The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1946

Author(s):  
Jürgen Buchenau

The Mexican Revolution was the first major social revolution of the 20th century. Its causes included, among others, the authoritarian rule of dictator Porfirio Díaz, the seizure of millions of acres of indigenous village lands by wealthy hacendados and foreign investors, and the growing divide between the rich and the poor. As a result of these varied causes and Mexico’s strong social and regional divisions, the revolution against Díaz lacked ideological focus. The revolutionaries ousted Díaz within six months but could not agree on the new social and political order and—after a failed attempt at democracy—ended up fighting among themselves in a bitter civil war. In 1917, the victorious Constitutionalist faction crafted a landmark constitution, the first in the world to enshrine social rights and limit the rights of private, and particularly foreign capital. Although never fully implemented and partially repealed in the 1990s, the document remains the most significant achievement of the revolution. After 1920, a succession of revolutionary generals gradually centralized political power until the election of a civilian presidential candidate in 1946. This effort at state building confronted significant resistance from popular groups, regional warlords, and disaffected leaders who had lost out in the political realignment. In the end, the symbolic significance of the revolution exceeded its political and social outcomes. While fundamentally agrarian in nature, the revolution thus ultimately produced a new national elite that gradually restored a strong central state. One can easily divide the revolution into a military (1910–1917) and a reconstructive phase (1917–1946). However, the latter phase witnessed an important generational shift that transferred political power from the leaders of the military phase to their subordinates as well as civilian representatives, with the formation of a revolutionary ruling party in 1929 serving as the most important watershed moment in this process. Therefore, this essay distinguishes among three separate phases: insurrection and civil war (1910–1917); reconstruction (1917–1929); and institutionalization (1929–1946).

1980 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Macias

Women played a significant but, until recently, largely overlooked role in the complex and destructive civil war known as the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920. A number of women trained and educated in the vocational and normal schools and molded by the incipient feminist movement of the Porfirian era actively sought involvement in the struggle during its various phases. A much larger number of women of the rural and urban lower classes found themselves caught up in the struggle and had no choice but to become actively involved, especially in the military aspects of the Revolution. Still others, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and including women of every class, were among the victims and casualties of that conflict. Lastly, women of primarily but not exclusively middle and upperclass origins who strongly identified with the Catholic Church became active and bitter enemies of the decidedly anti-clerical leadership of the Revolution.


1974 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry W. Knudson

A surprisingly frank letter from Francisco I. Madero, political figurehead of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, to New York publisher William Randolph Hearst casts new light on the difficult question of when Madero finally opted for revolution to topple the 35-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911).The letter was dated April 25, 1911, when Madero was with insurrectionary troops fighting at Ciudad Juárez. It contained Madero's responses to some written questions on his role in the Revolution submitted by Hearst through Sonunerfield, an American consular official in Mexico. Madero's answers were to form the basis for a news story in the Hearst newspapers.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184
Author(s):  
Neera Chandhoke ◽  
Ayi Kwei Armah

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule. The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa “things fall apart.”1 Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune: The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).2 The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein3 is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but “indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved…. The military coup d'etats and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation.”4 The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.5 The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very raison d'etre was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as “Bula Matari” (the crusher of rocks).6 The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.7 In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a “struggle for rulership.”8 Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,


2019 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-499
Author(s):  
Mikael D. Wolfe

Abstract This article combines the insights of historical climatology and analysis of press coverage to reexamine the agrarian origins of the Mexican Revolution from 1907 to 1911. Using a collection of hundreds of articles from dozens of newspapers, contemporary meteorological and agricultural bulletins, government correspondence, secondary works, and recent historical climatological data, I argue that environmental dynamics and political processes were intertwined in the four years preceding the revolution. Specifically, I contend that politico-environmental press coverage of drought and frost based on incomplete or misleading regional climatic information strongly influenced the government's relief measures and thereby exacerbated the acute economic and political crises that led to the ouster of the dictator Porfirio Díaz. By analyzing these understudied climate-society dynamics surrounding the Mexican Revolution, the article's aim is to expand understanding of the significance of these dynamics as well as to incorporate the Mexican case into the global historiography on climate and rebellion.


2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert McCaa

The Mexican Revolution was a demographic disaster, but there is little agreement about the human cost or its demographic components. Were the missing millions due to war deaths, epidemics, emigration, lost births, or simply census error or evasion? Reading the demographic history of the Revolution from a subsequent census, such as the highly regarded enumeration of 1930, yields more precise figures than those obtained from the usual benchmark, the census of 1921. The 1930 figures are of better quality and, therefore, more suitable for making an assessment by age and sex. This analysis shows that in terms of lives lost, the Mexican Revolution was a demographic catastrophe, comparable to the Spanish Civil War, which has been ranked the ninth deadliest international conflict over the past two centuries. La Revolucióón Mexicana fue un desastre demográáfico; sin embargo, no existe consenso en el monto de la péérdida demográáfica ni de sus componentes. ¿¿Los millones perdidos fueron por la emigracióón, la mortalidad por epidemias, las muertes por la guerra, la caíída en el núúmero de nacimientos, o simplemente error estadíístico? Leyendo la historia demográáfica de la Revolucióón de un censo posterior, como por ejemplo el de 1930, ya que goza de reconocimiento por su calidad y confiabilidad, puede llevarse a cifras, por sexo y edad, mejor fundamentadas. En téérminos de las péérdidas de vidas, las nuevas estimaciones colocan a la Revolucióón Mexicana, junto con la Guerra Civil Españñola, como la novena guerra con mayor mortalidad en el contexto internacional, en los úúltimos dos siglos.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Shubin

The Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) was an option in the Civil War that was essentially distinct from both the Soviet and the White alternatives. Komuch differed from the Soviet and the White authorities, as it was characterised by a combination of advanced socioeconomic policy and a dogmatically principled commitment to parliamentary democracy. In the event of the military victory of such a power, the success of the social democratic model was not guaranteed (as the history of Europe during the interwar period demonstrated), but Russia’s chances of moving along a path that combined a social state and democratic institutions would have increased markedly. While criticising, and in many respects rightly so, the military policy of the Bolsheviks, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had to partially restore market capitalist relations. Their successful development was possible with the cooperation of the government and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie demanded the dismantlement of “socialist conquests”, which Komuch was not going to do – both for ideological reasons and because the capitalist economy had begun to disintegrate during World War I and the Revolution. Komuch’s path involved the combination of a market economy (not necessarily just capitalist), state regulation, and broad social rights. After the Bolshevik promises, the workers and peasants took it quite calmly, fearing the possible cancellation of the social gains of the Revolution and expressing dissatisfaction with violations of promised civil rights. But the bourgeoisie, convinced of the “inconsistency” of dismantling institutions that infringed on the right of private property, stood in sharp opposition to Komuch, betting on its opponents in the anti-Soviet camp. At the same time, Komuch did not have time to build a state system for monitoring compliance with social rights and had to rely on the activity of trade unions, which, due to their social function, were critical of the government – in this case, Komuch. Komuch followed the law regulating the socialisation of land adopted by the Constituent Assembly and proposed a relatively successful version of regulating the food supply for the cities. Initially, the people’s army created by Komuch was also successful (enjoying support from the Czechoslovak Corps). However, Komuch faced a blockade by the Provisional Siberian Government. It was the opposition of more right-wing forces in the rear that predetermined the defeat of the Komuch alternative.


Author(s):  
William D. Stanley

El Salvador experienced five decades of direct military rule from 1931 through 1982, followed by a semi-authoritarian phase from 1982 to 1992 during which elected civilians ostensibly governed while the military retained veto power and impunity. Twelve years of civil war produced significant political change, and a 1992 peace settlement finally brought constitutional and institutional reforms that curbed the military’s political power. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the armed forces had a somewhat informal structure, and while coups d’état occurred periodically, the military was more the tool of powerful individuals than the source of their power. An uncompetitive electoral system in the early 20th century broke down in 1931 after a combination of political reforms and financial crisis undermined civilian authority, and a coup enabled the minister of defense to seize power. Shortly thereafter, the fledgling military government suppressed a peasant uprising with extreme violence, thereby consolidating its own position and discouraging challenges from oligarchic elites. Initially military rule was personalistic, with power vested in General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, but in the 1940s this transitioned to a more institutional system in which the officer corps collectively shaped the broad outlines of how the country would be governed and prevented any one leader from dominating. For over 30 years the institutional military government sought to achieve a degree of legitimacy through controlled elections, repressed opposition when it grew too strong, promoted economic growth, and implemented mild social reforms that always stopped short of challenging oligarchic interests. The military’s strategy failed to resolve severe social and political tensions that arose from the country’s highly unequal distribution of land and income. The military faced popular demands for access to land and adequate wages, while the agrarian elite resisted any reform. Factional strife broke out regularly within the military over whether to rely mainly on repression to contain social and political demands, or to break with the oligarchy and deliver deeper reforms. The result was an inconsistent policy that occasionally created political space for opposition and then violently closed it. By the late 1970s there were massive protests and the beginnings of armed insurgency. Outright civil war began in 1980, and the country began a partial transition to civilian rule in 1982. Despite ample help from the United States, the military failed to defeat the insurgents. In 1990, the conservative elected civilian government began negotiating with the insurgents, leading to accords that definitively excluded the military from political power. After 1992 the country struggled with a sluggish economy and pervasive crime, and questions remained about past human rights crimes. The political system was genuinely democratic, featuring unrestricted debate and a wide range of political ideologies. The military remained largely subordinate to civil authority under governments of both the right and the left. Yet legacies of authoritarianism persisted, and in 2020 a populist elected civilian president called on the military for political support and used it to detain people unlawfully during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Author(s):  
Matthew Rendle

Chapter 2 examines how the creation of a justice system, like other institution-building exercises, formed an important part of re-establishing central state authority during this period. The Bolsheviks inherited a shattered state and their weaknesses, alongside widespread opposition, exacerbated the problem initially. As political courts targeting a wide variety of counter-revolutionary crimes, staffed by party members who proactively targeted criminals, tribunals were better placed to convey the authority and objectives of the state than other courts. Law became the ‘emissary of the state’, extending the state’s reach across Russia. This chapter explores the steady expansion of tribunals, including the establishment of military tribunals, transport tribunals, and travelling sessions of tribunals, as a means of exerting state authority from the end of 1918. Gradual unification of the system followed, but the Bolsheviks had re-established the state by 1922, and this achievement, the end of the civil war, and the publication of new law codes rendered many tribunals obsolete. Law’s purpose changed in a more stable Soviet Union, moving from revolutionary consciousness to revolutionary legality, although this chapter finishes by exploring the legacy of exceptional forms of justice and its continuance in the military and in the form of show trials.


Author(s):  
Sharon Ann Murphy

In creating a new nation, the United States also had to create a financial system from scratch. During the period from the Revolution to the Civil War, the country experimented with numerous options. Although the Constitution deliberately banned the issuance of paper money by either Congress or the states, states indirectly reclaimed this power by incorporating state-chartered banks with the ability to print banknotes. These provided Americans with a medium of exchange to facilitate trade and an expansionary money supply to meet the economic needs of a growing nation. The federal government likewise entered into the world of money and finance with the incorporation of the First and Second Banks of the United States. Not only did critics challenge the constitutionality of these banks, but contemporaries likewise debated whether any banking institutions promoted the economic welfare of the nation or if they instead introduced unnecessary instability into the economy. These debates became particularly heated during moments of crisis. Periods of war, including the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, highlighted the necessity of a robust financial system to support the military effort, while periods of economic panic such as the Panic of 1819, the Panics of 1837 and 1839, and the Panic of 1857 drew attention to the weaknesses inherent in this decentralized, largely unregulated system. Whereas Andrew Jackson succeeded in destroying the Second Bank of the United States during the Bank War, state-chartered commercial banks, savings banks, and investment banks still multiplied rapidly throughout the period. Numerous states introduced regulations intended to control the worst excesses of these banks, but the most comprehensive legislation occurred with the federal government’s Civil War-era Banking Acts, which created the first uniform currency for the nation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
María del Carmen Collado

Most of the academic work on the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) has focused on sociopolitical and military affairs; few scholars have considered the economic aspects of the period. Even though business historians know now that the Revolution did not bring generalized chaos or total destruction of manufacturing, we still need more research on economic issues. This article analyzes the evolution of the businesses of the Braniff family, as well as their involvement in politics once the regime of Porfirio Díaz collapsed. It examines the Braniffs' political ideas, their strategies to gain power, and their support of the political faction favorable to their interests. The article exposes the tactics the family used to guarantee the safety of their businesses, the losses they suffered, and the new ventures they made after the Revolution.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document