Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas A. Masters

Any attempt to understand the legislative process, or to reckon how well it fulfills its purported functions, calls for a careful consideration of the relationships among congressmen. The beginning weeks of the first session of every congress are dominated by the internal politics of one phase of those relationships, the assignment of members to committees. Since congressmen devote most of their energies—constituents' errands apart—to the committees on which they serve, the political stakes in securing a suitable assignment are high. Competition for the more coveted posts is intense in both houses; compromises and adjustments are necessary. Members contest with each other over particularly desirable assignments; less frequently, one member challenges the entire body, as when Senator Wayne Morse fought for his committee assignments in 1953.The processes and patterns of committee assignments have been only generally discussed by political scientists and journalists. Perhaps the reason for this is too ready an acceptance of the supposition that these assignments are made primarily on the basis of seniority. Continuous service, it is true, insures a member of his place on a committee once he is assigned, but seniority may have very little to do with transfers to other committees, and it has virtually nothing to do with the assignment of freshman members. On what basis, then, are assignments made? Surely, not on the basis of simple random selection.A recent student sees the committee assignment process as analogous to working out a “giant jig saw puzzle” in which the committees-on-committees observe certain limitations.

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 889-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Rohde ◽  
Kenneth A. Shepsle

This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of which alternative is most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals. We argue that the allocation of committee assignments affects the goals of all the participants in the process, and thus we consider the choices of actors in the process in terms of their goals; specifically the goals of re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy.After first considering the process from the point of view of the member making requests, we show that the member's requests are related to the type of district he represents, and that the number of requests he makes is related to such considerations as whether he is a freshman, whether he faces competition from a member from his state, and whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee.The process is also considered from the point of view of the members making the assignments. Decisions on assignments are found to be affected by seniority (where success in getting requested committees is inversely related to seniority), margin of election (where members from marginal districts are more successful), and region (where southerners are less successful than members from other regions).


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Clint S. Swift

Legislative scholars largely agree on the importance of the committee system in the legislative process. Committees are generally considered the primary locus of lawmaking activity and individual legislators see them as important for accomplishing their goals. In this dissertation I argue that the value of committee assignments to a legislator is entirely dependent on the legislator's policy priorities. For example, assignment to the Agriculture Committee should be of more value to legislators with interests in agricultural policy than those unconcerned with such policy. I devise a means of measuring the degree of this match between priorities and assignments and demonstrate that legislators with better matches are more effective in their chambers. Further, I identify the ways in which individual characteristics and institutions shape opportunities for matching across a sample of American state legislatures. This research shifts the focus away from aggregate measures of committee assignment value and demonstrates the utility of thinking about the particularized benefits accrued through assignment politics.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ella Prihatini

Abstract Parliamentary committees are central in most modern legislatures in the world as key decisions are often made at this level. Consequently, women’s substantial representation in parliament is frequently measured by the appointment of women in powerful and prestigious committees. However, there is relatively little knowledge about how the politics of committee assignment operates, especially in Asian democracies, home to the majority of the world’s women. In this article, the Indonesian case is used to explore two issues, which are the gendered division of committees and the impact of Islam as a party ideology in assigning women to committees. Using a quantitative approach, this article examines a unique dataset of committee assignments in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR) from 2004 to 2014. Interviews with sitting parliamentarians are also used to complement the statistical analysis. The results show that gender bias is an enduring characteristic of Post-Suharto parliamentary politics and Islam as a party ideology is not solely accountable for this disparity in committee allocations.


1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles S. Bullock

Two students of the committee assignment process, Nicholas Masters and Charles Clapp, as well as some congressmen, assert that the most crucial factor in filling committee vacancies is whether the appointment will enhance the recipient's chance of re-election. This statement is tested using data for Republican and Northern Democratic freshmen elected to the House between 1947 and 1967.The freshmen are grouped on the basis of assumptions about which assignment or assignments should help them win re-election. When narrowly elected and safe freshmen are compared, there is no evidence that the former more frequently receive assignments likely to facilitate re-election. Thus there is no support for the Masters-Clapp proposition.Investigation further reveals that even those freshmen from marginal districts who are awarded “good” appointments are not re-elected significantly more often than are comparable newcomers having less favorable assignments. Committee assignments therefore seem relatively unimportant in determining whether a congressman wins a sophomore term. Indeed, more than 70 per cent of the freshmen who triumphed in hotly contested races to reach the House are returned. When these incumbents are defeated it is typically as a result of nation-wide forces over which they exercise little if any control.The implications of this research are that congressmen have a greater range of alternatives than is often thought. Even the narrowly elected novice is relatively free to seek appointment to committees for reasons other than constituency service or promotion. Largely symbolic activities are available through which concern for the district and its problems and needs can be demonstrated, thereby freeing much of the congressman's time and attention to pursue other less parochial goals.


Author(s):  
Philippe Steiner

The chapter first considers how the issue of commodification was handled in the legislative process that produced the ban on the market for organ transplantations, the political step necessary to make this form of transaction illegal. The second part considers some of the theoretical issues related to the conceptualization of illegality within the domain of exchange, examining the role that violence, secrecy, and the frontier between legality and illegality play in the functioning of illegal transactions. In the final part, the chapter considers three cases of illegal transplantation, paying particular attention to the organizational dimension and to the work of concealment that must be done in order to cross the frontier between the legal and the illegal worlds.


1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Holden

If an important part of the political scientist's mission is to anticipate and explain “the critical problems that generate turbulence” in that part of the world which attracts his attention, then, in the study of administration, bureaucratic “imperialism” must be of compelling interest. If systematic data directly assembled for the purpose are lacking, and if there are some signal problems of theory which have been little investigated, there is still enough evidence from studies of other political problems that it seems worthwhile to set out some trial-run ideas in the hope that they will elicit further discussion.Bureaucractic imperialism seems pre-eminently a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency as well as the jurisdiction of that agency. We are thus primarily concerned with the politics of allocation and shall, except incidentally, bypass some other interesting aspects of inter-agency politics such as cooperation between agencies sharing missions, competition for favorable “one-time-only” decisions which do not involve jurisdictional reallocation, or the critical problems of the “holding company” administrative organization and its internal politics. For the moment, our concern with the politics of allocation leads to a focus on what would appear to be the likely behaviors of those decisionmakers who have both inclination and opportunity to look after the institutional well-being of agencies.


Significance This is expected to be followed by the first parliamentary election since 2014, at some point in early 2022. It now looks increasingly likely that both elections will be delayed. The electoral process lacks the elements it would need to be truly transformative, but it is prompting shifts in the political elite which will dictate developments for at least the next year. Impacts Khalifa Haftar will keep pushing for his armed group to form the core of Libya’s future army Seif al-Islam Qadhafi’s candidacy in the elections is unlikely to result in him becoming president. Aguileh Saleh looks set to stay on as House of Representatives speaker with no clear date for parliamentary elections.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-106
Author(s):  
Khaled Elgindy

This essay looks at the hearing held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 1922 on the subject of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as well as the broader congressional debate over the Balfour Declaration at that crucial time. The landmark hearing, which took place against the backdrop of growing unrest in Palestine and just prior to the League of Nations' formal approval of Britain's Mandate over Palestine, offers a glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time as well as the ways in which the political discourse in the United States has, or has not, changed since then. Despite the overwhelming support for the Zionist project in Congress, which unanimously endorsed Balfour in September 1922, the hearing examined all aspects of the issue and included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints, including both anti-Zionist Jewish and Palestinian Arab voices.


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