problems can be ameliorated, thus reducing the role that asymmetric information plays in the financial market.</p>

scholarly journals The debtor-friendly fallacy in business rescue: Agency theory moderation and quasi relationships

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Access ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Multiple Relationships ◽  
Regulatory Authorities

Tension often arises when Chapter 6 business rescue practitioners (BRPs) are appointed by directors to rescue their distressed businesses. Regulating by means of standard agency contracting becomes irrelevant in the resulting multiple relationships. Looking through the agency lens, using analytic autoethnography and compiling narratives, this paper explains the perceptions of what appear to be quasiagency relationships and obtains a better understanding of these. The findings suggest that the apparent principal-agent relationships suffer from asymmetries of goals, information access, informal power and diverging perceptions of moral hazard, transaction costs and adverse selection. As a solution, contracting has been shown to have limited value owing to outcome uncertainty and measurability. This is because the tasks of the BRP are non-programmable and term-dependent. The findings provide filing directors, shareholders, creditors, regulatory authorities and BRPs in this newly instituted regime, with enhanced understanding of how the relationships manifest in practice and overcome the non-contractibility of the newly formed relationships.

Agency Theory and Uncertainty in Organizations: An Evaluation

1994 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 649-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Nilakant ◽  
Hayagreeva Rao
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Performance Outcomes ◽  
Team Work ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Performance Outcome ◽  
Incomplete Knowledge ◽  
Outcome Relationship

This paper evaluates agency theory as a theory of performance outcome. Agency theory attributes uncertainty in performance outcomes to moral hazard, adverse selection and the state of nature. This paper argues that by overlooking two critical sources of outcome uncertainty in organizations — incomplete knowledge about the effort-outcome relationship and lack of agreement about effort and outcome — the generalizability of the theory is strictly limited. Even in such settings where it is generalizable, principal-agent approaches to contract design are unrealistic to the extent that they presume that performance in organizations results exclusively from individual-contributor jobs, exagger ate the degree to which individuals are work-averse, and emphasize the quant ity of effort at the expense of the quality and type of effort. As a theory of performance, principal-agent approaches overstate the importance of opera tional effort and ignore the importance of facilitative effort such as team work.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Zur Reform des Rating-(Un)Wesens

2010 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanno Beck ◽  
Helmut Wienert
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Market Inefficiencies ◽  
Set Up

SummaryThe market for ratings suffers from several inefficiencies: asymmetric information and moral hazard lead to conflicts of interest and principal-agent-problems. Moreover, network externalities and economies of scale lead to a lack of competition in the market for ratings. There is empirical evidence for market inefficiencies as ratingshopping, herding or slow adjustment of wrong ratings to a changed environment. As a remedy for these problems, we suggest a fund where rating-orders are pooled and rated by means of a double-blind-approach. Each issuer of a security gives his product into a pool and rating agencies which meet the standards of the pool are free to tender for the mandate to rate the product. Several aspects how to set up such a pool and possible problems are being addressed in this paper.

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Neeraj Kumar Sharma ◽  
Vibha Gaur ◽  
Punam Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Reputation Building ◽  
Building Parameters

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

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