scholarly journals Evolutionary game of green manufacturing mode of enterprises under the influence of government reward and punishment

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-430
Author(s):  
A.L. Awaga ◽  
W. Xu ◽  
L. Liu ◽  
Y. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Production Mode ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Regulation Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Manufacturing Mode ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

scholarly journals Research on Green Collaborative Innovation Mechanism of Cloud Manufacturing Enterprises under Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Zhai ◽  
Xinliang Xu ◽  
Jianzhong Xu ◽  
Xichen Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Load Capacity ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cloud Manufacturing ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing economy based on “Internet plus” cloud platforms has become a new collaborative innovation mode and a hot topic in recent years. Considering that government regulation restricts green innovation cooperation among cloud manufacturing enterprises, an evolutionary game model involving the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B with potential differences in their technology knowledge is established using evolutionary game theory. A replication dynamic equation is established, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy of the three parties is analysed, and the key factors affecting the cooperative selection strategy of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises are discussed through a MATLAB-based numerical simulation. This research shows that when governmental incentives and punishments, the platform load capacity, the trust between enterprises, the technology loss coefficient, and the informatization degree are increased, the government will tend to choose supervision, and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B will tend to choose the “collaborative innovation” strategy. These results provide a scientific basis suggesting that the government should not only formulate rules and regulations for cloud manufacturing enterprises but also promote green collaborative innovation among such enterprises and enhance their core competitiveness.

scholarly journals The Formation Mechanism of Green Dairy Industry Chain from the Perspective of Green Sustainable Development

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Hongli Chen ◽  
Xiuli Liu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dairy Industry ◽  
Dairy Farmers ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Bilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Government

By constructing an evolutionary game model of green dairy industry chain from the perspective of green sustainable development, this paper analyzed the evolution process of strategy selection of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises under the supervision of the government. The study found the following. (1) In the absence of supervision, even if the initial cooperation willingness of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises is strong, once the additional cost of their input of “green production” is less than the additional benefit, they will eventually choose noncooperative strategy. (2) In the case of government supervision, when the government punishment or subsidy is not strong enough, the strategic choice of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will fluctuate repeatedly, and the game equilibrium cannot be reached. However, when the government punishments and subsidies are strong enough, dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will choose to cooperate in their own interests. At this time, government subsidies have a greater impact on the evolution of bilateral cooperation than government punishments. (3) The reduction of green production cost can promote the formation of the green dairy industry chain, which is conducive to the green dairy industry chain system to achieve an ideal equilibrium state.

Intelligent and Real-Time Information System of Production Manufacturing Based on Internet of Things Technology

2014 ◽  
Vol 651-653 ◽  
pp. 1594-1598
Author(s):  
Yan Hong Ma ◽  
Yao Xie ◽  
Lian Gang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Production Line ◽  
Management System ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Information Management System ◽  
Intelligent Manufacturing ◽  
Labor Costs ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Manufacturing Mode ◽  
Internet Of Things Technology

China is a big manufacturing country, and the number of manufacturing enterprises with a certain scale is large. With the increasingly fierce market competition, manufacturing enterprises need to adopt new management methods, improve the market competitiveness of enterprises, and reduce the production cost. This requirement has large scale of market, and it has good economic and society profits. In this paper, the design for intelligent manufacturing information management system is proposed, and it can make the production process be digital and information. The process accuracy is improved, labor costs are reduced, and management efficiency is improved. It can promote the upgrade of production lines effectively, and it can reduce the production line improvement cost. This system not only helps to establish digital production line, but also makes the production manufacturing mode be reformed. It can promote management system, standard, method, and way of production manufacturing to be changed.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayang Xu ◽  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yunfei Wang ◽  
Xiangrong Shi ◽  
Jiayun Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Green Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Suppliers

Sustainability issues have gained growing awareness in recent years. Governments play an important role in environment and resources problems since they can affect enterprises’ production activities by enacting policies and regulations. To promote green production in the long term associated with the consideration of financial intervention of governments, we establish a three-population model of suppliers, manufacturers and governments based on evolutionary game theory, and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of their unilateral and joint behaviors. Further, system dynamics (SD) is applied to empirical analysis for exploring the dynamic interaction of the populations’ strategy, and the key factors affecting ESS are also discussed in detail. The results show that: (1) the proportion of green suppliers and manufacturers in their groups determines whether the government implements regulation; (2) any party of the supplier and manufacturer that adopts green strategy could promote green behavior of the other; (3) the government is advised to supervise and implement reward and punishment mechanism under the low proportion of green supply chain; (4) government regulation could promote the corporations to adopt green behavior and should preferentially implements the mechanism on manufacturers. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development.

scholarly journals Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

Vaccines ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Xiaodong Wang ◽  
Xinfeng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Success Rate ◽  
Manufacturing Process ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulation Model

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (19) ◽  
pp. 10392
Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yinghui Song
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Construction Workers ◽  
Safety Education ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

scholarly journals The behavior strategies between the government and power generation enterprises considering the learning mechanism based on evolutionary game

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 01061
Author(s):  
Jianling Jiao ◽  
He Sun ◽  
Ranran Yang
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Energy System ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standard ◽  
System Transformation ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reward And Punishment

The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) as a policy tool to promote renewable energy development has gone through more than ten years in China. In order to research the strategic interaction between governments and power generation enterprises under the background of energy system transformation and upgrading, a learning mechanism was introduced based on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and an evolutionary game model between the government and power generation enterprises was established. The results showed that the evolutionary stability strategy depended on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, which is conducive to the gradual stability of the system. The existence of learning mechanism not only reduced the cost of wind power, but also reduced the probability of government supervision.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document