The Demographics of Meditation in the United States

Author(s):  
Conrad Hackett

This chapter describes which U.S. groups report meditating frequently. While there is little cross-national data available to analyze demographic characteristics associated with meditation, Pew Research Center’s nationally representative 2014 Religious Landscape Study (RLS) asked more than 35,000 U.S. adults, “How often do you meditate? Would you say at least once a week, once or twice a month, several times a year, seldom, or never?” Americans tend to say they meditate regularly (40 percent do so at least weekly) or rarely, if at all (45 percent seldom or never do). There’s not much middle ground—only 8 percent say they meditate once or twice a month and only 4 percent say they do so several times a year. The Americans most likely to report high frequency of meditation—Jehovah’s Witnesses, older Americans, Black Americans, poorer Americans, and political conservatives—diverge from stereotypes about frequent practitioners of meditation.

Author(s):  
Rupal N. Mehta

Why are states willing to give up their nuclear weapons programs? This book presents a new theory for how external inducements supplied by the United States can convince even the most committed of proliferators to abandon weapons pursuit. Existing theories focus either on carrots or sticks. I explore how using both positive and negative inducements, in the shadow of military force, can persuade both friends and foes not to continue their nuclear weapons pursuit. I draw on worldwide cross-national data on nuclear reversal, case studies of Iran and North Korea, among other countries, and interviews with diplomats, policy-makers, and analysts. I show that the majority of proliferators have been persuaded to reverse their nuclear weapons programs when offered incentives from the United States. Moreover, I demonstrate that these tools are especially effective during periods of leadership transition and can work on both allies and adversaries. My theory and evidence also suggest a broader conception of counterproliferation than currently exists, identifying how carrots and sticks used together can accomplish one of the international community’s most important policy objectives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 736-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Duhaime ◽  
Evan P. Apfelbaum

Scholars, politicians, and laypeople alike bemoan the high level of political polarization in the United States, but little is known about how to bring the views of liberals and conservatives closer together. Previous research finds that providing people with information regarding a contentious issue is ineffective for reducing polarization because people process such information in a biased manner. Here, we show that information can reduce political polarization below baseline levels and also that its capacity to do so is sensitive to contextual factors that make one’s relevant preferences salient. Specifically, in a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and a preregistered replication (Study 2), we find that providing a taxpayer receipt—an impartial, objective breakdown of how one’s taxes are spent that is published annually by the White House—reduces polarization regarding taxes, but not when participants are also asked to indicate how they would prefer their taxes be spent.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-170
Author(s):  
Gilbert A. Martinez ◽  
David A. Dodd

From 1955 to 1981, questionnaires were mailed to a nationally representative sample of mothers to determine the use of various milks for feeding infants during the first 6 months of life. Data from these surveys demonstrated the resurgence of breast-feeding both in incidence and duration, and this increase has occurred across all levels of income and education. Statistical analysis indicated that the trends were significant (P < .01) for all demographic categories surveyed. In 1981, as in 1980, a bimonthly telephone survey of mothers of infants 8, 10, and 12 months of age determined milk use during later infancy. A combination of data from the mail and telephone surveys for 1981 provided information on milk feeding patterns and demographic characteristics for the first 12 months of life. Maternal employment was shown to reduce the incidence and duration of breast-feeding.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110135
Author(s):  
Jordan Gans-Morse ◽  
Simeon Nichter

Prominent scholars in recent years have expressed alarm about political polarization, weakened civil liberties, and growing support for authoritarianism in the United States. But discussions of democratic backsliding pay short shrift to the value citizens place on one of the most fundamental democratic institutions: the act of voting. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, we show that despite traditional portrayals of the U.S. as the embodiment of a democratic “civic culture,” a substantial share of Americans express readiness to sell their votes for cash: 12% of respondents would do so for just $25, as would nearly 20% for $100. Citizens who place low importance on living in a democracy are significantly more willing to sell their votes. We argue that heightened attention to US voters’ attitudes toward clientelism would provide an additional barometer of democratic skepticism, help to integrate the study of American and comparative politics, and stimulate novel research agendas about the historic decline of vote buying in the United States.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dustin Gibson ◽  
Smisha Agarwal ◽  
Ankita Meghani ◽  
Rupali J. Limaye ◽  
Alain Labrique

AbstractBackgroundAt the time of this survey, September 1st, there were roughly 6 million COVID-19 cases and 176,771 deaths in the United States and no federally approved vaccine. The objective of this study was to explore the willingness to accept a COVID-19 vaccine in the United States and describe variability in this acceptability by key racial, ethnic and socio-demographic characteristics.MethodsThis was a cross-sectional digital survey that sampled participants from a nationally-representative panel maintained by a third party, Dynata. Dynata randomly sampled their database and emailed web-based surveys to United States residents ensuring the sample was matched to US Census estimates for age, race, gender, income, and Census region. Participants were asked how willing or unwilling they would be to: 1) receive a COVID-19 vaccine as soon as it was made publicly available, and 2) receive the influenza vaccine for the upcoming influenza season. Participants could respond with extremely willing, willing, unwilling, or extremely unwilling. For those who reported being unwilling to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, reasons for this hesitancy were captured. All participants were asked about where they obtain vaccine-related information, and which sources they trust most. Univariable and multivariable logistic regressions were conducted to examine the association of all demographic characteristics with willingness to receive COVID-19 vaccine.FindingsFrom September 1st to September 7, 2020, 1592 respondents completed the online survey. Overall, weighted analyses found that only 58.9% of the sample population were either willing or extremely willing to receive a COVID-19 vaccine as soon as it was made publicly available. In comparison, 67.7% of the respondents were willing or extremely willing to take the influenza vaccine. By gender, 66.1% of males and 51.5% of females were willing to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Males were significantly more willing to receive a COVID-19 vaccine (adjusted odds ratio (OR)=1.98, 95% CI: 1.56, 2.53; p<0.001) than females. Blacks were the least willing racial/ethnic group (48.8%) Blacks, (aOR=0.59, 95%CI: 0.43, 0.80; p<0.001) were significantly less willing, than whites, to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. There were numerous reasons provided for being unwilling to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. The most common reason was concern about the vaccine’s safety (36.9%), followed by concerns over its efficacy (19.1%).InterpretationIn conclusion, we found that a substantial proportion (41%) of United States residents are unwilling to receive a COVID-19 vaccine as soon as one is made publicly available. We found that vaccine acceptance differs by sub-populations. In addition to sub-group differences in willingness to receive the vaccine, respondents provided a variety of reasons for being unwilling to receive the vaccine, driven by various sources of vaccine information (and misinformation). This compounds the challenge of delivering a safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccine at a population level to achieve herd immunity. A multi-pronged and targeted communications and outreach effort is likely needed to achieve a high level of immunization coverage.


2008 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonmo Son ◽  
Nan Lin ◽  
Linda K. George

The study compares the effects of structural bases and functional elements of social support on mental health in Taiwan and the United States, using the study conducted in the United States by Lin, Ye, and Ensel (1999) as a reference. Based on a nationally representative sample of Taiwanese adults (n = 2,835), a fundamental similarity in social support structure and function between the two countries was observed. First, the structural bases of social support had a hierarchical order in their effects on depression: Binding (presence of an intimate relationship) was the strongest in reducing depression, whereas belonging (community participation) was the weakest, with bonding (social networks) in between. Regarding the functional elements, perceived social support was a better protector of mental health than actual social support, a finding in line with previous research. On the other hand, several notable differences in the structural bases and functional elements of social support between the two societies were observed, possibly due to the differential cultural and historical characteristics.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL L. ROSS

Does their need for greater tax revenue force governments to democratize? Most research on contemporary democratization says little about the effects of taxation. Yet there are good reasons to believe that taxation led to representation in the past: representative government first came about in early modern Europe when monarchs were compelled to relinquish some of their authority to parliamentary institutions, in exchange for the ability to raise new taxes; similarly, the war for independence in the United States began as a rebellion against British taxes. Some scholars argue that a comparable process is occurring today: the need to raise taxes forces authoritarian governments to democratize. These claims have never been carefully tested. In this article, the ‘taxation leads to representation’ argument is explored and tested using pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997. One version of the argument appears to be valid, while another does not. These findings are important both for scholars who wish to understand the causes of democracy, and for policy makers who wish to promote it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 392-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW H. GRAHAM ◽  
MILAN W. SVOLIK

Is support for democracy in the United States robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians? We develop a model of the public as a democratic check and evaluate it using two empirical strategies: an original, nationally representative candidate-choice experiment in which some politicians take positions that violate key democratic principles, and a natural experiment that occurred during Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House. Our research design allows us to infer Americans’ willingness to trade-off democratic principles for other valid but potentially conflicting considerations such as political ideology, partisan loyalty, and policy preferences. We find the U.S. public’s viability as a democratic check to be strikingly limited: only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices, and their tendency to do so is decreasing in several measures of polarization, including the strength of partisanship, policy extremism, and candidate platform divergence. Our findings echo classic arguments about the importance of political moderation and cross-cutting cleavages for democratic stability and highlight the dangers that polarization represents for democracy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 442-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sherry Everett Jones ◽  
Stephanie Foster ◽  
Andrew S. Berens

Radon is a naturally occurring, radioactive, colorless, odorless gas, and the second leading cause of lung cancer. The 1990–1991 National School Radon Survey estimated that more than 70,000 schoolrooms nationwide had “high short-term radon levels.” Using data from a nationally representative survey of schools in the United States ( N = 568; response rate = 69%), we examined the location and demographic characteristics of U.S. schools that had ever been tested for radon and whether having been tested varied by radon zone, which predicts average indoor radon levels in U.S. counties. Overall, 46.0% (95% confidence interval [39.8%, 52.4%]) of schools reported that they had ever been tested for radon. Testing significantly varied by region, percentage of minority students, and radon zone. These findings highlight the need for improved awareness of radon testing in schools, as testing is the only way to identify when remediation is needed.


Author(s):  
Alexander Dukalskis

Authoritarian states try to present a positive image of themselves abroad. They invest in foreign-facing media, retain public relations firms, and showcase their successes to elite and popular foreign audiences. But there is also a darker side to these efforts. Authoritarian states try to obscure or censor bad news about their governments and often discredit their critics abroad. In extreme cases, authoritarian states intimidate, physically attack, or even murder their opponents overseas. This book is about how authoritarian states manage their image abroad using both “promotional” tactics of persuasion and “obstructive” tactics of repression. They adopt these practices to enhance their internal and external regime security or, put differently, to make their world safe for dictatorship. To substantiate these arguments, the book uses a diverse array of data, including fieldwork and author interviews, cross-national data on extraterritorial repression, examination of public relations filings with the United States government, analysis of authoritarian propaganda, media frequency analysis, and speeches and statements by authoritarian leaders. It builds a new data set—the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database—that uses publicly available information to categorize nearly 1,200 instances in which authoritarian states repressed their critical exiles abroad, ranging from vague threats to confirmed assassinations. It also selects three cases for closer examination to understand in more detail how authoritarian states manage their image abroad using combinations of promotional and obstructive tactics: China, Rwanda, and North Korea. The result is a new way of thinking about the international dimensions of authoritarian politics.


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