The Civil Law Legal Tradition

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Jury Trial ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Council Of State

This chapter traces the origins and development of the civil law legal tradition, which assigns to judges only a mechanical, highly constrained form of decision-making. The civil law legal tradition is characterized globally by a historical reliance on Roman law; a modern rationalist code and no body of judge-made case law under the code; textualism and formalism; and the absence of jury trial and an inquisitorial approach to civil and criminal procedure. The civil law tradition allows judicial review, which has been seen as being inherently political, to be exercised soley by a separate institution, called a Constitutional Court, which alone interprets and enforces the Constitution and which is de facto the most important court in the country, even though de jure there are coequal courts of cassation and councils of state. Traditionally, judges received little social deference and were low on the hierarchy of status in civil law countries, whereas scholars and codifiers came first. The civil law legal tradition conceives of the separation of powers in a very wooden, ahistorical way that precludes judges from ever making policy by deciding administrative law and constitutional law cases. It was therefore necessary to create powerful constitutional courts as a specially chosen fourth branch of government in order for judicial review to work in civil law countries. The chapter conclude by looking at the court systems in civil law countries, which typically have three supreme courts: 1) a constitutional court; 2) a court of cassation; and 3) a council of state.

Introduction The Birth and Growth of Judicial Review: 1607–2020

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Charismatic Leadership ◽  
The United States ◽  
Boundary Line ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Third

This introductory chapter discusses how judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has usually emerged historically for a combination of four reasons. First, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is a response to a nation’s need for an umpire to resolve federalism or separation of powers boundary line disputes. The second main cause of the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is what can be called the rights from wrongs hypothesis; judicial review very often emerges as a response to an abominable deprivation of human rights. The third major cause is the out-and-out borrowing of the institution of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from either the United States’ model; the German Civil Law model; and, most recently, from the Canadian Second Look judicial review constitutional model. The fourth major cause is the existence of a system of checks and balances, which gives Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts political space to grow in. Revolutionary charismatic constitutionalism can also lead to the growth of judicial review as Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained in an important new book, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019).

The Concentrated and Hybrid Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-38
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Hybrid Models ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Government

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the civil law countries: the Concentrated Model and the Hybrid Model. The Concentrated Model of judicial review is built around the idea that what judges do when they enforce constitutions and Bills of Rights is inherently political and nonjudicial. For this reason, a separate Constitutional Court is created outside the ordinary judicial system, and is the only entity with the power of judicial review. The power of judicial review of Constitutional Courts is conceived as being a power to make the law and not simply to interpret it. Hence, a Constitutional Court in a civil law country is, essentially, a fourth branch of the government. Meanwhile, many countries, especially in Latin America, have developed distinct Hybrid Models of judicial review. The country of Brazil can be considered as the archetypal Hybrid Model. Brazil’s Hybrid Model of judicial review consists of a very complex system full of institutional mechanisms that are meant to enforce the Constitution. The Brazilian system combines features from both the Concentrated and the Diffuse Models hence the term Hybrid Model.

The Federative Republic of Brazil

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-230
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This chapter looks at Brazilian judicial review. Judicial review in Brazil originated because it was borrowed from the U.S. Constitution. It emerged in amplified form in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution because, by 1988, the normative appeal of judicial review was widely appreciated all over the world. Moreover, the Hybrid Model of judicial review in Brazil, whereby the Supreme Federal Tribunal is both, at the apex of a diffuse system of judicial review, and is also a Constitutional Court, reflects widespread appreciation for the value of a system like the German Constitutional Court in a civil law jurisdiction. The power of such a court to issue rulings with erga omnes effect is especially important in civil law countries like Brazil, which lack systems of stare decisis. First, judicial review emerged in Brazil as the result of borrowing. Second, it emerged as a rights from wrongs reaction to abuses of power during Fascism and during the military dictatorship, which ruled Brazil for 1964 until 1984. Third, judicial review is necessary in Brazil for both federalism and separation of powers umpiring reasons. Fourth, judicial review in Brazil also emerged because the constitution-writing elite wanted to entrench its liberal and socialist values to forestall the emergence of yet another military government in the country. And, fifth, the Brazilian Constitution divides and allocates power among so many federal and state entities that the Supreme Federal Tribunal has the political space it needs to play a really big role in governing the country.

scholarly journals Filling the Hole in Indonesia’s Constitutional System: Constitutional Courts and the Review of Regulations in a Split Jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Do So

The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.

Introduction The Birth and Growth of Judicial Review in the Civil Law World

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The United Kingdom

This book is about the stunning birth and growth of judicial review in the civil law world, since 1945. In Volume I of this two-volume series, I showed that judicial review was born and grew in common law G-20 constitutional democracies and in Israel primarily: (1) when there is a need for a federalism or a separation of powers umpire, (2) when there is a rights from wrongs dynamic, (3) when there is borrowing, and (4) when the political structure of a country’s institutions leaves space within which the judiciary can operate. The countries discussed in Volume I were the following: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, (3) Australia, (4) India, (5) Israel, (6) South Africa, and (7) the United Kingdom....

scholarly journals JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR SELF-RESTRAINT : SOME INSIGHT INTO THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Yuridika ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Radian Salman ◽  
Sukardi Sukardi ◽  
Mohammad Syaiful Aris
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The One ◽  
Law Making

The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia is centralized judicial review institution which implements a posteriori and abstract control. Constitutional court decision often politically sensitive and involve important issues. On the one hand handing down strong decisions that uphold important constitutional principles can bring great benefits to citizens and can strengthen support for democracy but on the other hand, strong role of the court in judicial review tends to encroach increasingly on the territory of the law making institution. This article examines the decision of constitutional court in the framework of a tension between constitutionalism and democracy, especially from theoretical or conceptual approach. As result of examining its decisions, Indonesian Constitutional Court may reflect two characters; judicial activism as characterized by acting as law-maker and using policy in judicial decisions and/ or judicial self-restraint.  Recent  Indonesian experience shows that judicial review of legislation is not a simply of judicial control over law-making institution, as it brings  tension in the context of power relations in the scheme of separation of power. Relationship between the court and legislature, in respective of judicial review, will culminate in the philosophy of the judiciary. However, as constitutionalism and democracy are virtue, decisions of the Constitutional Court in judicial review should create mode of self-limitation within the framework of the principle of separation of powers.

scholarly journals DISTINGUISHING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN JUDICIAL REVIEW CASES: A BLURRED BOUNDARY LINE

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 235
Author(s):  
B Bisariyadi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Boundary Line ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Court Practice

The establishment of the Constitutional Court to hold power of reviewing the constitutionality of Laws raises discourse on the distinction between constitutional interpretation and statutory interpretation. In judicial review cases, the separation, either in common law or civil law tradition, between the two interpretations is not clearly distinguished. The Indonesian Constitutional Court, in judicial review decisions, shows that the Court does not only interpret constitutional provision. In a number of decisions, the Court has put more emphasis on the use of statutory interpretation. The essay discusses the Constitutional Court practice in the use of constitutional interpretation and statutory interpretation on judicial review cases.Keywords: Constitutional Court, judicial review, constitutional interpretation, statutory interpretation.

The Common Law Legal Tradition: First Things First

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter explains briefly the origins and development of the common law tradition in order to better understand the rise of judicial review in the seven common law countries discussed in this volume. The common law legal tradition is characterized historically, in public law, by limited, constitutional government and by forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In private law, the common law tradition is characterized by judge-made case law, which is the primary source of the law, instead of a massive code being the primary source of the law. The common law tradition is also characterized by reliance on the institution of trial by jury. Judges, rather than scholars, are the key figures who are revered in the common law legal tradition, and this is one of the key things that distinguishes the common law legal tradition from the civil law legal tradition. The common law legal tradition emphasizes judicial power, which explains why it has led to judicial review in the countries studied in this volume. It is the prevailing legal tradition in the four countries with the oldest systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation: the United States, Canada, Australia, and India. Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in these four countries is very much shaped by common law attitudes about the roles of judges.

Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study. By Laura Langer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 192p. $62.50 cloth, $20.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-827
Author(s):  
Donald R. Songer
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
State University ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Almost All

Interest in strategic approaches to an understanding of judicial decision making, including the implications of the separation of powers (SOP), has grown dramatically in recent years. Unfortunately, almost all the research on these SOP interactions has been limited to those involving the U.S. Supreme Court. Laura Langer's book provides a refreshing alternative to the exclusive Supreme Court focus by examining the significance of separation of powers concerns for the exercise of judicial review by state supreme courts.

Why politicians want constitutional courts: the Russian case

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Thorson
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Democratic Transition ◽  
The Self ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
Consolidation Phase ◽  
Review Mechanism

Why are judicial review mechanisms being incorporated into so many democratizing states? This study analyzes why politicians create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. It sheds light on the role constitutional courts play in the consolidation phase of a democratic transition, focusing on one of those countries with no tradition of independent judicial review or of democratic forms of governance—Russia. Past practices and historical precedent do not support the formation of an independent judiciary in Russia, and yet a potentially powerful constitutional court now exists. Moreover, during the course of the transition from the Soviet state to the Russian Republic, there were three attempts to create an independent judicial review mechanism only one of which could be termed a success. This analysis focuses on the self-interested calculations of politicians in forming each of these three institutions, demonstrating that political actors establish a constitutional court to enhance their democratic credibility.

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