‘I am going through a mental hell’: Political crisis and the Admiralty, August – December 1931

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 377-397

Austen Chamberlain did not play a significant role in the events leading up to the political crisis or the decision to form a National Government on 24 August 1931. The eventual outcome of those developments, however, delivered a bitter blow to his self-esteem and marked a major watershed in his career. Had the Conservatives won the 1929 election, Chamberlain believed Baldwin would have returned him to the Foreign Office as he had promised. He continued to nurture this expectation throughout the period in Opposition. Even after being struck forcibly by the ‘violent animus against the “Old Gang”’ and the very specific attacks upon his foreign policy in Egypt and China at the Caxton Hall meeting in October 1930, he still consoled himself with the thought that none of his colleagues were excluded from criticism; that the critics consisted mainly of reactionary, disreputable or disgruntled groups (often all three) without ‘many young men of a decent type’; and that such grousing was symptomatic of the frustration engendered by Baldwin's lack of leadership and a natural impatience for youth to have its chance. As a result, he remained content to believe that not only did he still have much to contribute in foreign affairs but that there was no one else with a comparable claim to the portfolio.

Author(s):  
Asle Toje

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Askerov

With the advancement of power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has introduced revolutionary policies in Turkey in various realms, including foreign affairs. The new trend in the foreign policy focused on not having problems with neighbors. This could be possible or nearly possible theoretically but eliminating century-long and deep-rooted conflicts with some of the neighbors would not be easy in practice. The new idealistic/moralistic approach necessitated new ways of policy formulation based on mutual gains and unthinkable concessions on the part of Turkey. Ankara’s new approach had given a special importance to building bridges of trust with the neighbors, which also seemed attractive to the political leaders of the neighboring states. This idealistic/moralistic approach was vulnerable to the dynamic political and economic developments in the region and the world in general. The policy did not have a power of sustainability due to the various old, new, and emerging problems around Turkey and hence, the government had to give it up gradually and take a new course of foreign policy based on realistic approaches to defend its national interests.


2018 ◽  
pp. 203-260
Author(s):  
Vineet Thakur

This chapter traces the post-apartheid transformation of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in South Africa. It argues that in the first decade of transition, the Department remained preoccupied with the process of internal restructuring, which was successfully achieved. This caused structural pains as many of the old white diplomats left the service, robbing the Department of crucial expertise. In these years, the political leadership played a stronger role in the South African foreign policymaking. While Mandela’s foreign policy formulation was ad-hocist, Mbeki relied on institutional structures. However, rather than emphasizing on strengthening the DFA, he created new institutional structures under his integrated governance scheme which, ironically, further centralised foreign policymaking. Consequently, the DFA was further marginalized.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 919-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Graeme Boadle

In December 1930 Sir Victor Wellesley, the deputy under secretary at the Foreign Office, and its expert on Far Eastern finance, circulated a 29-page ‘Proposal for the establishment of a Politico-Economic Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office.’ This memorandum was prompted by the growing importance of tariffs, and various forms of investment, as instruments of foreign policy, and concern at his colleagues' failure to understand the political consequences. With economic nationalism in the ascendant, Wellesley recognized that Britain soon would have to consider whether she would ‘take part in the scramble for economic hegemony’. He hoped Cabinet would decide against tariffs and imperial preference, but was worried that the Foreign Office would be ill-equipped to defend this viewpoint. It was not that the Office lacked adequate sources of economic information, but rather that the division of duties between the Department of Overseas Trade and the Foreign Office precluded their assimilation with political appreciations. Although seventy five per cent of the work of the average mission was economic or commercial, this was generally left to the commercial counsellor, who reported directly to the Department of Overseas Trade. Political dispatches were forwarded to the appropriate Foreign Office department and there examined in virtual isolation. Moreover, the dominant attitude of mind among senior diplomats was, if not actually predisposed against economic work, at least so lacking in understanding that their efforts were often misdirected.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-165
Author(s):  
Hugh D. Hudson

The Soviet War Scare of 1927 is usually treated solely within the bounds of Soviet political machinations. This study explores the connection between Bolshevik domestic and foreign policy in the War Scare of 1927 with a focus on the peasants. The peasants in the early years of the NEP were seeking a compromise with the regime, seeing the relations of power following the war, the civil war, and horrendous famine of 1921-1922, not in their favor. The War Scare of 1927 altered how both the peasants and the regime saw one another and the possibility of compromise. The rumors of war were soon coupled with threats of peasants uprising against the communists. By fall 1927, both the local police in their svodki and the central OGPU in its summary reports to the political leadership were describing a mounting confrontational atmosphere among the peasants. Given the heightened anxieties within the leadership regarding the Soviet Union’s ability to defend itself, concern over the reliability of the peasantry and a demand to know more fully about the “political situation in the countryside” had reached a fever pitch. Surveiling the countryside, both the central OGPU and the party leadership concluded, not without some evidence, that a growing number of peasants desired a showdown. The War Scare of 1927 added significantly to the factors that helped set the process of collectivization in motion.


1995 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 399-423

Participation in the first brief National Government had disabused Chamberlain of many of his fondest illusions. Before the crisis he believed he still had a uniquely valuable role to play in foreign affairs and that others recognised such a claim to the Foreign Office. He also believed his voice carried considerable weight in party councils. The crisis and its aftermath appeared to suggest that this was not so. Or at least, it showed him that Baldwin and MacDonald had other ideas. While not entirely the same thing, such a realisation hurt him more rather than less. By the time the initial crisis had passed, Chamberlain had come to recognise that his ministerial career was at an end. Secure in a seat he intended to hold for only one more Parliament, he felt he could now ‘sing [his] Nunc Dimittis politically’. Many felt that this spelt the end of Chamberlain's political influence as well as his ministerial career. Even before the 1929 election, critics like Amery had believed that his proper role was as ‘the obvious successor to Balfour as principal Elder Statesman in a non-administrative office’ Certainly Chamberlain gave every outward appearance of being more rooted firmly in the parliaments of the late nineteenth than in the twentieth century. In his dress, manner and parliamentary conduct he seemed to many observers to be a charming anachronism. Yet such appearances were deceptive. For the next eighteen months Chamberlain was plunged into the depths of depression as he sought to accommodate himself to these new circumstances and to find a new role for himself — or even to discover whether there still remained a useful role for him to fulfil.


1994 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
David Dutton

This is according to Protocol. More briefly ‘Dear Anthony meet me at Geneva. Yrs. Cleopatra’Very few of the figures who held responsibility for the making and direction of British foreign policy in the 1930s did so with much benefit to their subsequent historical reputations. Three of the four men who occupied the post of Foreign Secretary after the General Election of 1931 appeared in the cast list of the ‘Guilty Men’, vilified by the triumvirate of left-wing journalists who wrote under the pseudonym of ‘Cato’ in the dramatic summer of 1940. That vilification has been only partially redeemed by the efforts of later revisionist biographers. Certainly, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Halifax all left the Foreign Office with their political reputations lower in the public mind than at the time of taking office. The exception to this experience was, of course, the case of Anthony Eden who, at the time of his resignation in February 1938 after more than six years as a member of the National Government, stood, in Churchill's famous words, as the ‘one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender’. The making of his reputation had begun in the early 1930s when Eden occupied only subordinate office within the administration. Yet an examination of the making of British foreign policy in the years 1931–5 will show that popular perceptions of Eden's position and of an apparently serious rift between him and his departmental superior were somewhat misleading.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-209
Author(s):  
Alexandra G. Koval ◽  
Mikhail I. Sorokin

Venezuela suffers currently from a deep economic and political crisis. China, being significant partner for Venezuela, has recently increased its presence on the Venezuelan market. The study reveals the distinguishing features of modern Chinese-Venezuelan economic relations. It analyzes China's foreign economic strategy in Latin America and identifies the trends in trade, investment and finance relations between China and Venezuela. The conclusion is made that the Chinese strategy in Venezuela is not based on the concept of South - South cooperation, but it more relates to the North - South approach. At the same time, the political factor plays an increasingly significant role in the development of relationship between states from a perspective of escalation of the confrontation between the United States and China. The possible scenarios and consequences of the Venezuelan political crisis for China are identified and certain comparisons with Russia are presented.


Author(s):  
Andrey Andreev

The article deals with the intermediate results of the use of a set of Russian political strategies and technologies in the Ukrainian direction of Foreign Policy since Ukraine gained independence. The research takes into account the peculiarities of the political development of Ukraine. The research objective was to identify the prerequisites, characteristics, and consequences of the Ukrainian political crisis at the turn of 2013–2014 and the resulting political regime and order. A systematic approach and comparative analysis made it possible to formulate a general assessment of the political situation in Ukraine following the so-called "the Revolution of Dignity". On the basis of formal-logical analysis, the author substantiated the need for a comprehensive audit of the amount of Russian technologies through the application of system analysis to certain political circumstances. The author substantiated the increasing role of political technologies of pro-active character in the situation of deep crisis of previously effective political institutions, mechanisms, and norms. The resonant nature of such technologies made it possible to link the latter with the political reflection on the place and role of Ukraine in the system of Russian Foreign Policy, as well as on the peculiarities of the Ukrainian political process and the nature of its political system. The author generalized the experience of Russian influence on the mentioned Ukrainian events and defined the general conditions that can allow Russia to affect a changeable political situation in the post-Soviet countries, taking into account the inconsistency of modern political trends. The scope of the results can be used in the spheres of foreign policy, public administration, and public policy.


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