The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons
This chapter argues for Phenomenal Rationalism about perceptual experiences: the claim that our basic awareness of reasons for perceptual belief is phenomenal and non-conceptual. The main idea is that, from the inside, perceptual experiences seem to be reason-giving insofar as they seem to be relations to, and determined by, external objects and their features. The argumentation centres partly on the claim that assuming the phenomenal presence of the relationality and determination of perceptual experiences provides the best explanation of why so many good philosophers were convinced of the soundness of the argument from hallucination. That we enjoy phenomenal access to reasons prior to any normative beliefs also helps to reconcile the Humean insight that infants (who lack concepts like ‘reason for’) can be motivated to act or form attitudes with the Kantian insight that motivation is a matter of recognizing and responding to reasons.