scholarly journals Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter

2021 ◽  
Vol 119 (1) ◽  
pp. e2025334119
Author(s):  
Ferenc Huszár ◽  
Sofia Ira Ktena ◽  
Conor O’Brien ◽  
Luca Belli ◽  
Andrew Schlaikjer ◽  
...  

Content on Twitter’s home timeline is selected and ordered by personalization algorithms. By consistently ranking certain content higher, these algorithms may amplify some messages while reducing the visibility of others. There’s been intense public and scholarly debate about the possibility that some political groups benefit more from algorithmic amplification than others. We provide quantitative evidence from a long-running, massive-scale randomized experiment on the Twitter platform that committed a randomized control group including nearly 2 million daily active accounts to a reverse-chronological content feed free of algorithmic personalization. We present two sets of findings. First, we studied tweets by elected legislators from major political parties in seven countries. Our results reveal a remarkably consistent trend: In six out of seven countries studied, the mainstream political right enjoys higher algorithmic amplification than the mainstream political left. Consistent with this overall trend, our second set of findings studying the US media landscape revealed that algorithmic amplification favors right-leaning news sources. We further looked at whether algorithms amplify far-left and far-right political groups more than moderate ones; contrary to prevailing public belief, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis. We hope our findings will contribute to an evidence-based debate on the role personalization algorithms play in shaping political content consumption.

Author(s):  
Jonathan Zimmerman

Universities are usually considered bastions of the free exchange of ideas, but a recent tide of demonstrations across college campuses has called this belief into question, and with serious consequences. Such a wave of protests hasn't been seen since the campus free speech demonstrations of the 1960s, yet this time it is the political Left, rather than the political Right, calling for restrictions on campus speech and freedom. And, as Jonathan Zimmerman suggests, recent campus controversies have pitted free speech against social justice ideals. The language of trauma--and, more generally, of psychology--has come to dominate campus politics, marking another important departure from prior eras. This trend reflects an increased awareness of mental health in American society writ large. But it has also tended to dampen exchange and discussion on our campuses, where faculty and students self-censor for fear of insulting or offending someone else. Or they attack each other in periodic bursts of invective, which run counter to the “civility” promised by new speech and conduct codes. In Campus Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know®, Jonathan Zimmerman breaks down the dynamics of what is actually driving this recent wave of discontent. After setting recent events in the context of the last half-century of free speech campus movements, Zimmerman looks at the political beliefs of the US professorate and students. He follows this with chapters on political correctness; debates over the contested curriculum; admissions, faculty hires, and affirmative action; policing students; academic freedom and censorship; in loco parentis administration; and the psychology behind demands for "trigger warnings" and "safe spaces." He concludes with the question of how to best balance the goals of social and racial justice with the commitment to free speech.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel L Perry ◽  
Andrew L Whitehead ◽  
Joshua B Grubbs

Abstract During the COVID-19 pandemic, state and local governments implemented lockdown restrictions that were tremendously polarizing. Those on the cultural and political left supported restrictions hoping to protect the vulnerable, while those on the cultural and political right challenged restrictions citing threats to the economy and liberty. We theorize that libertarian and authoritarian impulses within Christian nationalism undergirded much of the resistance to government restrictions. Analyzing national panel data collected before and during the pandemic, we find Christian nationalism is either the first or second strongest predictor that Americans prioritize the economy and liberty and deprioritize the vulnerable when asked about government restrictions. Religiosity works in the opposite direction, however. Findings underscore the centrality of Christian nationalism as an ideological driver of far-right discourse shaping COVID-19 responses.


2005 ◽  
pp. 317-353
Author(s):  
Gordon Laxer

In the 1960s, the left branded US imperialism the major enemy of social justice in the world. Such talk faded after the war against Vietnam and almost disappeared after communism fell in Eastern Europe. It’s not that the American brand of informal empire disappeared. It continued through US influences on other states’ policies, the sway of US corporations abroad on host governments, US military power, and the power of the Washington-based financial institutions. But, the discourse changed and raged around the softer term globalization. In the past few years, imperialism talk has roared back, led this time by the political right, who gave it a positive sheen. Some on the left have joined in too, in an exciting new literature, revising Marxist and Leninist critiques of imperialism. But, much of the political left and centre are still mired in aspirations for cosmopolitanism, which inadvertently obscure struggles for popular and national sovereignty. This paper examines the limits of cosmopolitanism for democracy, critiques the nature of US power, and discusses how a reasserted US empire has sparked the revival of nationalisms by looking at the cases of nationalism in the six top oil-exporting countries to the US. The paper concludes with inquiries into people-to-people internationalism and whether citizen-based democracy is possible without sovereignty.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
James Babb

Partisanship and institutionalization are more important to group formation and dynamics than is often recognized in the literature on interest groups. This study examines the contrasting cases of small business group formation and dynamics in Japan and the United States to demonstrate how opposition to the party or parties in power was crucial to the timing and nature of the largest small business organizations formed in both countries. Parties are also important to subsequent developments in the organization and institutional interactions of the sector. It is these processes which explain the divergent outcome whereby the US small business sector is identified with the political right and the small business in Japan with the political left.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
Carl A. Latkin ◽  
Lauren Dayton ◽  
Jacob R. Miller ◽  
Grace Yi ◽  
Afareen Jaleel ◽  
...  

There is a critical need for the public to have trusted sources of vaccine information. A longitudinal online study assessed trust in COVID-19 vaccine information from 10 sources. A factor analysis for data reduction revealed two factors. The first factor contained politically conservative sources (PCS) of information. The second factor included eight news sources representing mainstream sources (MS). Multivariable logistic regression models were used. Trust in Dr. Fauci was also examined. High trust in MS was associated with intention to encourage family members to get COVID-19 vaccines, altruistic beliefs that more vulnerable people should have vaccine priority, and belief that racial minorities with higher rates of COVID-19 deaths should have priority. High trust in PCS was associated with intention to discourage friends from getting vaccinated. Higher trust in PCS was also associated with participants more likely to disagree that minorities with higher rates of COVID-19 deaths should have priority for a vaccine. High trust in Dr. Fauci as a source of COVID-19 vaccine information was associated with factors similar to high trust in MS. Fair, equitable, and transparent access and distribution are essential to ensure trust in public health systems’ abilities to serve the population.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-605
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 194016122110091
Author(s):  
Magdalena Wojcieszak ◽  
Ericka Menchen-Trevino ◽  
Joao F. F. Goncalves ◽  
Brian Weeks

The online environment dramatically expands the number of ways people can encounter news but there remain questions of whether these abundant opportunities facilitate news exposure diversity. This project examines key questions regarding how internet users arrive at news and what kinds of news they encounter. We account for a multiplicity of avenues to news online, some of which have never been analyzed: (1) direct access to news websites, (2) social networks, (3) news aggregators, (4) search engines, (5) webmail, and (6) hyperlinks in news. We examine the extent to which each avenue promotes news exposure and also exposes users to news sources that are left leaning, right leaning, and centrist. When combined with information on individual political leanings, we show the extent of dissimilar, centrist, or congenial exposure resulting from each avenue. We rely on web browsing history records from 636 social media users in the US paired with survey self-reports, a unique data set that allows us to examine both aggregate and individual-level exposure. Visits to news websites account for about 2 percent of the total number of visits to URLs and are unevenly distributed among users. The most widespread ways of accessing news are search engines and social media platforms (and hyperlinks within news sites once people arrive at news). The two former avenues also increase dissimilar news exposure, compared to accessing news directly, yet direct news access drives the highest proportion of centrist exposure.


Author(s):  
Nora Abdelrahman Ibrahim

Terrorism and violent extremism have undoubtedly become among the top security concerns of the 21st century. Despite a robust agenda of counterterrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the evolution of global terrorism has continued to outpace the policy responses that have tried to address it. Recent trends such as the foreign fighter phenomenon, the rampant spread of extremist ideologies online and within communities, and a dramatic increase in terrorist incidents worldwide, have led to a recognition that “traditional” counterterrorism efforts are insufficient and ineffective in combatting these phenomena. Consequently, the focus of policy and practice has shifted towards countering violent extremism by addressing the drivers of radicalization to curb recruitment to extremist groups. Within this context, the field of countering violent extremism (CVE) has garnered attention from both the academic and policy-making worlds. While the CVE field holds promise as a significant development in counterterrorism, its policy and practice are complicated by several challenges that undermine the success of its initiatives. Building resilience to violent extremism is continuously challenged by an overly securitized narrative and unintended consequences of previous policies and practices, including divisive social undercurrents like Islamophobia, xenophobia, and far-right sentiments. These by-products make it increasingly difficult to mobilize a whole of society response that is so critical to the success and sustainability of CVE initiatives. This research project addresses these policy challenges by drawing on the CVE strategies of Canada, the US, the UK, and Denmark to collect best practice and lessons learned in order to outline a way forward. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2110529
Author(s):  
Vibeke Schou Tjalve

“Judeo-Christian civilization” and “Christian democracy” have emerged as darling far Right tropes, seemingly uniting radical conservatives in the US and Europe behind a single, geopolitical imaginary. This article presents a brief political-conceptual story of how “Judeo-Christianity” and “Christian democracy” became a rhetorical meeting ground for radical conservatives across the Atlantic. But it also sheds light on why deep, historical, intellectual, and ethnographic divides beneath, make those grounds highly unstable terrain. Divides not only between European and American traditions of liberalism and conservatism but also between the experiences and practices of state power that inform them. Beneath the slogans of Christian democracy espoused in such disparate contexts as Charlottesville and Budapest, move different legacies, memories, enemies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


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