Our brains: transparency within bounds

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-44
Author(s):  
GERALD WOLF

We already have considerable insight into the working of the brain, that part of our body which generates the mind, which makes us hope and wish and feel, and finally allows us to comprehend ourselves as ‘Self’. However, the big questions about what thinking, consciousness and emotions really consist of cannot be answered yet. Continued research on the brain persists, tackling one of the greatest challenges for the human mind, namely: to discover its own preconditions, to unravel its own prerequisites. May we hope (or fear) that, in the future, brain research we will be able to give the final answer to that everlasting question of philosophy ‘What makes us human?’ Or is there an epistemological barrier when we look at the human brain and the subjectivity generated by it? There are fundamental cognitive problems regarding the extreme complexity of the brain's system and the brain–mind question. On the other hand, the findings of brain research are already so compelling that their interpretations should be guidelines for the humanities and the social sciences.

2021 ◽  
pp. 253-303
Author(s):  
César Meseguer

The exact process of the human brain and mind information and development is still, in many ways, a true mystery. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the evolutionary process enabled the brain and mind to progress from the most basic and instinctive aspects to evermore advanced levels of abstraction, which permitted the generation of increasingly complex abilities and elaborate language. But, how do we believe that the human mind works? How are we able to acquire knowledge and to transmit it? What are the appropriate methods to try and get close to the «real» world that surrounds us? The Austrian School of Economics has made some very interesting contributions to this subject, not only with regards to epistemology but also in the social sciences, mainly thanks to the contribution of the school’s most outstanding representative, F.A. Hayek. The main goal of the present work is to try and make the importance of Hayek’s contribution known, as well as to examine its derived consequences for epistemology and social science methodologies in general, and the consequences for Economics and Law in particular. Key Words: Epistemology, evolution, methodology, ontology, knowledge, sci-ence, method, reason, Austrian School. JEL Classification: B40, B41, B49, B52, B53. Resumen: El proceso exacto de formación y desarrollo del cerebro humano y de la mente es todavía en muchos aspectos un auténtico misterio. No obstante, parece claro que el proceso evolutivo permitió ir pasando desde los aspectos más básicos e instintivos, hasta niveles cada vez más elevados de abstracción, que permitieron la generación de habilidades complejas y de un lenguaje cada vez más elaborado. Pero ¿cómo creemos que funciona la mente huma-na? ¿Cómo somos capaces de adquirir conocimientos y transmitirlos? ¿Cuáles son los métodos adecuados para tratar de acercarnos a la «verdad» del mun-do que nos rodea? Sobre estas materias, la Escuela Austriaca de Economía, ha realizado aportaciones muy interesantes, tanto en epistemología, como en metodología de las ciencias sociales, fundamentalmente gracias a la contribu-ción de su representante más destacado, F. A. Hayek. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es tratar de dar a conocer la gran importancia de esa contribu-ción, así como las consecuencias que de ella se derivan para la epistemología y la metodología de las ciencias sociales en general, y para la Economía y el Derecho en particular. Palabras clave: Epistemología, evolutivo, metodología, ontología, conocimien-to, ciencia, modelo, razón, Escuela Austriaca. Clasificación JEL: B40, B41, B49, B52, B53.


1954 ◽  
Vol 100 (421) ◽  
pp. 873-881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kennedy

Since there is little general agreement either on the nature of psychopathic personalities or on how to deal with the problems within organized society which their behaviour creates, we are justified in any attempt to present these problems in a new light and to examine the impact of recent work upon them. There is, moreover, an urgent need to clarify our own ideas on the subject in the hope that we can present them in practical form to those social agencies who so frequently meet with the psychopath as a perplexing hindrance to the smooth working of the State's affairs, whether in the schools, the courts, in industry, in the services or in any part of our national life in which planned co-operation is desirable. The psychopathic misfit for whom the increasing complexity of society has allowed no place, and for whom as yet science has found no certain remedy, often manifests his disability at least as much in a disorder of citizenship as in one of personal adjustment, and in no field of our work are we so constantly reminded that it is impossible to consider the patient in isolation from the milieu in which he must live. While the brain is a part, and the controlling, communicating part of the somatic mechanism, the concept of the mind of an individual is not so confined. In that the individual is a member of a group, part of his mental life belongs to that group and plays a part in forming its characteristics. In favourable circumstances this contribution is repaid by the guidance and support which membership of a group can provide. When an individual is so constituted that he is without the inward mechanisms necessary for the efficient working of this process of interchange, the result may be unhappiness for him or loss of harmony in the group. Thus, although it is to medical science that the appeal for an explanation or a remedy is most often made, the psychopathic personality is a responsibility which we must always share with the social sciences. Since the defect of personality is usually a constitutional one, the problems it creates are as likely to be solved by manipulation of the environment of the psychopath than by any effort to change his spots. This is not to say that the leopard in our kraal is not to be rendered more tame, or that he cannot be afforded the help of psychotherapeutic cosmetics, so long as the therapist in his preoccupation with the spots does not forget the savage heart that lies beneath them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Altmann

Universities are, like all organizations, at the intersection of different functional subsystems. They are not only dedicated to research (science) and teaching (education) but are also place for communications that form part of politics, economics and so on. But, what happens to universities, and, more precisely, social sciences in university, if the social system they work in is not differentiated in the way the social sciences in the Global North are used to? What if there is no clear distinction between science and politics? Does academic autonomy lead in this situation to some kind of ‘university as a subsystem’, complete with its own code and autopoiesis? Or will the different subsystems de-differentiate increasingly, as predicted by Luhmann? This contribution will analyse social sciences in Ecuadorian universities as an example for organizations at the intersection of functional systems that are not fully differentiated. The development, the operative closure, the institutionalization and the self-production of a concrete discipline under constant pressure of other social systems will be analysed. The goal is a further insight into processes of differentiation in the Global South and the role of institutions in these processes. Part of this is the attempt to actualize and criticize Niklas Luhmann’s approach of systems theory to regions outside of the Global North. JEL: O300, Z130


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 239821281881262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Fox

Emotions are at the heart of how we understand the human mind and of our relationships within the social world. Yet, there is still no scientific consensus on the fundamental nature of emotion. A central quest within the discipline of affective science is to develop an in-depth understanding of emotions, moods, and feelings and how they are embodied within the brain (affective neuroscience). This article provides a brief overview of the scientific study of emotion with a particular emphasis on psychological and neuroscientific perspectives. Following a selective snapshot of past and present research in this field, some current challenges and controversies in affective science are highlighted.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-278
Author(s):  
Torjus Midtgarden

Charles Peirce’s classification of the sciences was designed shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. The classification has two main sources of inspiration: Comte’s science classification and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Peirce’s classification, like that of Comte, is hierarchically organised in that the more general and abstract sciences provide principles for the less general and more concrete sciences. However, Peirce includes and assigns a superordinate role to philosophical disciplines which analyse and provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for the specialised sciences, and which are based on everyday life experience. Moreover, Peirce recognises two main branches of specialised empirical science: the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, the humanities and psychology on the other. While both branches share logical and methodological principles, they are based on different ontological principles in studying physical nature and the human mind and its products, respectively. Peirce’s most basic philosophical discipline, phenomenology, transforms his early engagement with Kant. Peirce’s classification of aesthetics, ethics and logic as normative sub-disciplines of philosophy relate to his philosophical pragmatism. Yet his more overarching division between theoretical (philosophical and specialised) sciences and practical sciences may be seen as problematic. Taking Peirce’s historical account of scientific developments into consideration, however, I argue that his science classification and its emphasis on the interdependencies between the sciences could be seen as sustaining and supporting interdisciplinarity and interaction across fields of research, even across the divide between theoretical and practical sciences.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vu Thi Hanh

History is written in textbooks but is indubitably remembered through cultural artifacts and architecture. This is particularly the case when one thinks of Hanoi, the capital city of Vietnam, where its thousands of years of ancient history can be found in the old citadels, and more than half a century of French colonialism can be glimpsed in the Old Quarter houses. Many of these structures have survived the brutality of wars and now feed into the nostalgia of French aesthetic. Yet, in what way can we come to gain greater insight into a cultural space where there is an interconnection between religion, house designs, and forms of feeling? One can find an answer to this question in a newly-published scientific research article titled “Cultural evolution in Vietnam's early 20th century: A Bayesian networks analysis of Hanoi Franco-Chinese house designs” in the Social Sciences and Humanities Open journal of Elsevier.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Tudor Irimiaș ◽  
Giuseppe Carbone ◽  
Adrian Pîslă

The essence of social sciences is well encompassed in Green’s (2006) quote “People were created to be loved. Things were created to be used. The reason why the world is in chaos is because things are being loved and people are being used. ” For this reason, social sciences are important, as major research paradigm on how and why individuals interrelate. The aim of the actual research is to look for a conceptual approach activity, as part of a larger project focused on individual rehabilitation. The brain is trained to react to the stimulus and command a behavior. The premise, for the considered approach, is understanding the social sciences as revealing the individuals interests for self conscience, well being and moral values and drawing the line to it’s importance for governments authorities, policymakers or NGO’s.


2017 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Luis Luque Santoro

This paper includes the main conclusions driven from a thorough com-pilation and interpretation of F.A. Hayek’s most relevant views on the subjects of philosophy of science, epistemology and methodology regarding social scien-ces. The dialogue that Hayek seems to establish between sciences and methods is particularly highlighted. This dialogue might be summarized in two ways: a «bottom-up» connection, by offering an alternative justification for methodologi-cal dualism and the proper methodological principles for the social sciences, from the perspetive of the natural sciences methodological paradigm in which Hayek frames his human mind theory in his work The Sensory Order; and a «top-down» connection, by concluding with respect to the complex phenomena theo-ries of natural sciences that there exist common methodological challenges with the social sciences, which require in both cases to take into account methodolo-gical differences not covered under the orthodox mainstream methodological paradigm. In this sense an interpretation of Hayek’s methodological approxima-tion to economics as an applied or empirical social science is proposed; which intends to offer explanations about concrete reality, as a necessary complement of Mises praxeology which instead only focuses on pure and formal theory. Keywords: Hayek; Philosophy of Science; Methodology; Praxeology; Pure Logic of Choice. JEL Classification: A12, A14, B41, B53. Resumen: En este trabajo se presentan las principales conclusiones de una detenida compilación e interpretación de los planteamientos más importantes de F.A. Hayek sobre temas de filosofía de la ciencia, epistemología y metodo - logía de las ciencias sociales. En particular se resalta el diálogo que Hayek parece plantear entre ciencias y métodos y que se concretaría en dos senti-dos: en una conexión «por abajo», justificando el dualismo metodológico y los principios metodológicos adecuados para las ciencias sociales, desde el paradigma metodológico de las ciencias naturales en el que elabora su teoría sobre la mente humana en El Orden Sensorial; y en una conexión «por arriba» al concluir respecto a las teorías sobre fenómenos complejos de las ciencias naturales la existencia de retos comunes con los que también se enfrentan las ciencias sociales y que requieren dar cabida en ambos casos a diferencias metodológicas no previstas según el criterio ortodoxo dominante. En este último sentido, se propone una interpretación de la aproximación metodoló-gica de Hayek para la economía como una ciencia social aplicada o empí-rica que tiene como objetivo ofrecer explicaciones de la realidad, como el complemento necesario a la praxeología misesiana centrada en la teoría pura formal. Palabras clave: Hayek; Filosofía de la Ciencia; Metodología; Praxeología; Lógica Pura de la Elección. Clasificación JEL: A12 (Relación de la economía con otras disciplinas); A14 (Sociología de la economía); B41 (Metodología económica); B53 (Escuela aus-triaca).


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Young

ArgumentThroughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the “evolutionary Freud” is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the “Overview of the Transference Neurosis” (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called “Freud wars.” Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the “Overview” and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.


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