Can we get human nature right?

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (39) ◽  
pp. e2108274118
Author(s):  
Iris Berent

Few questions in science are as controversial as human nature. At stake is whether our basic concepts and emotions are all learned from experience, or whether some are innate. Here, I demonstrate that reasoning about innateness is biased by the basic workings of the human mind. Psychological science suggests that newborns possess core concepts of “object” and “number.” Laypeople, however, believe that newborns are devoid of such notions but that they can recognize emotions. Moreover, people presume that concepts are learned, whereas emotions (along with sensations and actions) are innate. I trace these beliefs to two tacit psychological principles: intuitive dualism and essentialism. Essentialism guides tacit reasoning about biological inheritance and suggests that innate traits reside in the body; per intuitive dualism, however, the mind seems ethereal, distinct from the body. It thus follows that, in our intuitive psychology, concepts (which people falsely consider as disembodied) must be learned, whereas emotions, sensations, and emotions (which are considered embodied) are likely innate; these predictions are in line with the experimental results. These conclusions do not speak to the question of whether concepts and emotions are innate, but they suggest caution in its scientific evaluation.

Author(s):  
Emanuele Castrucci

The human mind has phased out its traditional anchorage in a natural biological basis (the «reasons of the body» which even Spinoza’s Ethics could count on) – an anchorage that had determined, for at least two millennia, historically familiar forms of culture and civilisation. Increasingly emphasising its intellectual disembodiment, it has come to the point of establishing in a completely artificial way the normative conditions of social behaviour and the very ontological collocation of human beings in general. If in the past ‘God’ was the name that mythopoietic activity had assigned to the world’s overall moral order, which was reflected onto human behaviour, now the progressive freeing of the mind – by way of the intellectualisation of life and technology – from the natural normativity which was previously its basic material reference opens up unforeseen vistas of power. Freedom of the intellect demands (or so one believes) the full artificiality of the normative human order in the form of an artificial logos, and precisely qua artificial, omnipotent. The technological icon of logos (which postmodern dispersion undermines only superficially) definitively unseats the traditional normative, sovereign ‘God’ of human history as he has been known till now. Our West has been irreversibly marked by this process, whose results are as devastating as they are inevitable. The decline predicted a century ago by old Spengler is here served on a platter....


1971 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Gareth B. Matthews
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Know How ◽  
The Mind ◽  

For when men pray they do with the members of their bodies what befits suppliants—when they bend their knees and stretch out their hands, or even prostrate themselves, and whatever else they do visibly, although their invisible will and the intention of their heart is known to God. Nor does He need these signs for the human mind to be laid bare to Him. But in this way a man excites himself to pray more and to groan more humbly and more fervently. I do not know how it is that, although these motions of the body cannot come to be without a motion of the mind preceding them, when they have been made, visibly and externally, that invisible inner motion which caused them is itself strengthened. And in this manner the disposition of the heart which preceded them in order that they might be made, grows stronger because they are made. Of course if someone is constrained or even bound, so that he cannot do these things with his limbs, it does not follow that, when he is stricken with remorse, the inner man does not pray and prostrate himself before the eyes of God in his most secret chamber.(Augustine: De cura pro mortuis 5.7)One smiles and tells the expert chef how good the sauce béarnaise is, not so much to inform him about the sauce (he knows better than we do how good it is) as to assure him that we are enjoying it and that we appreciate his efforts. But when a man kneels in his pew and repeats a litany of thanksgiving it is not, it seems, that he means to be informing God of anything—not even of his thankfulness. For God, unlike the chef, has no need of information.


Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.


Volume 11 of the Collected Works, with an introduction by the British analyst Professor Steven Groarke, consists of two books of Winnicott’s writings, Human Nature and The Piggle, both published posthumously. Human Nature gathers together Winnicott’s own teaching notes on the subject of human growth and development with other unpublished writings from this period. Winnicott reflects on the vast subject of human nature from his own experience, returning throughout to certain topics of continuing interest for him, including psyche-soma and the mind, health and ill health, the body and psychological disorder, psychosomatics and emotional development, health and the instincts, the depressive position, repression, hypochondria, the inner world, intellectual function, illusion, creativity, the environment in psychoanalysis, withdrawal, and regression. The second half of Volume 11 consists of the case history The Piggle: An Account of the Psychoanalytic Treatment of a Little Girl, in preparation by Winnicott at the end of his life but completed and published after his death. This book includes an introduction by Donald Winnicott, a preface by Clare Winnicott and the British analyst Ray Shepherd, and a foreword by the American analyst Ishak Ramzy, who corresponded with Winnicott and, with his help, prepared and edited the book for publication. The Piggle collects Winnicott’s records of sixteen consultations with a toddler-age child, Gabrielle, and an afterword by her parents. Volume 11 is introduced by the psychoanalyst and Professor of Social Thought, Steven Groarke.


Author(s):  
Gavin Miller

This chapter explores the entanglement of cognitive psychology with science fiction, but avoids familiar motifs from post-cyberpunk fiction. The beginnings of cognitive psychology are traced to the foundational work of figures such as George Miller and Noam Chomsky, subsequently codified into a self-conscious school by Ulrich Neisser. Jack Finney’s classic narrative, The Body Snatchers (1955), draws upon earlier proto-cognitivist discourses to contend, often quite didactically, that the human mind typically operates as a biased, limited capacity information processor. With this psychological and political thesis, the novel explores possible personal, political and aesthetic strategies that might free the human mind from its stereotypes and blind spots. The unsettling of everyday perception in The Body Snatchers is systematically generalized by the linguistic novums of Ian Watson’s The Embedding (1973), Samuel Delany’s Babel-17 (1966), and Ted Chiang’s ‘Story of Your Life’ (1998), which imagine that language (and thought) is fundamentally constructive of perceived reality. These stories ask broader, cosmological questions about the nature and accessibility of ultimate reality – with Watson’s novel ultimately proposing a mystical riposte to cognitivism’s model of the mind.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Davis

In chapter 8 of Dorian Gray, Dorian reflects on the terrifying discovery, which he has made the previous night, that the painting has been somehow altered to express his own moral state. He speculates thus on a possible explanation for the change in the picture: Was there some subtle affinity between the chemical atoms, that shaped themselves into form and colour on the canvas, and the soul that was within him? Could it be that what that soul thought, they realized? – that what it dreamed, they made true? (Wilde 93) At the end of the chapter, he thinks along similar lines: Might there not be some curious scientific reason for it all? If thought could exercise its influence upon a living organism, might not thought exercise an influence upon dead and inorganic things? Nay, without thought or conscious desire, might not things external to ourselves vibrate in unison with our moods and passions, atom calling to atom in secret love or strange affinity? (103) Wilde's references to “atoms” encapsulate something of the complexity and paradox which characterise the novel's representations of the mind and its connection with the body. Atoms make up the painting and Dorian's own body, and this reminder of the materiality of both reminds us, in turn, of the possibility that Dorian, and all human selves, may occupy an insignificant yet inescapable place in the wider processes of the physical world. Most pervasively in the novel, and in the fin de siècle more generally, anxieties about one such material process – that of evolution, and especially of degeneration – haunt representations of the self. In Dorian's thoughts about “atoms” lies the still more extreme possibility that the very distinction between organic and inorganic may be blurred, a vertiginous sense that human evolutionary kinship extends beyond even the simplest organisms to matter itself, and that the category of the human is thus under greater threat than ever in the light of scientific theories of the material world. At the same time, the questions that Dorian asks himself envisage not the reduction of the mind to matter but the near-opposite of this: the possibility that “thought” may somehow “influence” the matter of the painting. In a fantastical version of the Hegelian idealism which forms an important part of Wilde's philosophical position, the mind may prove to be the ultimate reality, independent of and dominant over matter, as the state of Dorian's mind is mysteriously given sensuous form in the transformations which the painting undergoes. The atoms of the painting, like the human mind, take on an ambiguous relationship to the material world. The atoms are not fixed but fluid; like the mind itself, they are material and yet seem to act in ways contrary to physical laws of cause and effect, always in process and resistant to external comprehension.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 143-155
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Babiarz

Ambrosiaster belongs to the Roman school of exegesis. He deserves the atten­tion because of the relations between him and Marius Victorinus, his predecessor, as well as Pelagius and Augustine, his successors. The purpose of the article was to present Ambrosiaster’s anthropology on the basis of his writings. The conclu­sions have been presented in three parts: the elements of human nature, the ratio­nality of knowledge and the scope of free will. The first part shows the process in which the elements of nature are integrated. The spirit plays the decisive role synchronizing both the body and the soul. This dynamic and ongoing process is inspired by the presence of the Holy Spirit. The second part reveals two conditions for gaining knowledge: accepting the limita­tions of the mind and expanding and developing the principle of analogy. The last part presents two ways the free will is practised: by increasing how much one owns, which may be associated with lust, or by strengthening one’s inner strength. The role of the cultural and the ecclesial environment constitutes important infor­mation for the reconstruction of the views of Ambrosiaster. This raises the ques­tion whether – alongside Antioch and Alexandria – one could also talk about the Roman school of exegesis (Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius).


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nerijus Stasiulis

In this article I present the outline of Filosofija. Sociogija 30(3) the articles of which I see as mainly centering around the issue of Man as placed and interacting within social, cultural and political contexts. However, the discussion of the social or political is generally nourished by metaphysical or epistemological issues or insights. The human mind deals with the fundamental questions concerning human nature, the existence or the metaphysical structure of the world, the status of cognition in general and science/ technology in particular. The articles merge into a choir signalling the inescapably social and political mode of our consciousness.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 99-117
Author(s):  
Jan Słomka

Origen's reflections on priesthood, as well as his interpretation of the Book of Leviticus, arc based on the assumption that there exists inner priesthood which is inherent in human nature. Such priesthood means human ability to offer spiritual sacrifices to God. Origen points to the human mind as the priest in man. It is the mind that is capable of turning to God. The spiritual priesthood imposes a moral obligation on every human being. Only against this background does Origenes consider priesthood in the Old and the New Testament. The Old Testamental priesthood was established by Moses and involved the ability to make both material! and spiritual offerings. That priesthood was an anticipation of the priesthood Jesus Christ. Jesus is, at the same time, a priest and a sacrifice, thus he fulfills all the promises of the Old Testament in himself.


Author(s):  
Don Garrett
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  

Spinoza’s central doctrines in Part 5 of the Ethics include the following: (1) there is in God an idea of the formal essence of each human body; (2) because this idea remains after the death of the body, a part of the human mind is eternal; and (3) the wiser and more knowing one is, the greater is this part of one’s mind that is eternal. Each doctrine seems to be inconsistent—indeed, each in two different ways—with the rest of Spinoza’s philosophy. Resolving these apparent inconsistencies requires an understanding of Spinoza’s theory of formal essences and its connection to his theories of intellect and consciousness. This chapter explains, for each doctrine, (i) why it must be attributed to Spinoza; (ii) why it seems difficult to reconcile with the rest of his philosophy; and (iii) how an understanding of his theory of formal essences can resolve the apparent inconsistencies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document