Implications for Growth

2019 ◽  
pp. 88-89
Author(s):  
Andrew Smithers
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Capital Stock ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
The Us ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Hurdle Rate ◽  
Working Age Population ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Trend Growth

Without policy measures to offset the negative impact of the bonus culture, investment, productivity, and growth are likely to remain depressed. Given the slow growth of the working age population, the UK’s trend growth rate will thus be 1 per cent and that of the US 0.87 per cent, unless productivity improves. An alternative method of estimating US trend growth from the value data for tangible capital stock provides a slightly better rate of 1.1 per cent per annum. The prospects for the UK and US are so poor that policy measures to stimulate growth are vital. All growth is the result of changes in either TFP or NTV, so one or other must improve to avoid stagnation. There is no way to improve the former, but changes in NTV can be brought about through a lower hurdle rate, which requires the damage from the bonus culture to end.

scholarly journals The Impact of Policy Measures on Human Mobility, COVID-19 Cases, and Mortality in the US: A Spatiotemporal Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 996
Author(s):  
Yun Li ◽  
Moming Li ◽  
Megan Rice ◽  
Haoyuan Zhang ◽  
Dexuan Sha ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Human Mobility ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Information Campaigns ◽  
Rapid Spread ◽  
The Us ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
The Impact ◽  
At Home

Social distancing policies have been regarded as effective in containing the rapid spread of COVID-19. However, there is a limited understanding of policy effectiveness from a spatiotemporal perspective. This study integrates geographical, demographical, and other key factors into a regression-based event study framework, to assess the effectiveness of seven major policies on human mobility and COVID-19 case growth rates, with a spatiotemporal emphasis. Our results demonstrate that stay-at-home orders, workplace closures, and public information campaigns were effective in decreasing the confirmed case growth rate. For stay-at-home orders and workplace closures, these changes were associated with significant decreases (p < 0.05) in mobility. Public information campaigns did not see these same mobility trends, but the growth rate still decreased significantly in all analysis periods (p < 0.01). Stay-at-home orders and international/national travel controls had limited mitigation effects on the death case growth rate (p < 0.1). The relationships between policies, mobility, and epidemiological metrics allowed us to evaluate the effectiveness of each policy and gave us insight into the spatiotemporal patterns and mechanisms by which these measures work. Our analysis will provide policymakers with better knowledge regarding the effectiveness of measures in space–time disaggregation.

Friend or Foe? The US Invades Grenada

2015 ◽  
pp. 93-144
Author(s):  
Sally-Ann Treharne
Keyword(s):  
Negative Impact ◽  
International Community ◽  
Special Relationship ◽  
Caribbean Island ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
Eastern Caribbean ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
British Commonwealth ◽  
The Uk

The US-led invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada at the alleged behest of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on 25 October 1983 had a profound negative impact upon the development of the Special Relationship under Reagan and Thatcher. The dubious legality of the intervention was widely criticised by the international community, most notably the UK. And yet, it was the Thatcher government that bore the scars of considerable domestic criticism regarding the unlawful US involvement in the internal affairs of a member of the British Commonwealth. The US invasion of Grenada, or operation ‘Urgent Fury’ as it is otherwise known, raised important questions regarding the limits of British credibility and importance within the Anglo-American alliance.

Description of My Model

2019 ◽  
pp. 56-59
Author(s):  
Andrew Smithers
Keyword(s):  
Capital Stock ◽  
Full Employment ◽  
Quality Improvements ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Us ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Civilian Employment ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Employment Quality

The volume of the capital stock is defined as the original cost at constant prices of all tangible capital that has not been scrapped. Due to the poor data available for the UK my calculations and testing have had to be limited to the US. The volume of labour is defined as civilian employment. Quality improvements for both labour and capital are defined as being part of TFP. TFP is under conditions of full employment and must therefore be measured over long time periods. All growth comes from TFP, changes in labour and NTVs. The change in the volume of capital less the change in the volume of labour equals the change in NTVs and the balance is that from changes in technology (TFP). NTV is exogenous in aggregate. The value of the capital stock, but not its volume, is mean-reverting.

Ageing Populations

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-37
Author(s):  
Andrew Smithers
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rates ◽  
Total Population ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
Favourable Change ◽  
Working Age ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ageing Populations ◽  
Trend Growth

The changes in demography, together with low investment and poor productivity, have been responsible for the whole of the decline in the trend growth rates of the UK and US economies. Living standards measured by GDP per person are given a boost when the population of working age grows faster than the total population. This favourable change in demography was the situation up to 2008. Until then living standards tended to improve faster than productivity. Since then the total population has been growing faster than the numbers of working age and living standards will now tend to grow less rapidly than productivity. The impact on prosperity has been sharp because we have moved from a favourable to an unfavourable situation.

An Analysis of EU Growth Trends, with a Particular Focus on Germany, France, Italy and the UK

2007 ◽  
Vol 199 ◽  
pp. 82-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran McMorrow ◽  
Werner Roger
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Potential Growth ◽  
Individual Country ◽  
Reform Agenda ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
Time Period ◽  
The Us ◽  
Good Individual ◽  
The Uk

Since the mid-1990s the growth performance of the Euro Area as a whole, despite some good individual country performances, has failed to keep pace with developments elsewhere in the EU (including the UK) and also in the US. This is especially the case for a number of the larger Euro Area economies. Despite an encouraging performance in terms of its labour input trends, there has been a significant, offsetting, deterioration in the Euro Area's underlying productivity performance. This is driven in large part, worryingly, by a marked downward shift in the growth rate of total factor productivity. Looking to the future, no significant recovery is predicted in the Euro Area's underlying economic performance over the period 2007–11. While the policy challenge is a serious one, the Euro Area as a whole can take comfort from the fact that the gains from a successful refocusing of its overall reform agenda could be considerable. For example, the progressive introduction of the five key measures linked to the Lisbon strategy (i.e. the services directive; reduction of the administrative burden; improving human capital; 3 per cent R&D target; and increases in the employment rate) could boost the Euro Area's economic and employment growth rates by more than ½ a percentage point annually for more than a decade. Such an outturn would give the Euro Area a potential growth rate of around 2½ per cent, a rate of growth which in per capita terms would be broadly comparable to that of the US over the 2007–15 time period and, on the basis of current trends and policies, slightly better than that of the UK.

scholarly journals Precautionary breaks: planned, limited duration circuit breaks to control the prevalence of COVID-19

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt J. Keeling ◽  
Glen Guyver-Fletcher ◽  
Alex Holmes ◽  
Louise Dyson ◽  
Michael J. Tildesley ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Exponential Growth ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Societal Costs ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Age Structured ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Limited Duration

AbstractThe COVID-19 pandemic in the UK has been characterised by periods of exponential growth and decline, as different non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are brought into play. During the early uncontrolled phase of the outbreak (early March 2020) there was a period of prolonged exponential growth with epidemiological observations such as hospitalisation doubling every 3-4 days (growth rate r ≈ 0.2). The enforcement of strict lockdown measures led to a noticeable decline in all epidemic quantities (r ≈ −0.06) that slowed during the summer as control measures were relaxed (r ≈ −0.02). Since August, infections, hospitalisations and deaths have been rising (precise estimation of the current growth rate is difficult due to extreme regional heterogeneity and temporal lags between the different epidemiological observations) and various NPIs have been applied locally throughout the UK in response.Controlling any rise in infection is a compromise between public health and societal costs, with more stringent NPIs reducing cases but damaging the economy and restricting freedoms. Currently, NPI imposition is made in response to the epidemiological state, are of indefinite length and are often imposed at short notice, greatly increasing the negative impact. An alternative approach is to consider planned, limited duration periods of strict NPIs aiming to purposefully reduce prevalence before such emergency NPIs are required. These “precautionary breaks” may offer a means of keeping control of the epidemic, while their fixed duration and the forewarning may limit their society impact. Here, using simple analysis and age-structured models matched to the unfolding UK epidemic, we investigate the action of precautionary breaks. In particular we consider their impact on the prevalence of infection, as well as the total number of predicted hospitalisations and deaths. We find that precautionary breaks provide the biggest gains when the growth rate is low, but offer a much needed brake on increasing infection when the growth rate is higher, potentially allowing other measures (such as contact tracing) to regain control.

Mental health and psychiatric disorders

2019 ◽  
pp. 398-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J.L. Heron ◽  
Neil Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Psychiatric Morbidity ◽  
Economic Cost ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Health Condition ◽  
Health Conditions ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Health Disorders ◽  
Working Age Population ◽  
The Uk

Mental health disorders significantly impact well-being and productivity in the working age population. They affect around 17% of the population and their economic cost has been estimated at £70 billion or 4.5% of gross domestic product in the UK. Mental health conditions are a leading cause of sickness absence with 70 million working days lost per year. Over half of disabled people who are out of work have a mental health and/or musculoskeletal disorder as their main health condition. This chapter considers how work and mental health interrelate, how employers can ensure that their workforce mental health needs are managed, opportunities for productivity maximized, and psychiatric morbidity minimized.

scholarly journals Unemployment Invariance

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marika Karanassou ◽  
Dennis J. Snower
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Labor Force ◽  
Unemployment Rate ◽  
Capital Stock ◽  
Growth Path ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Endogenous Growth Model ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Invariance Hypothesis ◽  
Working Age Population

Abstract This paper provides a critique of the ‘unemployment invariance hypothesis’, according to which the behavior of the labor market, by itself, ensures that the long-run unemployment rate is independent of the size of the capital stock, productivity and the labor force. In the context of an endogenous growth model, we show that the labor market alone need not contain all the equilibrating mechanisms to ensure unemployment invariance; in particular, other markets may perform part of the equilibrating process as well. By implication, policies that raise the growth path of capital or increase the effective working-age population may influence the long-run unemployment rate.

Prospects for the UK economy

2008 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 35-53
Author(s):  
Ehsan Khoman ◽  
Simon Kirby
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Household Consumption ◽  
Fourth Quarter ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
Preliminary Estimate ◽  
Fixed Investment ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Trend Growth

Despite the turmoil in global financial markets during the second half of 2007, UK GDP continued to grow at a robust pace. The above trend growth of 2006 continued into the first three quarters of last year and the preliminary estimate of GDP growth shows only a limited moderation into the fourth quarter of last year (figure 1). This suggests we will see a growth rate of 3.1 per cent for 2007 as a whole, a slight acceleration from 2.9 per cent in 2006. This robust growth has been sustained by household consumption and, to a lesser extent, gross fixed investment.

US demographic change will have broad economic effects

2022 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Population Decline ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
Participation Rates ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Working Age Population ◽  
Spending Cuts

Significance This has implications for the size of the workforce and the living standards that the US economy is capable of supporting. It will also have broader consequences for the US economy over the next 30 years. Impacts Lower workforce participation rates will lower average living standards, relative to what they would have otherwise been, by 10% by 2050. Medicare and social security spending will rise by 4% of GDP over the next 30 years; higher taxes or spending cuts elsewhere will be needed. Immigration is projected to be just sufficient to offset natural population decline by 2050, cushioning the working-age population drop. Estimating the extent to which immigration and automation could help to fill worker shortages over the longer term is difficult.

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