Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Rule Out

Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and connections, we come to see that the distinctness of persons is a less deep fact than we naively supposed that it was. And this weakens the attraction of moral theories which take the distinctness of persons as fundamental and reject utilitarianism on that account. Scheffler points out that Parfit's argument cannot establish, nor can it be extended to establish, anything stronger than this. For the complex view can only rule out nonutilitarian theories if it simply denies that in any sense persons exist over time. But this view rules out not only non-utilitarian moral theories, but every moral theory.

From the Nature of Persons to the Structure of Morality

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Noggle
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Moral Theories

Intuitionism—in some form or another—is the most widely recognized and thoroughly discussed method of justification for moral theories. It rests on the claim that a moral theory must not deviate too much from our pre-theoretical moral convictions (or at least those that we are prepared to hold on reflection). In some form or another, this methodology goes back at least as far as Aristotle, and has been discussed, refined, and defended by such contemporary philosophers as John Rawls and Norman Daniels.There is, however, another methodology for constructing and defending moral theories. It draws on premises about human nature or the nature of persons to support conclusions about the nature and structure of morality. This method—which I will call the nature to morality methodology—evaluates a moral claim or moral theory on the basis of its relation to some (alleged) facts about the kind of beings we are. For brevity, I will use the term ‘nature-claims’ to refer to claims about human nature or the nature of persons, and the term ‘nature-facts’ to refer to true nature-claims. The nature-claims that have been used to support or criticize various moral theories include claims about human motivation, personal identity, the human soul, and the conceptual features of personhood or rational agency.

The Distinction between [P] and [S]

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.

Concern, Respect, and Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Simple Set ◽  
Collective Activity ◽  
Complexity Results ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.

scholarly journals Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited

Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (52) ◽  
pp. 9-22
Author(s):  
Harold Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Clear Sense ◽  
Reasonable Possibility ◽  
Time Fall ◽  
Recent Account ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

Abstract Eric Olson has argued, startlingly, that no coherent account can be giv- en of the distinction made in the personal identity literature between ‘complex views’ and ‘simple views’. ‘We tell our students,’ he writes, ‘that accounts of personal identity over time fall into [these] two broad categories’. But ‘it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed’. I argue, first, that, for all Olson has said, a recent account by Noonan provides the coherent characterization he claims impossible. If so we have not been wrong all along in the way he says in what we have been telling our students. I then give an account of the distinction between the reductionist and non-reductionist positions which makes it differ- ent from the complex/simple distinction. The aim is to make clear sense of the notion of a not simple but non-reductionist position — which seems an eminently reasonable possibility and something it may also be useful to tell our students about.

Pyogenic Granuloma of the Foot with Satellitosis: A Role for Conservative Management

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-60
Author(s):  
Janice Bacher ◽  
Dalal Assaad ◽  
David N. Adam
Keyword(s):  
Differential Diagnosis ◽  
Case Report ◽  
Conservative Management ◽  
Treatment Options ◽  
Pyogenic Granuloma ◽  
Conservative Approach ◽  
Review Of The Literature ◽  
Atypical Case ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Rule Out

Background: Pyogenic granuloma (PG) with satellitosis is a rare phenomenon that typically occurs in children and teenagers. It can be seen after excision or trauma to the original lesion. Objective: The aim is to review an atypical case of PG with satellitosis and to highlight a conservative approach to management. Methods: This article includes a case report of a 48-year-old woman developing PG with satellitosis in her right foot and includes a review of the literature. Results: There are few cases of PG with satellitosis in the literature. Our patient differs from most given her age and the location of the lesions. She was managed differently with a conservative observational approach, and, over time, her symptoms abated. Conclusion: PG with satellitosis can occur in varying patient populations with varying presentations. Although several treatment options exist, managing patients conservatively should be considered an approach to management. Early investigations should be conducted to rule out more sinister items in the differential diagnosis.

Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-206
Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
Over Time

This chapter brings together the results of the previous chapters and shows what role Locke’s moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs play in his thinking about persons and personal identity. Locke breaks with traditional metaphysical debates, first, by adopting a metaphysically agnostic stance with regard to the materiality or immateriality of thinking substances and, second, by arguing for a kind-dependent approach to questions of identity over time. Locke’s moral and legal conception of a person, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, is informed by his moral and religious beliefs. His thinking about moral accountability can be challenged and has been challenged by his contemporaries. Although Locke has good reasons for distinguishing our idea of a person from that of a human being and of a substance, these reasons are based on his metaphysical agnostic views and his religious belief in an afterlife.

How Personal Theories of the Self Shape Beliefs about Personal Continuity and Transformative Experience

2020 ◽  
pp. 52-72
Author(s):  
Sarah Molouki ◽  
Stephanie Y. Chen ◽  
Oleg Urminsky ◽  
Daniel M. Bartels
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Experimental Work ◽  
Developmental Trajectory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Concept ◽  
Personal Change ◽  
Transformative Experience ◽  
Transformative Experiences ◽  
Over Time

This chapter summarizes experimental work exploring how individual beliefs about the personally disruptive character of transformative experiences are influenced by intuitive theories of what a self fundamentally is, at the current moment and over time. Judgments of disrupted personal identity are influenced by views of the causal centrality of a transformed trait to a person’s self-concept, with changes in more central features perceived as more disruptive to self-continuity. Furthermore, the type of change matters: unexpected or undesirable changes to personal features are viewed as more disruptive to self-continuity than changes that are consistent with a person’s expected developmental trajectory. The degree to which an individual considers a particular personal change to be disruptive will affect how he or she makes decisions about, reacts to, and copes with this experience.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Locke’s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Persistence Conditions ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Subsequent Discussion ◽  
Over Time

This chapter offers a close analysis of Locke’s approach to questions of individuation and identity over time. It examines how Locke distinguishes individuation from identity and proposes that Locke’s approach to identity is best understood as kind-dependent. This means that the persistence conditions vary depending on the kind of being under consideration. For Locke it is important to first examine the kind under consideration, before persistence conditions for members of this kind can be specified. More precisely, if the nominal essences of kind F and kind G vary, then it is likely that the persistence conditions for members of kind F will vary from the persistence conditions for members of kind G. This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document