A Neutral Case for Autonomy Promotion

2019 ◽  
pp. 170-197
Author(s):  
Gina Schouten
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
Neutral Case

This chapter elucidates the notion of citizenship that rightly informs the neutrality constraint and the criterion of reciprocity: On the basis of citizenship interests, neutrality limits coercive political intervention; and through the criterion of reciprocity, citizenship interests also positively demand certain coercive political interventions. Political liberalism’s characterization of citizenship attributes to citizens certain fundamental interests. When those interests are jeopardized, and when they can be protected without jeopardizing stronger interests of citizenship, exercises of political power to protect those interests are demanded by the criterion of reciprocity. This can have surprising implications. A fundamental commitment of political liberalism is that, while political institutions should be ordered by liberal values, individuals should be substantially free to reject those values within their own lives. But under some circumstances, essential citizenship interests demand political interventions to promote enactments of substantive autonomy; as such, those interventions can be required by the criterion of reciprocity.

Division de pouvoir et intégration social: de Montesquieu à la crise actuelle du parlementarisme

1968 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-269
Author(s):  
André Vachet
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political System ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Social Division ◽  
Western Democracy ◽  
Vital Forces

Division of power and social integrationExplanation of some of the recent challenges to western democracy may be found in a re-examination of Montesquieu's thought. Here we find the theory of the separation of power to be far more complex than is implied in the simple divisions of legislature, executive, and judiciary. For Montesquieu, the separation of power is more a social division than a political or juridical one. He contemplated returning the organs of political power to various social forces, e.g. monarchy, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie, and that then the self-assertion of forces would be restrained by the resistance of other social groups. The realization of its goals would require every important social group to integrate itself both to society and to the state and to seek its goals through realization of the general good.Since Montesquieu's time, political structures would seem to have been very little changed even though social structures have been greatly altered by the rise of economic powers. Political institutions have been losing touch with the vital forces of society and these have had to find other channels of expression. The personalization of power, the rise of the executive, violence, and increasing paternalism may be viewed as phenomena of compensation by which attempts are being made to bridge the gap between the structures of political power and those of a society which has been restructured.Revigoration of parliamentary democracy would seem to require that all vital social forces be reintegrated into the political system and be given meaningful channels of political expression. Failure to make such changes opens the way to identification of the political powers with technocracy and the increasing general use of violence in the resolution of social problems.

Colloquium 4 A Man of No Substance: The Philosopher in Plato’s Gorgias

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
S.Montgomery Ewegen
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
The One ◽  
The City

Abstract At the center of Plato’s Gorgias, the shameless and irascible Callicles offers an attack against philosophy (484c and following). During this attack, he describes philosophy as a pastime fit only for the young which, if practiced beyond the bloom of youth, threatens to render those who practice it politically inept and powerless. Moreover, when taken too far, philosophy provokes the city into stripping the philosopher of all of his rights and property, leaving him with no οὐσία at all (486c). Thus, according to Callicles, far from making one powerful within the city, philosophy ultimately renders one impotent and utterly without substance. In what follows I argue that the Socrates of the Gorgias agrees with this characterization of the philosopher as the one who lacks power and οὐσία. However, whereas Callicles sees such a condition as the most worthless and pitiable sort, Socrates sees it as the unique and singular posture from out of which true philosophical thinking, and true political power, are possible. As I will show, through the course of the Gorgias as a whole, Socrates offers a counter-discourse that presents the philosopher as a powerless person lacking οὐσία who is precisely thereby able to undertake a pursuit of the truth and the good. Phrased otherwise: Socrates takes ignorance understood as lack or powerlessness to be the very condition for the possibility of philosophy and true political power, while showing rhetoric understood as the pretense of wisdom to be an obstruction to these.

The non-cognitive challenge to a liberal egalitarian education

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Morton
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Educational Institutions ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Cognitive Challenge ◽  
Conception Of The Good

Political liberalism, conceived of as a response to the diversity of conceptions of the good in multicultural societies, aims to put forward a proposal for how to organize political institutions that is acceptable to a wide range of citizens. It does so by remaining neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good while giving all citizens a fair opportunity to access the offices and positions which enable them to pursue their own conception of the good. Public educational institutions are at the center of the state’s attempt to foster both of these commitments. I argue that recent empirical research on the role that non-cognitive dispositions (such as assertiveness) play in enabling students to have access to two important primary goods – opportunities for higher education and desirable jobs – creates a distinctive challenge for a liberal egalitarian education in remaining neutral with respect to conceptions of the good while promoting equal opportunity.

Food Movements Oscillating Between Autonomy and Co-Production of Public Policies in the City of Madrid

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Simon-Rojo ◽  
Inés Morales Bernardos ◽  
Jon Sanz Landaluze
Keyword(s):  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Food Policy ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Alternative Food ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Alternative Food Movement ◽  
The City ◽  
Food Movement

In the aftermath of the economic crisis in the city of Madrid, food geography transformed. The urban unemployed began to engage in agriculture in periurban areas, creating new alliances between producers and consumers. Over a period of 15 years the alternative food movement organized on the fringe gave way to agroecological civic platforms that are highly assertive, and a dialogue with political institutions has opened. A key moment in the advance of this proactive attitude came about in the municipal elections of May 2015. Activists ascended to positions of political power and the backdrop of the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, created an opportunity for the food movement to move from protest to program, and public policies permeated by agroecological principles.

scholarly journals Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 598-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Peter
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Reasonable Disagreement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person

At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. But why should we take disagreements seriously? This—epistemic question—has not received the attention it deserves so far. I argue that the significance of public justification can be explained through the possibility of reasonable disagreement. In a reasonable disagreement, the parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs, but each is justified to hold the belief they do. I shall use the notion of a reasonable disagreement to explain the possibility of an irreducible pluralism of moral and religious doctrines and, on that basis, why the justification of political institutions has to be public.

scholarly journals Mary Wollstonecraft's Political Political Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Frazer
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Political Judgment ◽  
Theoretical Justification ◽  
Complex Processes ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
Civil And Political Rights

AbstractThis paper separates Wollstonecraft's critical concept of “machiavelian” power and the capacity for domination, from a neutral concept of politics as the complex processes surrounding the power to govern, from her normative account of popular sovereignty which emphasizes collective political power to ensure the discharge of natural duty by way of civil and political rights and duties. Wollstonecraft's voice as political judge—which is audible throughout her work, but particularly clearly in her book on the French Revolution—articulates the ways that political power can be abused and misused, and can also be effective. Her theory is political in several ways: she interrogates the nature of political power and its explanatory importance; she consistently articulates political judgment about matters both conventionally political and social; she offers a theoretical justification for the expansion of the scope of politics to cover relations that hitherto were thought to be outside its domain; and finally her work itself constitutes a political intervention.

John Searle on the concept of political power, the power of states and war-making: why states demand a monopoly of the organisation and use of soldiers

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
THORVALD GRAN
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Nation States ◽  
The Military

Abstract:John Searle has developed a strong theory of how speech acts and agreements generate institutions. How is the general theory specified for political institutions? He, like Max Weber, suggests that a government monopoly of soldiers is a condition for the existence of political institutions. However, governments' wielding of force is only political if those attacked consider the attack a responsible and a morally acceptable act. All political power in Searle's theory is deontic. It is assigned as a right, an obligation or the like, as a status function. If power wielding by a government is not assigned, it is beyond the political; it is only brute force. My contention is that this distinction limits the power of Searle's theory in the analysis of politics. From the idea of political institutions as ultimate institutions in a specific, bordered territory it is the strong idea of deonticity that is misleading. Ultimate institutions cannot by definition have externally assigned status. Leaders of other ultimate institutions can accept their existence, but then mainly because they have the military power to defend their borders. Nation states, demanding territorial sovereignty, therefore logically demand a monopoly of soldiers. This sovereignty seen over time suggests an evolutionary first principle of political institutions.

Philosophical foundations for Indigenous economic and political rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (11) ◽  
pp. 1264-1276
Author(s):  
Paul Robert Patton
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Indigenous Rights ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Normative Foundations ◽  
Conceptual Work

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine some influential accounts of the basis for Indigenous rights, consider their strengths and weaknesses, and ascertain whether and in what degree they support effective self-government and self-determination for Indigenous people. Design/methodology/approach The paper begins with a brief discussion of the emergence of specifically Indigenous rights, the significance of self-determination as a means of improving the economic and social conditions of communities, and the problem such rights pose for late 20th versions of egalitarian liberalism. It then examines the liberal culturalist argument for minority rights developed by Will Kymlicka, before turning to James Tully’s elaboration of the historical approach to the justification of Indigenous rights that draws on the tradition of treaty relations in North American colonialism. Finally, it outlines a third approach based on the political liberalism of John Rawls. Findings The conditions of legitimate government set out in Rawls’ political liberalism are a better way to provide normative foundations for Indigenous rights in contemporary postcolonial democracies. Research limitations/implications The discussion of Indigenous rights is confined to those countries established by colonization with largely British political institutions and populations. The arguments for Indigenous rights are confined to those advanced within the liberal tradition of political thought. Originality/value Some of the criticisms of the liberal culturalist argument and of Tully’s approach are original. The case for Indigenous rights based in the legitimacy requirements of political liberalism is original and based on conceptual work by the author.

Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice: Opinion, Tradition and Objectivity in Political Liberalism

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-43
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
The Stability

AbstractIn Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes the practical character and aims of his conception of justice. Justice as fairness is to provide the basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political agreement by locating grounds for consensus in the fundamental ideas and values of the political culture. Critics urge, however, that such a politically liberal conception of justice will be designed merely to ensure the stability of political institutions by appealing to the currently-held opinions of actual citizens. In order to evaluate this concern, I suggest, it is necessary to focus on the normative character of Rawls's analysis. Rawls argues that justice as fairness is the conception of justice that citizens of modern democratic cultures should choose in reflective equilibrium, after reflecting fully upon their considered judgments regarding justice. Since judgments in reflective equilibrium are grounded in considered judgment, rather than situated opinions, I argue that the criticism fails.

Employing the Critical juncture hypothesis to explain the 2011 Egyptian revolution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rustam Mussa ◽  
◽  
Raushan Yesbergen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Critical Juncture ◽  
Egyptian Revolution ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Contemporary Development

Our research question involves applying the critical juncture hypothesis formulated by Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors in the series of the articles and books to the context of the 2011 Arab Spring events. Critical juncture hypothesis states that politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions a country has, because the former represents the distribution of political power. Whoever controls political institutions then can set up economic institutions, determining the rules governing economic activities and who will benefit from them. Generated resources are then used in defending these sets of institutions. Though for Acemoglu and his co-authors politics always precedes economics, it is the interplay of political and economic institutions that explain contemporary development of states. The case of 2011 Egyptian Revolution is presented, as the well-documented illustraion of the hypothesis at work.

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