Metametaphysics

Author(s):  
Anna-Sofia Maurin ◽  
Alexander Skiles

Metametaphysics is the philosophical study of metaphysics. It attempts to answer questions such as: what is the proper subject matter of metaphysics? Which methods should be employed in addressing metaphysical disputes? Is metaphysical knowledge even possible? And what metaphysical claims do answers to the previous questions commit one to? One way to approach the topic is by distinguishing metaontology—which specifically focuses on these questions as they pertain to ontology, the metaphysical inquiry into what exists—from an assortment of topics that fall within the scope of metametaphysics yet that to some extent fall outside the scope of metaontology (although the distinction is itself an item of ongoing metametaphysical controversy).

2020 ◽  
pp. 004839312097682
Author(s):  
Gianluca Pozzoni

Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the philosophy of political science remain vague. This article traces this vagueness to the changing subject matter of political science throughout its history, but argues that all social sciences are subject to radical changes in what count as their defining characteristics. Accordingly, the only legitimate definition of “philosophy of political science” is “the philosophical study of whatever happens to conventionally fall within the scope of political science at a given moment.” Moving from this assumption, this article makes the case for a unified philosophy of social science.


Dialogue ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Owens

The term “ontology”, as is well enough known, is of seventeenth-century vintage. According to current research, it first appears in the year 1613. By the end of the century it had waxed firm in common recognition. Through the influence of Christian Wolff in the following century, the eighteenth, it quickly became standard in the school tradition for the science of being in general, the science of being qua being. In its morphology the term showed clearly enough that it was meant to designate a science that bore upon being in the widest range of the notion. In that tenor it was described at the time as metaphysica de ente, philosophia de ente, doctrina de ente, or entis scientia, in the sense that “being” denoted its proper subject matter (objectum proprium) more correctly than did “metaphysics”.' Accordingly, it was intended to imply that “being”, tout court, was to be regarded as the object of a philosophical science quite as “soul”, for instance, played the role of object for psychology.


Author(s):  
Karyna Pryiomka ◽  
Joshua Clegg

Like science in general, psychological research has never had a method. Rather, psychologists have deployed many methods under quite variable justifications. The history of these methods is thus a history of contestation. Psychology’s method debates are many and varied, but they mostly constellate around two interconnected concerns: psychology’s status as a science, and psychology’s proper subject matter. On the first question, the majority position has been an attempt to establish psychology as scientific, and thus committed to quantification and to objective, particularly experimental, methods. Challenging this position, many have argued that psychology cannot be a science, or at least not a natural one. Others have questioned the epistemic privilege of operationalization, quantification, experimentation, and even science itself. Connecting epistemic concerns with those of ethics and morality, some have pointed to the dehumanizing and oppressive consequences of objectification. In contrast to the debates over psychology’s status as a science, the question of its proper subject matter has produced no permanent majority position, but perennial methodological debates. Perhaps the oldest of these is the conflict over whether and how self, mind, or consciousness can be observed. This conflict produced famous disagreements like the imageless thought controversy and the behaviorist assault on “introspection.” Other recurrent debates include those over whether psychologists study wholes or aggregates, structures or functions, and states or dynamic systems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Sigit Purnama

<p><em>The development research could be a relatively new kind of Arabic educational/instructional study in Indonesia. The aim of this study to provide Arabic educational/instructional product that could bridge between researchers and practitioners (Arabic teachers). Therefore practitioners just implement the result of the study in their educational/instruction activities.</em></p><p><em>The development was conducted in several steps, designing, producing, and evaluating. Designing process is the first step in the development which was done by identifying and determining the objective, the target, the matter and supporting component. The second process is production in which all collected and compiled materials were arranged to became the initial product. The next process is product evaluation which consisted of some steps; media and subject matter expert evaluation, one to one experiment, small group experiment, and field experiment. Theoretically its aim to provide any product needed by user (teachers or students). </em></p><p><em> </em></p><p><strong><em>Keyword</em></strong><em>: Development research</em></p>


Author(s):  
Lindsay J. Starkey

This chapter explores some of the most frequently printed and widely circulated natural philosophical texts of the sixteenth century along with their medieval predecessors. It focuses on each author’s conception of water and his classification for why water did not flood the earth. This chapter argues that most of these authors did ultimately classify the dry land’s existence as a natural occurrence. However, it also shows that their arguments for this naturalness were longer and more convoluted than previous discussions, incorporating redefinitions of the proper subject matter of natural philosophy to do so. These longer, more complex discussions suggest that water was of more particular interest to sixteenthcentury authors of natural philosophical texts than to previous ones.


Philosophy ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 5 (17) ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
H. H. Price

We must begin by asking; What exactly is common sense? No doubt the word was originally used as a translation of Aristotle's; κοί⋯νη αἴσθησις but that is not its modern meaning. When Reid or more recent philosophers speak of common sense, they clearly have something else in view. At the present day, it is perhaps most often used to mean a quality of a mind, as when we say that jurymen or Members of Parliament should be men of common sense, meaning that they should show intelligence in the ordinary affairs of life; or again, we say that a little common sense would enable us to solve this or that political problem. But we are not concerned with that meaning either, though it would be interesting to discuss it. Common sense, as we are concerned with it here, means rather a body of very general principles commonly accepted by ordinary non-philosophical men in the ordinary affairs of life. These principles are really philosophical—that is to say, they belong to the proper subject-matter of philosophy—but, of course, the plain man who accepts or applies them at every moment of his life is far from being aware of this. Some of them are metaphysical, or (if we prefer to say so) epistemological, others are ethical; and whether or not there can be a common-sense theology, as a recent writer has asserted, it seems quite possible that there may be one or two among them which properly belong to the theologian's province. All these principles, taken together, make up what is usually called the common-sense view of the world. But in this discussion we shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical or epistemological ones, which are more frequently appealed to than the others, and which, besides, seem to be more interesting. But our conclusions, if valid, will apply to the others also.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Cimino

AbstractThe present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Husserl’s co-inherited philosophical project, to elucidate his transcendental critique of reason, and to present Husserl's idea of reason in its distinctive features. A historical excursus first provides a frame to understand the necessity of a critique of reason, its proper subject-matter, and its function for the project of genuine philosophy. In particular, this historical reflection identifies the form that a critique must assume in order to fulfil its philosophical-scientific task. The focus is then directed at Husserl's methodological recalibration of the problem of reason. Husserl's ‘prinzipielle Kritik’ is elucidated in his transcendental reassessment of the headings ‘reason’ and ‘unreason,’ and is thought in connection to the concept of Selbstbesinnung. Lastly, Husserl’s idea of reason is reconstructed in relation to, and in disambiguation from, the concepts of self-evidence, logos, synthesis, fulfilment, positing, etc. Reason, as teleological rule and structural form of transcendental subjectivity, is clarified in its dependence on, and irreducibility to, the problems of constitution and in light of the question of its objective/subjective character.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-156
Author(s):  
Anna Camilleri

Byron’s interest in the classical past is manifest throughout his life and work. Alongside citations from and references to a remarkable catalogue of writers, thinkers, and historical figures, we also have extensive poetic responses to classical places, classical architecture, and to Greek and Roman art and sculpture. Yet it is clear that Byron’s classical pretentions are by no means underpinned by a thorough grasp of classical languages. His Greek in particular was extremely poor, and his Latin compositions barely better than the average eighteenth-century schoolboy’s. As I shall go on to demonstrate, this does not mean that attending to those moments when he does stray into classical allusion or composition is uninteresting, but it is Latin and not Greek that Byron engages with most frequently. Specifically, Byron’s less than proper Latin becomes a means by which he negotiates less than proper subject matter in his poetry.


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