Metternich's Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for “Perpetual Peace”

1998 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Sofka

This article examines the foreign policy of Prince Clemens Metternich of Austria, the chief architect of the Vienna Treaty of 1815, in the light of Enlightenment political thought. Metternich is commonly considered a reactionary and practitioner of callous balance-of-power diplomacy, and this article seeks to refute this conclusion. By examining Metternich's deeply held theoretical beliefs on the nature of the European state system, and above all his Kantian belief in progress and federalism, this essay concludes that Metternich pursued a reformist, and indeed idealistic, program in international politics which cannot be divorced from late Enlightenment philosophy. His Conference System, which was designed to regulate European politics in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, represented a novel experiment in European union which remains a pressing concern in the contemporary international system.

1968 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tareq Y. Ismael

The emergence of the new states of Africa into world politics not only influenced the traditional balance of power in the international system, but also created a response among the older African states to restore the equilibrium of order maintained on the continent and fill the vacuum created by the departure of the colonial powers without clashing with the new nationalist movements. Henceforth, the search for influence had to take an ideological overtone. The activities of Egypt in Africa are a reflection of this. Since the mid-fifties, her African policy has aimed at creating a sense of community, cultural loyalty, and political integration. An attempt was made to reinforce the existing culture created by Islam and to transform it into what Pye and Verba call ‘political culture’.1 Thus, Egypt turned gradually toward the employment of religion on the African continent as an instrument of its foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Robert H. Donaldson

Russian foreign policy has both been similar and unique to that of other great powers. As a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance-of-power policies, which essentially involves the mobilization of power to countervail the power of an enemy or a potential adversary. The enduring goals pursued by Russian foreign policy have placed primary emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic wellbeing of the country, and enhancing national prestige. The dominant theme in the Russian foreign policy under the tsars is that of expansionism. No single motive force can be found to explain tsarist Russian expansionism; rather, the influences of geography, regime type, the international system, and ideology all weigh in, though in different proportions at different times. The ideology known as Marxism–Leninism has also had a significant effect on Soviet and post-Soviet policy. Meanwhile, Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin’s primary aim in foreign policy, like Mikhail Gorbachev’s before him, was to create a nonthreatening external environment that would be most conducive to his country’s internal economic and political development. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin pursued a pragmatic, cautious, and nuanced policy. The most visible change that Putin brought to Russia’s foreign policy was a heightened level of presidential activism. In his second presidential term, Putin further changed the direction of Russian foreign policy, increasingly demanding that Russia be recognized as a great power and be given commensurate weight in the resolution of global issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-171
Author(s):  
Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira

Abstract In the 21st century, China’s rise has been shifting global and regional geopolitical scenarios. Faced with its growth and fears of being perceived as a threat, China sought to associate its economic and political emergence with the preservation of the current international system, emphasizing speeches about a peaceful development and harmonious world in which it would be an actor who wants to grow and accommodate the world order. However, changes in the balance of power and its continued rise have caused China’s behaviour to change in its own region, especially regarding maritime disputes and affecting other countries’ perceptions. By applying Neoclassical Realism, this paper analyses the Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century, elucidating its behaviour in terms of the country’s action and reactions regarding the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and shows the perceptions of other countries to that behaviour. The article concludes that perceptions concerning the balance of power, Chinese capabilities, nationalism, regime legitimacy, and on leadership images affect the intensity of Beijing’s responses and foreign policy about maritime territorial disputes. Also, the article shows that China’s growing assertiveness in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea is pushing countries that have territorial disputes with China to grow closer.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-139
Author(s):  
Michael McFaul

Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.


2018 ◽  
pp. 580-589
Author(s):  
Mykola Kapitonenko

The year of 2018 has not become a unique one for Ukraine’s foreign policy. As in earlier years, the issue of resolving the conflict in Donbas and preventing a war with Russia has remained its most imminent challenge. Given the decrease in domestic resources, the problem of weakening political institutions of the state and the decline of its positive image on the international scene because of pervasive corruption, lack of reforms, and democracy deficit, together with the bulk of negative tendencies in the relations with the key partners – the EU and Russia – have become the greatest challenge. All of these factors further limit the leeway in supporting Ukraine in withstanding the Russian aggression and generally weaken its position in the regional international system. Such developments are taking place under deteriorating geostrategic prospects for Ukraine, resulting from the intensification of Russian pressure in the course of the ongoing hybrid war and hostilities in Donbas. The issues brought about, in the first place, by the Russian military aggression, occupation of Donbas, and annexation of Crimea have predetermined the sluggishness, reactivity, and contradictory character of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Due to the alarming settings Ukraine has faced, it is often referred to as a ‘troublesome country’ or a ‘weak state’, which is a disturbing message. After the frustrating failure of all the hopes about the Budapest Memorandum, a search for allies represented by the US and NATO became an urgent task of Ukrainian diplomacy, accompanied by the need for effective diplomatic means of ‘appeasing’ Russia. These are the major areas, on which Ukraine has focused its diplomatic efforts in 2018. The Russian issue will for many years remain the most complicated, cumbersome, and critical for Ukrainian foreign policy. Mistakes in its regard will come at the highest price, while simple solutions will be the least effective. The correlation of powers, the style, and priorities of Russia’s foreign policy, asymmetric interdependence, and intricate history turn Ukrainian-Russian relations into a knot of contradictions, which is hard to unravel even in regular circumstances. Today, as Crimea is occupied and part of the territory of eastern Ukraine is taken hostage, it will be even more difficult to build relations with Russia. Keywords: NATO, Russian-Ukrainian war, Helsinki summit, European Union, American-Russian summit, PACE.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-676
Author(s):  
Samuel H. Beer

In this thoroughly researched, well-organized, and clearly written work, John Turner raises important questions of comparative politics. The book is packed with facts and informed by ideas. You may well disagree with his conclusions, as I do. But you must give him credit for the seriousness of his concerns and his willingness to present the evidence, even though it can sometimes be used to support a different interpretation. “Over the past forty years,” he writes, when stating his central conclusion, “Europe has transformed the nature of British politics and Tory politics in particular” (p. 1). Contrary to a view common among political scientists that foreign policy normally has far less influence on electoral behavior than on domestic policy, he finds that Britain's relation to European integration has “gradually…moved to the heart of the domestic political agenda” (p. 1), radically altering the balance of power between the two main parties. As the Euroskeptical champions of national independence, the Conservatives have become “increasingly beleaguered over the issue,” thereby making it possible for Labour “to use Europe as a way of revitalizing the party's programme and image” (p. 2). He clearly would like to see terminal decline for the Conservatives and continued success for a social democratic Britain in a similarly collectivist Europe.


1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Mendelson

Studies explaining the end of the cold war and change in Soviet foreign policy tend to emphasize the role of the international system: decision makers “learned lessons” about the international system, and this learning brought about Soviet accommodationist policies. Such systemic and cognitive learning approaches tend, however, to mask the political and highly contingent nature of the policy changes. To understand these changes, one must explore how certain ideas got placed on the political agenda and how others were forced off.This essay stresses the role of ideas about both the foreign and the domestic scene, as well as the role of a network of specialists that helped put these ideas on the national agenda. Ideas alone cannot explain any one outcome. They must be understood in terms of the political process by which they are selected. Ideas are more likely to be implemented and epistemic communities are more likely to be influential under three conditions: (1) access to the leadership, (2) salience of the ideas to the leadership, and (3) the ability of the leadership to control the political agenda.One critical example of great change in foreign policy was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This study examines the interplay of ideas and politics over time and explains how the decision to withdraw was implemented and why it occurred when it did. It focuses on (1) the mobilization of an epistemic community before Gorbachev came to power, (2) massive personnel changes within Soviet institutions in the 1980s, and (3) the empowerment of the epistemic community once Gorbachev had consolidated his power.


Author(s):  
Maurizio Isabella

This chapter discusses the relationship between Mazzini's vision of international relations and that of the Carbonari, who represented the previous generation of Italian patriots. It argues that, in spite of Mazzini's contempt for the Carboneria's cosmopolitanism, his ideas were heavily indebted to their views. While rejecting 18th-century notions of cosmopolitanism, the Carbonari believed that the independence of nations represented a step towards the universal expansion of freedom. They advanced a universal idea of civilization, which they identified with constitutionalism and free circulation of ideas and goods. Finally, they advocated the establishment of a new international order, based on the recovery of the balance of power destroyed by the Napoleonic wars, and the introduction of a new international legal system and supranational institutions. Like the Carbonari, Mazzini supported the idea of an international system alternative to the Vienna settlement, their notion of universal civilization, and the right of intervention to defend another country's freedom. However, his internationalism ignored the Carbonari's Kantian concern for international law as it was based on the belief that the establishment of republics would ‘naturally’ result in a peaceful European order.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd S. Etheredge

Whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions has been a matter of considerable disagreement. A test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory shows such influences have probably been crucial in a number of cases in American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. In 49 cases of intraelite disagreement on force-related issues and 13 cases of intraelite disagreement on inclusionary issues the direction of disagreement could be predicted in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations. A four-fold speculative typology suggests fundamental personality-based differences in orientation towards America's preferred operating style and role in the international system (e.g., introverts are drawn toward impersonal principles and mechanisms like balance of power–or in an earlier period to international law).The evidence implies that one source of war and hard-line foreign policy is the structure of self-selection and recruitment to high office in the American political system. As well, the systematic tendency to self-expressive personalization in major foreign policy decisions probably increases the rate of error of American elites.


Author(s):  
Giorgio Cella

In the current phase of global geopolitical transition, Ukraine finds itself – now more than ever – dependent on the macro-dimension dynamics, on the global dynamics and on the fast-changing balance of power of the international chessboard. A less cohesive Euro-Atlantic front, the return of a classic Machtpolitik of both regional and international powers – such as Russia, Turkey and China – and the return of sovereign-nationalist approaches in various central-western states, stand out on the future of the Slavic country, augmenting risks and uncertainties. A country placed on the sound binary of a democratic path and going towards an approximation to the European Union, although marked by internal crises, risks for its state-territorial cohesion, and continuous hardships in the implementation of the age-old structural reforms so badly needed. The only certainty left, in this delicate phase of the international system transition and (the relative) weakening of the unipolar western-led order – seems, however, the continuation of the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.


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