The Genesis of Opération Pilote
In January 1957 the military and colonial government accepted a master plan drawn up by the anthropologist Jean Servier to undertake Opération Pilote in the Chelif region, the biggest counterinsurgency (COIN) experiment of the Algerian War. The arrival of Salan and Indochina specialists in command accelerated the adoption of the doctrine of revolutionary warfare, that victory over the FLN could not be achieved by conventional ‘big’ force operations, but only through winning over the indigenous population. The catastrophic failure of counterinsurgency in Kabylia in late 1956 diverted attention to the Chelif where a dispersed population was seen as advantageous to COIN operations. Servier’s plan was linked to the revival of Lucien Paye’s communal reform of 1945 to 1948, seen as the key reform to retain Algérie française. By late 1956 the colonial government and military had rapidly lost control of the Dahra and Ouarsenis mountains, a collapse signalled by the evacuation of isolated colons, and the aim was to ‘reconquer’ the interior through driving the ALN and its OPA structures from each douar, and replacing it by ‘djemâa amie’ that could form the core of future rural municipalities in which peasants could take on board their own local government and auto-defense. Unable to guarantee open elections Opération Pilote aimed to secretly train future douar leaders in the psychological warfare centre at Arzew.