Post-colonial state–military relations

Author(s):  
Musambayi Katumanga

This chapter looks at how the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) has been shaped by successive governments. The analysis underscores a reality of continuity amidst change; namely of a dual logic of the prioritization of loyalty to the regime in power, and an emphasis on the need to ensure regime stability and order. This engenders a mirror image of military culture that constraints the institution’s ability to address nation–state crises and other challenges in its operational environment. Assured of regime security, the ruling elite seek to consolidate control over the political economy instead of a broad strategic culture necessary for developing a viable inclusive state. The implication is that while the military can potentially help to foster security, democracy, and accountable governance, its potential for state-building remains unexploited. This is explored through the KDF’s domestic policing initiatives as well as through their involvement in the war with Somalia.

PCD Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Ejaz Husain

This article has attempted to explain why the military has remained a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. Its purpose was to test a hypothesis that posited that the colonial authority structure and the 1947 partition-oriented structural dynamics provided an important structural construct in explaining politics and the military in post-colonial Pakistan. To explain and analyse the problem, the study used books, journals, newspapers and government documents for quantitative/explanatory analysis. The analysis has focused on the military in the colonial authority structure in which the former, along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class, formed an alliance to pursue politico-economic interests in British India. The article has also explained and analysed the partition-oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory (Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees). The findings proved that these 'structural dynamics' have affected politics and the military in Pakistan. The theoretical framework in terms of 'praetorian oligarchy' has been applied to structurally explain colonial politics ad well as politics and the military in Pakistan. The study treated Pakistan as a praetorian state which structurally inherited the pre-partition 'praetorian oligarchy'. This praetorian oligarchy constructed 'Hindu India' as the enemy to pursue politico-economic interests. The military, a part of praetorian oligarchy, emerged from this as a powerful political actor due to its coercive power. It has sought political power to pursue economic objectives independently.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Nature, Aristotle said, abhors a vacuum. He argued that a vacuum, once formed, would be immediately filled by the dense material surrounding it. Aristotle’s insights into vacuums in the physical world also apply to civil-military relations. Where a vacuum exists in domestic politics because the political parties are weak, unstable, or underdeveloped, the dense material that is the military may fill the void by staging an intervention into domestic politics. But when, as in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the civilian leaders themselves hold densely concentrated authority—in other words, are powerful, popular, and credible—their attempts to keep the military at bay are far more likely to succeed. Without a vacuum there is no void for the military to fill.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184
Author(s):  
Neera Chandhoke ◽  
Ayi Kwei Armah

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule. The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa “things fall apart.”1 Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune: The treachery of political life has been very real: armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).2 The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein3 is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but “indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved…. The military coup d'etats and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation.”4 The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.5 The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very raison d'etre was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as “Bula Matari” (the crusher of rocks).6 The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.7 In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a “struggle for rulership.”8 Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,


Subject The impact of the failed July coup on civilian-military relations. Significance The psychological impacts of the attempted coup across political life cannot be understated; it has far-reaching implications for the political, bureaucratic and even ideological structures of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more determined than ever to alter the civilian-military machinery of government in Turkey radically. Impacts The purge and radical reforms will bring into question the TSK's operational and strategic reliability for Western partners. A permanently weakened TSK would ease the way for constitutional reforms strengthening Erdogan's grip on the state. It will take years to rebuild the confidence and prestige the military has lost among broad swathes of Turkish society. Any criticism of the TSK reforms, domestically or from abroad, will meet the authorities' fierce condemnation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Alexander Sidorov ◽  

The introduction examines the interaction of the EU countries and their approaches to the themes of defence and security in the changed geopolitical realities (Brexit, D. Trump's rise to power in the USA, the mood of the new leadership of the EU institutions, etc.). It highlights both the difficulties in creating an independent defence pole and the opportunities that open up in connection with Brexit and an objective reduction in the potential for blocking initiatives aimed at revitalizing and implementing specific defence projects. The difficulties of creating the EU military doctrine and the implementation of a common strategic culture are revealed in the context of different goal-setting of the main participants in European defence construction, related, inter alia, to the heterogeneous development of the integration in the context of its ongoing expansion, different perception and assessment of threats and the existence of de facto unequal security zones in Europe. The nature of the interaction between the CSDP EU and NATO is shown; the role of this interaction as a catalyst for the processes of greater EU independence in the military sphere is highlighted, taking into account the specifics of the EU global approach to resolving crises of low and medium intensity on the periphery of the EU. An assessment of the feasibility of cooperation plans in the field of defence and security, initiatives at the EU and interstate levels in connection with the pandemic is given. It notes the flexibility, sustainability and multi-formatting of defence cooperation in the EU, the political mood of its main participants to continue and improve cooperation within the framework of the CSDP in order to strengthen the EU’s position as an international political actor.


Author(s):  
Olaf Bachmann

Like many other African military forces, the Gabonese national army was a direct offshoot of a colonial army—the French one, in this case. Like many of their former brothers in arms on the African continent, the Gabonese military has had difficulty finding their bearings in the newly independent nation, with which they have experienced no bonding. A coup carried out by a handful of officers in 1964 dealt an early blow to the development of civil‒military concord. As of 1965, the political leadership, then firmly in the hands of the Bongo family, made sure it would keep the military under control. An important part of the security belt created by the Bongo regime was the propping up—and corresponding generous endowment—of a Presidential Guard and the paramilitary forces of the Gendarmerie. With the regime feeling more and more secure, among other reasons thanks to the agile management of an extensive patronage system fuelled by the country’s oil wealth, the army was allowed to grow and develop somewhat, although it never reached the capacity to defend the country’s sovereignty against any serious threat. Over the more than four decades of Omar Bongo’s rule (1967‒2009), Gabon’s defense remained outsourced to France through a range of initially secret and later publicly “legitimized” defense treaties. Occasional tensions, such as in the mid-1970s, did not significantly alter that pattern. With its security firmly guaranteed by the Garde Républicaine, the Gendarmerie, and the French, the regime worked to integrate the army into its control system. This was done though accelerating creation of a large number of senior officers’ posts, and these officers were gratified with honors, financial rewards, and at times official government posts. Meanwhile, the rank and file were kept at bay. Consequentially, a two-tier army that mirrored the country’s sociopolitical makeup evolved. Small pockets of professional soldiers did emerge in the country over the years, especially among up to colonel-rank commissioned officers, who benefited from excellent training abroad and were able to perfect their skills on peacekeeping operations. However, professionalism did not percolate through the institution. In 2020, 10 years into the reign of Omar Bongo’s son, Ali, the relationship of the military to the political power is unclear. On the one hand, the army may be an instrument of repression used by a ruling elite that is less and less benevolent in distributing benefits because it has lost the resources to do so. Such was the case in response to unrest after the 2016 elections. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that part of the army’s lumpenmilitariat could side with the people in a revolt against the government. Because the legitimacy of the clientelist order is under duress, the coercive force provided by the carriers of arms can provide one line of defense, but the military may also turn against their increasingly anemic patron.


Author(s):  
Fawaz Hammad Mahmoud

The State of Iraq was formed in 1921 and described as a product of the British occupation state. This was in line with what was planned by the occupation government in all fields of intellectual, cultural and political. This resulted in the establishment of the "King of Iraq" of Arab origins, as well as contributed groups of tribal or economic influence to contribute to the establishment of the Iraqi state, where the Iraqi society was suffering from poverty and ignorance and disease under the Ottoman Empire, and others may see that the Iraqi state, which came under the umbrella Britain, after the First World War, may not differ in terms of dealing with the Iraqi society from the Ottoman administration, and may be a continuation of, and worse, and therefore there was concern, and fear of all steps of the government, even if it was positive, and increased military intervention through coups policy The state and its apparatus to calculate the dominant parties But it turned into a preoccupation with the minds of the people, the futility or futility of such coups, which are no more than conflicts between families, parties, and perhaps people, using the violence that the military led to express in the three coups which We gave it our attention in this study, which included, after this introduction, three investigations and a conclusion.


Author(s):  
Naila Salihu

Civil–military relations is traditionally concerned with the nature and interaction among three societal actors namely military institutions, political elites, and the citizenry. The nature of this complex relationship and whether it is harmonious to prevent military intervention in politics depends on how these societal actors cooperate on certain societal variables. Civil–military relations of West African countries are influenced by those countries’ colonial and postindependence experiences. The military establishments of most African states were birthed from colonial armies. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defense forces in society created deep cleavages between state and the military, and their relations to political authority on the one hand, and society on the other. The use of African armies for political and imperialist purposes during the colonial era and their roles in the struggle for independence were important factors in shaping the behavior of African armies after independence. Most colonial states did not attain independence with indigenous, nationalist-oriented military institutions. The transition of colonial regiments into the national armies of newly independent states were met with challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness, as these institutions had been set up under conditions that were not ideally suited to the needs of new states. Most postindependence African leaders missed the opportunity to build democratic and national militaries; instead, they maintained the status quo, as these leaders appeared more interested in building large armies for the purposes of regime stability. Successive political leaders resorted to deleterious devices such as patron–client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. These practices undermined the professionalism of the security apparatus and provided breeding grounds for pretorian tendencies. As the military became conscious of their political power, coups d’état became a common feature in the political dispensation of West African states. Frequent military interventions in West Africa often came with destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts, insurgencies, and even civil wars. Even in those countries where civil wars did not occur, the military were influential in the political landscape, in which autocratic regimes ruled with an iron hand and often used the military to inflict severe hardship on the citizens. With the return to constitutional democracies from the late 1980s, it was widely expected the role or influence of the military in the political space would be diminished as those states became more professional and democratic. However, coups d’état have reduced in the region, rather than going away completely, and the military as a state institution with a monopoly over legitimate force remains a very strong political actor, even under civilian governments. Former metropoles have been providing defense and security assistance programs to West African states for diverse reasons, including maintaining strategic hold on former colonies. Some of these interventions that aim at professionalization of the military have produced mixed outcomes in the region. In Anglophone West Africa, the British colonial policy of indirect rule contributed to the class division between the upper class (civilian politicians) and the lower class (the military and common people). This, coupled with the use of the military as agents of repression to safeguard colonial interests, created a popular dislike and negative image of colonial armies. State militaries went on to become destabilizing forces in political processes across the region. After independence, United Kingdom maintained a fluctuating presence in its former colonies due to its imperial past and strategic interests. In French West Africa, Africans were recruited from French colonies into the French army serve France’s military interests. African soldiers played diverse roles in their countries’ struggles for independence, which led to the military’s having a central role in the politics of postindependence Francophone states. France’s Africa policy differs from that of other former colonial powers in terms of its postindependence engagements with former colonies. In other parts of West Africa, Portuguese colonialism contributed to the creation of a central role for national liberation forces, which metamorphosed into postindependence military and political actors, with destabilizing consequences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1033-1047
Author(s):  
Furkan Halit Yolcu

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.


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