Rawls and a Shrinking Liberty of Conscience

1998 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Diversity ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

John Rawls claims that his system of political liberalism represents the “completion and extension” of liberty of conscience, a grand solution to the problem of religious diversity that accompanied liberalism's emergence in the early modern world. I argue that such a claim cannot withstand historical scrutiny, that Rawlsian liberalism instead represents aretreatfrom the commitments that drove liberal tolerationists. Rawls's political liberalism forces individuals with non-mainstream comprehensive doctrines either to change the doctrine to fit Rawls's conditions of publicity; to manufacture a “public” justification for comprehensively derived political stances; to seek to change the parameters of public debate through, for example, civil disobedience; or to advance comprehensively derived views only so long as public reasons follow in due course. The first two of these solutions run counter to the historical development of liberty of conscience, and the third fails due to Rawls's pervasive emphasis on stability. The fourth misrepresents the nature of moral reasoning and comprehensive doctrines themselves. In conclusion, I argue that underlying Rawls's liberalism is a belief-action split that has historically suppressed religious liberty and, more troubling, a type of repression that undermines the very notion of comprehensive doctrines.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

scholarly journals Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 598-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Peter
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Reasonable Disagreement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person

At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. But why should we take disagreements seriously? This—epistemic question—has not received the attention it deserves so far. I argue that the significance of public justification can be explained through the possibility of reasonable disagreement. In a reasonable disagreement, the parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs, but each is justified to hold the belief they do. I shall use the notion of a reasonable disagreement to explain the possibility of an irreducible pluralism of moral and religious doctrines and, on that basis, why the justification of political institutions has to be public.

scholarly journals O Construtivismo Político: Uma Teoria Pública da Razão Prática/Political Constructivism: a public theory of practical reason

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Everton Puhl Maciel
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
The Universe

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism.

scholarly journals Justificação pública: a função da ideia de estrutura básica da sociedade em Rawls

2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (123) ◽  
pp. 197-211
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Justice As Fairness

O objetivo principal deste artigo é estabelecer uma reflexão sobre a função da ideia da estrutura básica da sociedade (basic structure of society) para a justificação pública (public justification) dos princípios morais na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, principalmente nas obras Political Liberalism (PL, Lecture VII) e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JF, I, § 4, 9; II, § 15, 16), com a intenção de identificar um modelo ético coerentista e pragmatista de justificação, analisando o papel da categoria de justiça de fundo (background justice) neste contexto justificacional.

scholarly journals Sattumuslikkus, hegemoonia ning õiglus: John Rawls ja radikaalne demokraatia

2011 ◽  
pp. 39-72
Author(s):  
Peeter Selg
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Radical Democracy ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Justice As Fairness

Artikkel käsitleb kriitiliselt üht viimaste kümnendite vastandust poliitilises filosoofias — ‘poliitilise liberalismi’ (Rawls) ja ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ (Laclau ja Mouffe) vahel. Artikkel püüab käivitada potentsiaalset dialoogi nende kahe näiliselt lahkneva lähenemise vahel. Kokkuvõttes näitab artikkel, et vastandus on möödarääkimine vähemalt ühes fundamentaalses mõttes: mõlemad lähenemised jagavad ühiskonnastmõtlemisel sama aluseetost. Artiklis nimetatakse seda ‘sattumuslikkuse eetoseks’ ning väidetakse, et see on kõige fundamentaalsem alusveendumus nii Laclau ja Mouffe’i ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ kui ka Rawlsi ‘õigluse kui ausameelsuse’ idee jaoks. Artikkel osutab ka ühele kesksele kitsaskohale Laclau ja Mouffe’i lähenemises: nende suutmatusele kontseptualiseerida institutsioonilisi korraldusi tulenevalt nende ülemäärasest rõhuasetust demokraatia dekonstruktiivsele potentsiaalile. Selles suhtes osutatakse ka Rawlsi käsitluse ilmselgetele eelistele, kuna see pakub juhiseid organiseerimaks demokraatlikke institutsioone.The paper concentrates on a controversy in recent decades’ political thought between ‘political liberalism’ of Rawls and ‘radical democracy’ (represented in this paper by Laclau and Mouffe). The article tries to initiate a potential dialogue between these seemingly divisive approaches. In conclusion the paper maintains that the whole controversy is misguided in one fundamental respect: both approaches share the same underlying ethos in envisioning society—‘the ethos of contingency’. It is argued that it is the most fundamental tenet informing both Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony with its complementary idea of ‘radical democracy’, and justice as fairness conceived in terms of reciprocity with its accompanying idea of public justification and reflective equilibrium. _e article points to a central impasse in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach: its incapability to conceptualize institutional arrangements due to their overemphasis on the deconstructive potential of democracy. In this respect the obvious merits of Rawls’ conception are highlighted in view of his proposals for organizing democratic institutions.

The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Schwartzman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Cultural Imperialism ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Basic Features

An important objection to political liberalism is that it provides no means by which to decide conflicts between public and non-public reasons. This article develops John Rawls’ idea of ‘reasoning from conjecture’ as one way to argue for a commitment to public reason. Reasoning from conjecture is a form of non-public justification that allows political liberals to reason from within the comprehensive views of at least some unreasonable citizens. After laying out the basic features of this form of non-public justification, this article responds to three objections based on concerns about insincerity, cultural imperialism, and the epistemic authority of those who reason from conjecture.

scholarly journals Justiça, Equidade e Liberalismo em Rawls

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Mateus Salvadori
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Interests ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
The Relationship

A teoria da justiça proposta por John Rawls investiga a estrutura básica da sociedade, tendo como base a justiça política, a justiça pública e a justiça distributiva. Rawls propõe uma teoria que representa uma alternativa ao utilitarismo, pois para o autor os direitos não deverão estar sujeitos à negociações políticas ou sujeitos ao cálculo de interesses sociais. É através do contrato social que Rawls busca apresentar a relação entre justiça, equidade e liberalismo político.Abstract: The theory of justice proposed by John Rawls investigates the basic structure of society, based on political justice, public justice and distributive justice. Rawls proposed a theory that is an alternative to utilitarianism, in which rights should not be subject to political negotiations or subject to calculation of social interests. It is through the social contract that Rawls seeks to present the relationship between justice, equity and political liberalism. Keywords: Rawls, liberty, equality, reasonable pluralism, comprehensive doctrines.

Dialectics, Rhetoric, and Functional Issues in Early Modern Hungarian Religious Disputes. Polemics Research in a Long Reformation Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-244
Author(s):  
Csilla Gabor
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Religious Diversity ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Typical Form ◽  
The Right

The study deals with 16th and 17th century Hungarian printed polemical works considering religious disputes a typical form of communication in the age of Reformation and Catholic renewal. Its conceptual framework is the paradigm or research method of the long Reformation as an efficient assistance to the discovery and appreciation of early modern theological-religious diversity. The analysis examines several kinds of communication which occurs in the (religious) dispute, and explores the rules and conventions along which the (verbal) fighting takes place. Research shows that the opponents repeatedly refer to the rules of dialectics refuting each other’s standpoints accusing them of faulty argumentation, i.e., the wrong use of syllogisms. Dialectics is, namely, in this context not the ars with the help of which truth is found but with which evident truth is checked and justified in a way that the opponents can also be educated to follow the right direction.

From Crusades to Colonization: Violence in Secular and Religious Political Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Xavier Scott
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
State Power ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Beliefs And Values

This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern-states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy. 

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