Luck, Genes, and Equality

2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 712-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Fox

In a little noted passage in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that genetic intervention in the traits of offspring may be morally required as a matter of distributive justice. Given that the “greater natural assets” of each “enables him to pursue a preferred plan of life[,]” Rawls wrote, the parties to the original position “want to insure for their descendents the best genetic endowment.…Thus over time a society is to take steps at least to preserve the general level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects.…The pursuit of reasonable policies in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones.” (Emphasis added.) Whether biological enhancement actually is a moral obligation we owe to future generations is a question that I have taken up elsewhere, but which lies beyond my scope here. If we agree with Rawls that some measure of safe and effective genetic intervention may be required as a matter of justice, it stands to ask how the distribution of genetic goods – that is, the hereditary basis of human traits – should be carried out.

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”


Author(s):  
Robert Allen

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 84-99
Author(s):  
Viturino Ribeiro da Silva

A cooperação equitativa é um conceito central da filosofia de John Rawls e possui uma estreita relação com as noções de racionalidade, razoabilidade e tolerância. Portanto, faz-se necessário ressaltar que tais temas são fundamentais para uma adequada compreensão da teoria rawlsiana de justiça. Rawls elege a justiça como virtude primária e princípio norteador na construção da sua teoria. Em virtude disso, a preocupação de Rawls é a resolução das desigualdades sociais que ocorrem nos sistemas políticos democráticos. A noção de justiça como equidade faz-se indispensável frente à necessidade de eleger a liberdade enquanto preocupação com o justo equilíbrio e ao “consenso nas sociedades plurais”. É a partir da concepção de cooperação equitativa que Rawls tenta resolver o impasse contemporâneo da convivência de diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis sejam elas, religiosas, filosóficas ou morais. Dessa forma, a teoria rawlsiana de justiça tem como proposta a “coexistência pacifica” ante essa pluralidade de doutrinas compreensivas. Assim posto, a justiça como equidade, pode plausivelmente, ser a forma mais viável de coexistência pacífica que agrupamentos sociais poderiam seguir ou se pautar. Sob essa ótica, acredita-se que a noção de cooperação equitativa rawlsiana será uma via de justiça que enfatiza os direitos individuais sem desmerecer aquilo que é próprio do coletivo. Abstract: Fair cooperation is a central concept of J. Rawls´s philosophy and keeps a close relationship with the the notions of rationality, reasonability, and tolerance. Thus it is important to claim that these notions are necessary for a correct comprehension of rawlsian theory of justice. Rawls claims justice as the primary virtue and main principle of his theory. The aim of Rawls is to solve the social inequalities that occur in democratic political systems. The concept of justice as fairness is essential before the need of electing the liberty as concerning to the just balance and to the “consensus in the plural societies”. By starting from the conception of fair cooperation Rawls tries to solve the contemporary problem of different comprehensive doctrines sharing the same political and social space, no matter they are religious, philosophical or moral ones. The rawlsian theory of justice claims to propose as “pacific cohabitation” among that plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In this way, justice as fairness may plausibility be the most viable form of pacific cohabitation that social groups can follow or be ruled. Under this perspective, we believe that the rawlsian concept of fair cooperation will be a way of justice that focus on individual rights without deprive the significance of collective. Keywords: Rawls, fair cooperation, original position, rationality, reasonability. 


Author(s):  
Juliano Morimoto

1.     The lack of diversity and equality of opportunities in academia is often seen as evidence of unfair processes in academic institutions when it comes to the distribution of goods. In this paper, I propose a novel framework to address this issue. 2.     The framework integrates the body of literature on human developmental ecology with the theory of justice by John Rawls. The underlying premise of the framework is that academic institutions should account for the arbitrary ecological factors (e.g., culture, socioeconomic background) that influence the opportunities for academic achievements by individuals throughout their lives prior to application for goods. 3.     The framework is designed to help academic institutions mitigate (or potentially, eliminate) the benefits accrued over time by individuals that experienced arbitrary but favourable ecological conditions, and assess and judge candidates relative to the expected academic performance given candidates’ ecological contexts (i.e., objective fairness). In doing so, this framework is a process that, if adopted by academic institutions, can result in fair equality of opportunities in the distribution of goods. 4.     I also discuss the concept of ‘years post-PhD’, which attempts to make competition fair by discretising career trajectories. I propose a different landmark, which takes into account years post-first authorship publication, and argue that years post-first authorship publication is less relativistic and accounts for differences in academic structure between countries. I discuss the limitations and alternative attempts to make processes in academic institutions fair throughout the text. 5.     Overall, this paper proposes a framework designed to improve the academic environment by creating fairness in the distribution of goods by academic institutions, thereby generating true equality of opportunities to all. Keywords: social justice; policy; equality; minorities


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.


DoisPontos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrício Pontin

O impacto e a relevância da teoria econômica para o desenvolvimento de A Theory of Justice são, frequentemente, deixados de lado na imensa literatura a respeito das obras de John Rawls. Ainda assim, entender os elementos de economia política na obra de Rawls é fundamental para a compreensão dos motivos pelos quais ele abandonará uma abordagem utilitarista para a filosofia política e, consequentemente , par a noss o entendimento das principais questões que dão origem à noção de justiça como equidade. Este artigo tem dois objetivos principais: primeiramente, descrever a influência de John Stuart Mill, Kenneth Arrow e Vilfredo Pareto na virada metodológica encontrada na ideia de posição original; segundo, descrever os elementos históricos pressupostos para a compreensibilidade dos ideais rawlsianos. Concluirei com algumas observações que sugerem um complemento historicista e fenomenológico para as descrições ideais encontradas no liberalismo político tal como é entendido por Rawls.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-136
Author(s):  
Iqbal Hasanuddin

Charles Taylor is a Canadian Philosopher who is very critical to the idea of distributive justice from the liberal thinkers. One of them is John Rawls, especially his thought in A Theory of Justice. Then, this paper will examine Taylor’s view on that idea. To do so, I analyze Taylor’s Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Following Aristotelian way of thinking on the importance of society to achieve the human good, Taylor criticizes some basic assumptions which support the liberal idea of justice. For him, the emergence of the idea of distributive justice is caused by the failure of the modern thinkers to understand the essence of human being and its relation to society.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Wadyo Pandapotan Pasaribu

ABSTRACT: This article with a title "ThePolicy of People Business Credit (PBC ID: KUR) in the view of John Rawls Theory of Justice" will firstly explain the economic condition of our country (the Republic of Indonesia) from the analysis of experts in economy and governments view to the current economic situation. Next, the discussion is about the formula of the policy of people business credit as an economic policy of Indonesian government in her effort to reduce the number of economic gap or income gap with a business fund allocation to SMEthrough PBC program. Then, this article explains John Rawls general principle of justice which is related to pareto optimalitywhereas on its practical level it is distributive justice that takes effect, in which each actor will get in accordance with his contribution in the market. KEYWORDS:people business credit, distributive justice, John Rawls


Author(s):  
Michael Blake

Most discussions of intergenerational justice focus on distributive justice between generations. Much of contemporary thinking about justice, though, focuses on how people might reason together in a respectful and egalitarian manner—with, that is, justice in political discourse. This chapter seeks to apply this latter sort of theorizing to the intergenerational context. It identifies two ways in which discursive justice might be applicable to that context. First, the present generation might wrong future generations by making discursive justice more difficult in the future; it might, for instance, create a future in which political agents must display greater virtue—both intellectual and moral—than present generations have had to demonstrate. Second, if we accept that agents may have interests that outlive themselves, then one generation might wrong another by failing to listen to the claims that persist through time and across generations. This discussion is compatible with the conclusion that moral claims generally diminish in importance over time; as the world in which a given generation’s moral commitments were made changes, so too does the moral pull of those commitments diminish.


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