Deciding Under the Influence: the Impact of Intoxication on Ultimatum Game Behavior

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Krishnamurti ◽  
Carey Morewedge ◽  
Dan Ariely
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hernando Santamaría-García ◽  
Jorge Martínez Cotrina ◽  
Nicolas Florez Torres ◽  
Carlos Buitrago ◽  
Diego Mauricio Aponte-Canencio ◽  
...  

AbstractAchieving justice could be considered a complex social decision-making scenario. Despite the relevance of social decisions for legal contexts, these processes have still not been explored for individuals who work as criminal judges dispensing justice. To bridge the gap, we used a complex social decision-making task (Ultimatum game) and tracked a heart rate variability measurement: the square root of the mean squared differences of successive NN intervals (RMSSD) at their baseline (as an implicit measurement that tracks emotion regulation behavior) for criminal judges (n = 24) and a control group (n = 27). Our results revealed that, compared to controls, judges were slower and rejected a bigger proportion of unfair offers. Moreover, the rate of rejections and the reaction times were predicted by higher RMSSD scores for the judges. This study provides evidence about the impact of legal background and expertise in complex social decision-making. Our results contribute to understanding how expertise can shape criminal judges’ social behaviors and pave the way for promising new research into the cognitive and physiological factors associated with social decision-making.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paloma Díaz-Gutiérrez ◽  
Juan E. Arco ◽  
Sonia Alguacil ◽  
Carlos González-García ◽  
María Ruz

AbstractPrior personal information is highly relevant during social interactions. Such knowledge aids in the prediction of others, and it affects choices even when it is unrelated to actual behaviour. In this investigation, we aimed to study the neural representation of positive and negative personal expectations, how these impact subsequent choices, and the effect of mismatches between expectations and encountered behaviour. We employed functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging in combination with a version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) where participants were provided with information about their partners’ moral traits previous to their fair or unfair offers. Univariate and multivariate analyses revealed the implication of the supplementary motor area (SMA) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in the representation of expectations about the partners in the game. Further, these regions also represented the valence of expectations, together with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Importantly, the performance of multivariate classifiers in these clusters correlated with a behavioural choice bias to accept more offers following positive descriptions, highlighting the impact of the valence on the expectations on participants’ economic decisions. Altogether, our results suggest that expectations based on social information guide future interpersonal decisions and that the neural representation of such expectations in the vmPFC is related to their influence on behaviour.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Zhang ◽  
Hui Zhao ◽  
Ruixue Liu ◽  
Chunhui Qi

People show a strong aversion to inequality and are willing to sacrifice their own interests to punish violations of fairness norms. Empirical research has found that group membership could influence the fairness judgment and norm enforcement of the individuals but has shown inconsistent findings and has not focused much on the potential moderators. Here, the two studies aimed to investigate whether victim sensitivity and proposal size moderate the impact of group membership on reactions to unfair proposals. In both studies, the participants with different victim sensitivity (low vs. high group) played the hypothetical (Study 1) and incentivized (Study 2) ultimatum game under the intragroup and intergroup condition and indicated their responses to the different proposals. Results showed that, regardless of the victim sensitivity, ingroup member is often given preferential and positive treatment. Low victim sensitive persons are more likely to accept unfair offers from the ingroup than the outgroup, while this effect was attenuated for those with high victim sensitivity, especially for highly ambiguous unfair offers (offer 6:4 in Study 1 and 8:2 in Study 2). Moreover, the ingroup favoritism score for ambiguous unfair offers was smaller for high compared with the victim sensitivity group. Taken together, the victim sensitivity, and proposal size could moderate the ingroup favoritism on responses to unfairness.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 39-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Seldon ◽  
Peter Tsigaris

In this paper we examine the ultimatum game’s income distribution and efficiency implications and modify the game to investigate the impact of re-distributional policies imposed on the parties.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1301-1313 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Pulcu ◽  
E. J. Thomas ◽  
P. D. Trotter ◽  
M. McFarquhar ◽  
G. Juhasz ◽  
...  

Background.Prosocial emotions related to self-blame are important in guiding human altruistic decisions. These emotions are elevated in major depressive disorder (MDD), such that MDD has been associated with guilt-driven pathological hyper-altruism. However, the impact of such emotional impairments in MDD on different types of social decision-making is unknown.Method.In order to address this issue, we investigated different kinds of altruistic behaviour (interpersonal cooperation and fund allocation, altruistic punishment and charitable donation) in 33 healthy subjects, 35 patients in full remission (unmedicated) and 24 currently depressed patients (11 on medication) using behavioural-economical paradigms.Results.We show a significant main effect of clinical status on altruistic decisions (p = 0.04) and a significant interaction between clinical status and type of altruistic decisions (p = 0.03). More specifically, symptomatic patients defected significantly more in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (p < 0.05) and made significantly lower charitable donations, whether or not these incurred a personal cost (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). Currently depressed patients also reported significantly higher guilt elicited by receiving unfair financial offers in the Ultimatum Game (p < 0.05).Conclusions.Currently depressed individuals were less altruistic in both a charitable donation and an interpersonal cooperation task. Taken together, our results challenge the guilt-driven pathological hyper-altruism hypothesis in depression. There were also differences in both current and remitted patients in the relationship between altruistic behaviour and pathological self-blaming, suggesting an important role for these emotions in moral and social decision-making abnormalities in depression.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eve Floriane Fabre ◽  
Rino Rumiati ◽  
Cristina Cacciari ◽  
Sylvie Borau ◽  
Mickael Causse ◽  
...  

The present study was designed to test the impact of frame manipulations on the decision making of responders playing the ultimatum game. Experiment 1 investigated responders event related potentials (ERPs) measured in response to the offers as a function of the frame (i.e., negative: the proposer keeps versus positive the proposer offers). While no difference in acceptation rate was found as a function of the offers frame, electrophysiological results suggest that the stronger negative affective response to the offers in the negative frame (N400) was successfully reappraised by the responders (P600), possibly explaining why the offer frame manipulation did not modulate acceptation rates. No framing effect was found when the ultimatum game was played in its one-shot version (Experiment 2), suggesting that repeated measurements did not affect responders behavior. However, an offer framing effect was found in female (but not in male) responders, when the players cognitive charge was increased using more complex game rules (Experiment 3), presumably reflecting women's greater affective responses to negative outcomes. Taken together, these results suggest that framing manipulations are associated with complex affective and cognitive processes, supporting the cognitive affective tradeoff model.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eve Fabre ◽  
Mickaël Causse ◽  
Lorella Lotto

The present study aimed at investigating the impact of action framing manipulations − which consists in priming an individual to act in a certain way − on ultimatum game players. In Experiment 1 (N = 188), participants who played as responders were asked to indicate which offers (from 1€ to 9€) they would either accept or reject. Responders’ minimal offer acceptable was higher in the reject frame than in the accept frame, suggesting that compared to the reject frame the accept action frame primed responders to accept a wider range of offers and favored the acceptance of unfair offers. In Experiment 2 (N = 400), participants played as proposer and were asked to indicate either how much money they wanted to keep for themselves (i.e., selfish frame) or give to the responder (i.e., prosocial frame). Surprisingly, proposers were found to be more generous in the selfish frame than in the prosocial frame. Compared to the prosocial frame, the selfish frame may have led proposers to focus more intensely on the loss inflicted to the responder which triggered a stronger anticipated feeling of guilt, thereby inducing them to be more generous in the selfish than in the prosocial action frame.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ding Yi ◽  
Ting-Ting Ji ◽  
Chen Xu ◽  
Glenn Hitchman

In previous studies of the Ultimatum Game (UG), it has been found that proposers do not maximize self-interest by making extremely unfair offers, but instead make relatively fair offers. The main issue is whether or not the proposer's fair behavior is motivated by fear of rejection or by a concern for fairness. We, therefore, conducted this study to examine the impact on the proposer's decision in the UG when information was obtained about the responder's minimum acceptable offer (MAO). The results show that a high percentage of the proposer's offers were close to the MAO, indicating that fear of rejection, rather than concern for fairness, accounted for the proposer's positive offer. We also found that Machiavellian personality traits played an important role in the proposer's offering behavior. This indicated that fear of rejection may be more prominently displayed by people scoring highly in Machiavellianism.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neelanjan Sircar ◽  
Ty Turley ◽  
Peter Cornelis van der Windt ◽  
Maarten Voors

Laboratory experiments offer an opportunity to isolate human behaviors with a level of precision that is often difficult to obtain using other (survey-based) methods. Yet, experimental tasks are often stripped of any social context, implying that inferences may not directly map to real world contexts. We randomly allocate 632 individuals (grouped randomly into 316 dyads) from small villages in Sierra Leone to four versions of the ultimatum game. In addition to the classic ultimatum game, where both the sender and receiver are anonymous, we reveal the identity of the sender, the receiver or both. This design allows us to explore how fairness behavior is affected by social context in a natural setting where players are drawn from populations that are well-acquainted. We find that average offers increase when the receiver's identity is revealed, suggesting that anonymous ultimatum games underestimate expected fair offers. This study suggest that researchers wishing to relate laboratory behavior to contexts in which the participants are well-acquainted should consider revealing the identities of the players during game play.


2020 ◽  
pp. 014616722096529
Author(s):  
Robin Bergh ◽  
Jim Sidanius

In this article, we examined the relation between valuing hierarchies (dominant value orientations) and personally wanting to get ahead, without regard for others’ welfare (domineering dispositions). Survey data from five studies (total N > 1,500) indicated differences between being domineering and endorsing dominant value orientations. This distinction was also evident in different strategies in economic games. Domineering individuals typically gave less to a powerless player (dictator game) but changed behaviors when the other party possessed bargaining power (ultimatum game). Individuals endorsing dominant value orientations did not show such “exploitative opportunism.” In a third-party punishment task, in contrast, individuals with dominant value orientations were more likely to intervene against fair decisions (i.e., upholding inequalities between others). Correcting behaviors of others were not predicted by domineering dispositions. We discuss implications for distinguishing between traits and social values more broadly.


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