Lying and Certainty

Author(s):  
Neri Marsili

In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers lies involving partial beliefs (beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty). The first section analyses graded-belief lies: lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion. A revised insincerity condition is introduced to deal with these cases, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section analyses assertions that express graded beliefs, exploring how epistemic modals affect the insincerity conditions of a given utterance. The last section considers the case of lies that attack certainty (knowledge lies), understood as attempts to alter the hearer’s graded beliefs.

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Alonso Villarán ◽  

What is a conflict of interest? What is morally problematic about one? Beginning with the definition, this paper organizes the core (philosophical) literature and creates two continuums—one devoted to the more specific definition of ‘interest,’ and the other to that of ‘duty’ (two elements that belong to the definition of conflicts of interest and over which the debate revolves). Each continuum places the authors according to the narrowness or broadness of their positions, which facilitates the understanding of the debate as well as what is at stake when defining conflicts of interest. The paper then develops a moral analysis that leads to the sought-for definition and to an explanation of why we should treat conflicts of interest carefully. While doing so, the paper discloses the criterion to judge whether a definition is right and presents the duties that makes conflicts of interest special as ‘tertiary’ duties of morality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Pavel Vladimirov

Russian neo-Kantianismʼs status in the history of the development of Russian philosophy is an important, but poorly presented in scientific publications, issue is revealed in the article. With some exceptions, which are represented by a number of few, but informative and informative articles and a monograph, the problem remains without proper reception in the scientific discourse of our time. Russian neo-Kantianism, however, leaving aside the question of what is the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism, it is impossible to productively and consistently actualize the content of Russian neo-Kantians and, moreover, to show their significance in the history of Russian philosophical and socio-humanitarian thought in general. Three key difficulties stand out: 1) the question of originality and the related theme of the independence of the philosophical direction (originality, independence and originality – differ from each other, but are united in their immanent orientation); 2) Russian neo-Kantianism, which in many ways seems to be the most difficult task for researchers engaged in historical and philosophical reconstruction; 3) the question remains ambiguous as to whether Russian neo-Kantianism is a continuation of the German tradition or whether it is a direction of Russian philosophy of thought. Russian neo-Kantianism, the three difficulties identified in the reception of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism taken as a whole, are consistently revealed in the content of the proposed article, supplemented by a brief overview of the most systemic positions of Russian philosophers, ranked among Russian neo-Kantianism. Overcoming the indicated difficulties, which undoubtedly affect the objective disclosure of the creativity of each representative of Russian neo-Kantianism or thinkers related to them, seems appropriate not only from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, but also for actualizing the heritage of philosophers in the conditions of modern socio-humanitarian pragmatics. Russian neo-Kantianism The author of the article suggests that one of the ways to overcome the ambiguity of the definition of Russian neo-Kantianism in the history of Russian thought may be, firstly, a more detailed consecration of the activities of Russian neo-Kantians in the historical and philosophical literature, and secondly, a comprehensive representation of this direction, including studies of individual personalities and their works. Despite the controversial and polemical nature of the task, its formulation is necessary for the objectivity of the meaning of Russian thought in the global context.


Dialogue ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Madeleine Arseneault ◽  
Robert Stainton

AbstractWe believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

The essay explains the emotional significance of punishment in law and in common life. The explanation entails first understanding inflictions of punishment as a form of retaliation. So understanding inflictions of punishment requires abandoning the standard definition of punishment in the philosophical literature that takes legal punishment as the central case. A broader definition is offered that comprehends a broader array of cases including punishment by crime bosses of their underlings, punishment by international powers of countries that have attacked their citizens or property, and punishment inflicted by vigilantes. Given this broader definition, the emotional significance of punishment is then explained by considering punishment’s functions as a deterrent to those contemplating disrupting the social order, an assurance of support for those who maintain an allegiance to the social order, and a mechanism for reintegrating into society those who have disrupted the social order and caused a breach in their relations with its members.


Author(s):  
Ian Rumfitt ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  

Liar sentences say nothing, according to this chapter—which, it claims, we can, in effect, prove. But extending the proof as the chapter does appears to result in revenge. The solution to this problem is to restrict the laws of logic by distinguishing expressing a falsehood from failing to express a truth. But the question that presses is how we can signify that a given sentence—a liar sentence, for example—fails to express a truth without being mired in paradox. To this end, the chapter revisits the sort of bilateral system that Rumfitt (2000) has discussed. The chapter shows that there is a way of developing Aristotle’s conception of truth into a definition of truth that does not yield a contradiction, even when applied to a semantically closed language. If successful, the proposal will enable us to reject a Strengthened Liar as untrue without asserting its negation.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 56-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert Cornillie

In this paper it is argued that Langacker’s definition of grounding predications is problematic for languages other than English. The idea that in English tense and modal auxiliaries are mutually exclusive grounding elements leads Langacker (1990, 2003) to consider both deontic and epistemic modal auxiliaries as grounding predications, whereas he excludes German modals from being so on the basis of their tense inflection. In this paper I contend that, unlike the deontic modal verbs, and despite their tense marking, Spanish epistemic modals deber ‘must’, poder ‘may’ and tener que ‘have to’ are certainly appropriate for modal grounding due to their reference point function and to the subjectification they undergo. I show that deontic modality is more affected by temporal grounding than epistemic modality. Moreover, the impossibility of inserting an inchoative verb such as ir a ‘to be going to’ corroborates the theoretical underpinning that Spanish epistemic modals effect an epistemic grounding similar to that of the grounding predications in English.


Author(s):  
Julia Staffel

This chapter is about two kinds of lies, knowledge lies and group lies, which are considered to be interestingly different from typical lies. Typically, lies are told by an individual, and they are intended to convince their addressee of a false claim. By contrast, in telling a knowledge lie, the liar does not intend to deceive the addressee into believing a false claim. Instead, the liar intends to prevent the addressees from knowing, but not necessarily from believing, some true claim. Group lies are lies that are told by a group, such as a company, a government, or your knitting circle. Group lies are unlike typical lies, because they are not straightforwardly related to lies told by individuals who are members of the lying group. For each type of lie, I give a more rigorous characterization, then discuss why this kind of lie deserves special philosophical attention, and lastly provide some critical discussion of the accounts of each type of lie that have been proposed in the philosophical literature.


Traditio ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 369-405
Author(s):  
Amos Edelheit

This article is focused on Angelo Poliziano's general attitude to philosophy as a discipline and on his specific accounts of scholastic philosophy, found mainly in his four opening lectures to his courses on Aristotle's logic and ethics that were held in the Florentine Studium between 1490 and 1494, in the light of his overall exclusive classical approach. It shows, among other things, that philosophy was more important to Poliziano than common expressions such as “the humanist interest in philosophy” may suggest. Poliziano's important definition of history presented in his Panepistemon, together with other pieces of evidence, can reveal the moment in which disciplines associated with the “humanities” (in the modern sense of this term) began to be separated from the natural sciences — at a point just preceding the massive critique of Aristotelian science during the sixteenth century — through Poliziano's notion of a philosophical literature to which also the Aristotelian texts belong.


Author(s):  
D.V. Ankin ◽  

The term «agnosticism» is used quite often in the philosophical literature. Usually, the meaning of this term is associated with the presence of boundaries in knowledge, and as an example of agnosticism, they refer to the philosophy of I. Kant. Nevertheless, the meaning of this term raises many questions. What are these boundaries? What exactly does Kant consider unknowable? And a number of other questions are still waiting to be answered. Our goal will be to remove some of the existing uncertainties and to demonstrate, if not senselessness, then the problematicity of the very term «agnosticism». We will try to show that what is suitable for the philosophy of religion is not always meaningful and suitable for epistemology. Our methodology will be the analysis of the logical form of statements about the existence / non-existence of something. Such statements are called existential. The methodology for studying problems through the analysis of their linguistic form is the norm for analytical philosophy. For the definition of analytic philosophy, see V. Ye. Borisov and [7]. This methodology is associated with a «linguistic turn in philosophy» [14]. In this case, the term «agnosticism» should be investigated through existential statements, through statements about the existence / non-existence of something (God, spirits, etc.). In defining the concept of agnosticism, the interpretation of the position of I. Kant in relation to the boundaries of knowledge is of great importance. The position of I. Kant is also appropriate to interpret through the ways of using existential statements. Some existential statements according to Kant turn out to be cognitively insoluble. Such are the statements about God, about spirits, about a world transcendent to our experience (things in themselves), etc. For example, it is impossible to prove or disprove the existence of God — this is not a question of cognition (epistemology), but exclusively of faith. Of particular importance is I. Kant’s division of thinking and cognition. The research carried out shows that the term «agnosticism» is often used unreasonably and even meaninglessly, especially when some a priori negative characteristic is attached to it. The use of this term turns out to be very problematic.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 387-397
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Babiarz

Ambrosiaster uses two forms for the definition of the concept of faith. The first one – in the sense of a noun: fides; the second one – from the perspective of the knowing subject: credere. Abraham’s act of faith, whose object is God, is shown as a cognitive model. The acceptance of God’s authority leads to recogniz­ing in Christ the Son of God. Believers receive in Baptism the gift the Holy Spirit and knowing the will of God. By participating in the fullness of His life, they are given access to the Eucharist. Knowability is one of God’s characteristics. Accepting this fact and submit­ting oneself to God’s guidance results in knowing the Trinity. Christ’s confidence in the Father is the basic principle of knowing through faith, and this translates into absolute certainty of the truthfulness of the conclusions. It is a duty of believ­ers to explore the truth. The Gospel, interpreted by the authority of the Church, remains the main source of revelation. The intensity of cognition influences the entirety of one’s life, manifests itself in the acceptance of all the truths of the faith and in creating harmony between faith and the virtues of love and hope.


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