The Public Interest, Public Goods, and Third-Party Access to UK Biobank

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 240-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Capps
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Uk Biobank ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Legal Standing Yayasan sebagai Badan Hukum

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 264-269
Author(s):  
Sunarmi Sunarmi
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Legal Entity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Illegal Acts

Dalam Pasal 1 angka 1 UU No. 16 Tahun 2001 tentang Yayasan disebutkan bahwa yayasan adalah badan hukum (rechtspersoon, legal entity) yang terdiri atas kekayaan yang dipisahkan dan diperuntukkan untuk mencapai tujuan tertentu di bidang sosial, keagamaan, dan kemanusiaan, yang tidak mempunyai anggota. Sebagai badan hukum maka yayasan memiliki harta kekayaan tersendiri yang terpisah dari harta kekayaan organ yayasan yaitu pembina, pengurus dan pengawas. Apabila korporasi dalam bentuk Perseroan Terbatas, pemiliknya adalah para pemegang saham, maka pemiliki yayasan itu bukanlah pendiri yayasan. Pemilik yayasan adalah tujuan yayasan itu sendiri, sehingga apabila terjadi dugaan penyimpangan terhadap aset yayasan, permasalahannya adalah apakah masyarakat memiliki kedudukan hukum (legal standing) untuk meyampaikan laporan kepada kepolisian terhadap organ yayasan yang diindikasikan melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum yang merugikan yayasan, siapakah yang memiliki kewenangan untuk melakukan pemeriksaan yayasan apabila terdapat dugaan penyimpangan terhadap aset yayasan dan siapakah yang bertanggung jawab terhadap terjadinya penyimpangan aset yayasan. Permasalahan di atas penting untuk dikemukakan melihat banyaknya laporan dari masyarakat anggota suatu perkumpulan yayasan yang melaporkan terjadinya perbuatan melawan hukum yang dilakukan oleh organ yayasan, sementara masyarakat dan penegak hukum masih memiliki tafsir yang berbeda terhadap pemahaman bahwa yayasan adalah milik masyarakat. Ada yang berpendapat bahwa yayasan adalah badan hukum publik dengan mengingat tujuan yayasan adalah sosial, keagamaan dan kemanusiaan sehingga yayasan bertujuan untuk melayani kepentingan umum, dengan demikian konsekwensinya adalah masyakat memiliki kewenangan untuk menyampaikan laporan terjadinya dugaan penyelewengan terhadap aset yayasan. Di pihak lain ada yang berpendapat bahwa yayasan adalah badan hukum privat karena didirikan oleh orang perorangan sebagaimana ditentukan dalam Pasal 9 Undang –Undang No. 16 Tahun 2001. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji secara normatif siapakah yang memiliki legal standing untuk menyampaikan laporan terjadinya perbuatan melawan hukum dalam suatu yayasan dengan menggunakan pendekatan normatif Dari hasil penelitian diketahui bahwa ditinjau dari segi Undang-Undang No. 16 Tahun 2001 tentang Yayasan, pengurus yayasan memiliki legal standing untuk mewakili kepentingan yayasan baik di dalam maupun di luar pengadilan (Pasal 35 ayat (1). Apabila pengurus terindikasi melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum yang mengakibatkan kerugian terhadap yayasan maka pengurus tersebut tidak berwenang mewakili kepentingan yayasan, yang berwenang mewakili kepentingan yayasan adalah pihak sebagaimana diatur dalam Anggaran Dasar (Pasal 36). Apabila terdapat dugaan terjadinya penyimpangan terhadap harta kekayaan yayasan maka Bab VIII tentang Pemeriksaan Terhadap Yayasan menentukan bahwa pihak ketiga yang berkepentingan dapat mengajukan permohonan tertulis disertai alasannya agar pengadilan mengeluarkan penetapan untuk melakukan pemeriksaan terhadap yayasan. Hal ini dilakukan sebagai bentuk pengawasan publik terhadap yayasan yang diduga melakukan perbuatan yang bertentangan dengan Undang-undang, Anggaran Dasar, atau merugikan kepentingan umum. Apabila penyimpangan terhadap aset yayasan tersebut dilakukan oleh organ yayasan maka yang bertanggung jawab adalah organ yayasan itu sendiri.   In Article 1 No. 1 Act No. 16 of 2001 concerning the Foundation stated that the foundation is a legal entity (rechtspersoon, legal entity) which consists of separated wealth and intended to achieve certain goals in the social, religious, and humanitarian fields, which do not have members. As a legal entity, the foundation has its own assets which are separate from the assets of the foundation's organ, who are the supervisor, managers, and supervisor. If the corporation is in the form of a Limited Liability Company, and the owner is the shareholders, then the owner of the foundation is not the founder of the foundation. The owner of the foundation is the purpose of the foundation itself, so that if there is an alleged deviation from the assets of the foundation, the problem is whether the community has a legal standing to submit a report to the police towards the organ of the foundation which is indicated to violate the foundation, then who has the authority to conduct a foundation monitoring if there is an alleged deviation from the assets of the foundation and who is responsible for the deviation of the assets of the foundation. The above problem is important to be noted when there are many reports from the community members of a foundation association that report the occurrence of illegal acts carried out by the organ of the foundation, while the community and law enforcement still have different interpretations of the understanding that the foundation belongs to the community. Some argue that the foundation is a public legal entity considering the foundation's purpose is social, religious, and humanitarian, so that the foundation aims to serve the public interest, thus the consequence is that the community has the authority to submit reports of alleged fraud towards the assets of the foundation. On the other hand, there are those who argue that foundations are private legal entities because they are established by individuals as specified in Article 9 of Act No. 16 of 2001. This paper aimed to normatively examine who has the legal standing to submit a report on the occurrence of unlawful acts in a foundation using a normative approach. From the results of the study, it is known that in terms of Act No. 16 of 2001 concerning the Foundation, the management of the foundation has a legal standing to represent the interests of the foundation both inside and outside the court (Article 35 paragraph (1). If the management is indicated to have committed an unlawful act that resulted in a loss to the foundation, the management is not authorized to represent the interests of the foundation, which is authorized to represent the interests of the foundation as the party stipulated in the Articles of Association (Article 36). If there is an alleged deviation from the foundation's assets, Chapter VIII of the Investigation of the Foundation determines that the interested third party can submit a written application along with the reason that the court issues a determination to conduct an examination of the foundation. This is done as a form of public supervision of foundations that are suspected of committing acts that are contrary to the Law, Articles of Association, or harming the public interest. If the deviation from the foundation's assets is carried out by the organ of the foundation, then the responsible organ is the foundation itself.

scholarly journals Assessing ‘good governance’:‘scientific’ measurement and political discourse

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gregory
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Political Discourse ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
The Public ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
The Past ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
State Authority

The idea of governance – as distinct from government – has become intellectually fashionable in academic circles over the past decade or so, constituting a new conceptual paradigm that embodies ideas about the dispersal and fragmentation of formerly centralised state authority, the increasing involvement of civil society in the delivery of public goods and services, and the networked collaboration of a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental bodies in the pursuit of public purposes and the public interest.

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR STATE AGREEMENTS?

2005 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
A.G. Castledine ◽  
M. Lamattina
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Infrastructure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Risks ◽  
National Competition

State Agreements are agreements between private proponents and a State government which aim to facilitate the development of resources and processing projects and associated public infrastructure. State Agreements have been used extensively throughout Australia and each has been given varying levels of legislative recognition and effect, which in turn affects whether the rights and obligations arising under them have statutory or merely contractual effect. This ambiguity highlights the need to balance within State Agreements the private rights of the proponents with the public interest. The public interest critically involves third party rights to access infrastructure or services developed by proponents under the State Agreement. The introduction of National Competition Principles and regulatory regimes has affected the balance of these interests in favour of the public interest which has, in turn, led to a more stringent approach to State regulation under State Agreements. In particular, States are compelled through inter-governmental, federal and international competition and trade agreements to limit the extent to which it can negotiate its terms in a purely commercial way, embodying concessions in favour of proponents or preferences in favour of the State over other states or countries. Where a State Agreement expressly confers a benefit on third parties associated with access, third parties have successfully sought to enforce those benefits through the Courts, resulting in increased risks and costs for proponents that may not have been originally anticipated. Coupled with the political risks associated with changing governments and government policies, State Agreements, which have historically played a significant role in State development, are increasingly losing their ability to meet the commercial objectives of proponents.

Introduction: professional health regulation in the public interest

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
John Martyn Chamberlain
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Public Involvement ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Reform Agenda ◽  
The Public ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Healthcare Work ◽  
Professional Health ◽  
Complex Relationships

This chapter provides a commentary on, and introduces, the collection of papers in this volume. It begins by outlining how professional forms of health care expertise have become increasingly subject over the last four decades to third-party scrutiny, as well as how we have witnessed greater public involvement in the monitoring and quality assurance of healthcare work, particularly in Western neo-liberal societies. It then discusses how these changes have led the ‘social closure’ model of professional work to become revised, and in doing so how this raises concerns regarding academic engagement with members of the public as part of a broader patient advocacy and policy reform agenda focused on the promotion of the public interest. This discussion helps set the scene for subsequent chapters, which together seek to unpack the complex relationships that exist between health care practitioners, civil society, the state and professional groups in a variety of different international borders and regulatory jurisdictions. In doing so, each author seeks to explore critically how calls for increased efficiency and cost effectiveness in healthcare are balanced with the need to promote the public interest through providing citizens with essential health services.

scholarly journals "Public Purpose or Public Interest" and Third Party Transfers

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 206
Author(s):  
Bradley Virgil Slade
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Employment Opportunities ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Purpose ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Broad Interpretation

 In this article the difference between public purpose and public interest in section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution is considered. It is generally accepted that public purpose is a narrower category than public interest and that the distinction between public purpose and public interest does not make any practical difference. However, in this contribution it is suggested that the difference between public purpose and public interest makes no practical difference only in cases where expropriated property is used by the state for the realisation of a particular purpose. The difference between public purpose and public interest becomes more important when a particular expropriation also involves a third party transfer, since it indicates the level of scrutiny that the courts should apply in determining the lawfulness of the expropriation. When property is expropriated and transferred to a third party for the realisation of a public purpose, such as building and managing electricity plants, the lawfulness of the expropriation is not easily questioned. As such, the application of a rationality test to determine the legitimacy of the expropriation is generally easy to accept. However, this lenient approach cannot be as easily accepted where an expropriation and third party transfer takes place in the public interest. Examples of third party transfers in the public interest include land reform, slum clearance and economic development. In the examples of land reform and slum clearance the expropriation and third party transfer is usually authorised in legislation or, as is the case with land reform in South Africa, the 1996 Constitution. Because (as in the land reform example) the expropriation and third party transfer is authorised by the Constitution and regulated by legislation, the application of a rationality test to determine the legitimacy is acceptable. However, the application of a rationality test where property is expropriated and transferred to third parties for broader purposes such as economic development is problematic, especially if there is no specific legislation authorising such expropriation. Although an expropriation involving a third party transfer for purposes of economic development may well be in the public interest because it can lead to the creation of employment opportunities, it is argued that in the absence of specific legislation that authorises both the expropriation and the transfer of the property to third parties, the justification for the expropriation and the transfer is not entirely clear. Therefore, in the absence of a clear legislative scheme authorising the expropriation and transfer of property to third parties for the purpose of economic development, which can be said to fall within a very broad interpretation of the public interest requirement in section 25(2), the courts should apply a stricter scrutiny in evaluating its legitimacy.

A Theoretical Analysis of the “Green Lobby”

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Kerry Smith
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Environmental Groups ◽  
The Public ◽  
Efficient Outcome ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Benefits And Costs

The purpose of this article is to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing why individuals support private environmental “public interest” groups. The model attempts to integrate past contributions which have argued that these decisions could be explained by one of several factors, including: bounded rationality and imperfect information (Moe, 1980); the features of the public goods provided (or influenced by) these groups (Mitchell, 1979); the existence of a disequilibrium in households' demands for public goods (Weisbrod, 1977); or as a response to contract failures (Hansmann, 1980). The article uses a theoretical framework originally developed to explain individuals' decisions to join private clubs and specifies the conditions for the efficient provision of access to different types of private, nonprofit groups. By describing the optimal access conditions as if individuals could be coordinated to assure this efficient outcome, the model provides insights into the benefits and costs associated with membership in the environmental groups in practice.

scholarly journals The Tobacco Industry, Researchers, and Ethical Access to UK Biobank: Using the Public Interest and Public Good

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (10) ◽  
pp. 1833-1839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin James Capps ◽  
Yvette van der Eijk
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Uk Biobank ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Giving Unwanted Gifts: Political Economy of Youtube Apology

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 166-176
Author(s):  
Eka Sri Dana Afriza ◽  
Udi Rusadi
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Moral Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Exploitation ◽  
Moral Economies ◽  
The Media ◽  
Common Content

A public apology is a fairly common content found on the YouTube platform to restore the reputation and regain people's trust. At the same time, Youtube can also be used as a commodity-based economic platform that allows organizations, individuals, and Google (the owner of Youtube) to earn revenue either through advertising or direct promotion. These two things reflect the dual benefits of two opposites: genuine demand in the public interest and economic exploitation for the benefit of certain parties. This is well explored by the political economy theory of media which sees the digital platform as a convergence between the moral economy of commodities, the moral economy of gifts, and the moral economy of public goods. This article aims to further explore the three elements of the political economy of the media in the context of apologies on Youtube in five cases that occurred in Indonesia. The five apology cases were analyzed using parameters reflecting the moral economy of commodities, gifts, and public goods. The results of the analysis provide a typology of apology and a model that reflects the interrelation between the three moral economies involved in every apology.

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

scholarly journals Theoretical Problems of Public Interest Sector Industrial Relations

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 566-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Philips
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Public ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Explicit Consideration ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Over Time

This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model with explicit consideration of the determinants of the bargaining range and the narrowing of that range over time as a function of perceived bargaining power and costs of settlement. The model is then applied to the public-interest sector under altered assumptions of costs of settlement and the introduction of political influences in the determination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party intervention is considered in both the industry and public-interest sector cases.

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