Generic Issues Program Overview and Update

Author(s):  
Jack W. Foster ◽  
John V. Kauffman

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a Generic Issues Program (GIP) to address Generic Issues (GI). A GI is defined as “a regulatory matter involving the design, construction, operation, or decommissioning of several, or a class of, NRC licensees or certificate holders that is not sufficiently addressed by existing rules, guidance, or programs.” This rather legalistic definition has several practical corollaries: First, a GI must involve safety. Second, the issue must involve at least two plants, or it would be a plant-specific issue rather than a GI. Third, the potential safety question must not be covered by existing regulations and guidance (compliance). Thus, the effect of a GI is to potentially change the body of regulations and associated guidance (e.g., regulatory guides). The GIP was started in 1976, thus it is a relatively mature program. There have been approximately 850 issues processed by the program to date. More importantly, even after 30 years, new GIs continue to be proposed. The entire set of Generic Issues (GIs) is updated annually in NUREG-0933, “A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues.” GIs tend to involve complex questions of safety and regulation. The efficient and effective means of addressing these issues is very important for regulatory effectiveness. If an issue proves to pose a genuine, significant safety question, then swift, effective, enforceable, and cost-effective action needs to be taken. Conversely, if an issue is of little safety significance, the issue should be dismissed in an expeditious manner, avoiding unnecessary expenditure of resources and regulatory burden or uncertainty. This paper provides an overview of the 5-stage program, from identification through the regulatory assessment stage. The paper also includes a discussion of the program’s seven criteria, sources of proposed GIs, recent improvements, publicly available information, historical performance, and status of current GIs.

Author(s):  
Alan D. Chockie ◽  
M. Robin Graybeal ◽  
Scott D. Kulat

The risk-informed inservice inspection (RI-ISI) process provides a structured and systematic framework for allocating inspection resources in a cost-effective manner while improving plant safety. It helps focus inspections where failure mechanisms are likely to be and where enhanced inspections are warranted. To date, over eighty-five percent of US nuclear plants and a number of non-US plants have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, RI-ISI programs. Many are already involved in the periodic update of their RI-ISI program. The development of RI-ISI methodologies in the US has been a long and involved process. The risk-informed procedures and rules were developed to take full advantage of PRA data, industry and plant experiences, information on specific damage mechanisms, and other available information. An important feature of the risk-informed methodologies is the requirement to make modifications and improvements to the plant’s RI-ISI application as new information and insights become available. The nuclear industry, ASME Section XI, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have all worked together to take advantage of the lessons learned over the years to refine and expand the use of risk-informed methodologies. This paper examines the lessons learned and the benefits received from the application and refinement of risk-informed inservice inspection programs. Also included in the paper is a review of how the information and insights have been used to improve the risk-informed methodologies.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Harold Adkins ◽  
Judith Cuta ◽  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
...  

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, at the interchange known as the “MacArthur Maze.” The accident involved a double tanker truck of gasoline overturning and bursting into flames. The subsequent fire reduced the strength of the supporting steel structure of an overhead interstate roadway causing the collapse of portions of that overpass onto the lower roadway in less than 20 minutes. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has analyzed what might have happened had a spent nuclear fuel transportation package been involved in this accident, to determine if there are any potential regulatory implications of this accident to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper provides a summary of this effort, presents preliminary results and conclusions, and discusses future work related to the NRC’s analysis of the consequences of this type of severe accident.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


2012 ◽  
Vol 134 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Gamble ◽  
William Server ◽  
Bruce Bishop ◽  
Nathan Palm ◽  
Carol Heinecke

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [1], Section XI, Appendix G provides a deterministic procedure for defining Service Level A and B pressure–temperature limits for ferritic components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. An alternative risk-informed methodology has been developed for ASME Section XI, Appendix G. This alternative methodology provides easy to use procedures to define risk-informed pressure–temperature limits for Service Level A and B events, including leak testing and reactor start-up and shut-down. Risk-informed pressure–temperature limits provide more operational flexibility, particularly for reactor pressure vessels with relatively high irradiation levels and radiation sensitive materials. This work evaluated selected plants spanning the population of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). The evaluation included determining appropriate material properties, reviewing operating history and system operational constraints, and performing probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses. The analysis results were used to define risk-informed pressure–temperature relationships that comply with safety goals defined by the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This alternative methodology will provide greater operational flexibility, especially for Service Level A and B events that may adversely affect efficient and safe plant operation, such as low-temperature-over-pressurization for PWRs and system leak testing for BWRs. Overall, application of this methodology can result in increased plant efficiency and increased plant and personnel safety.


Author(s):  
Amir Ali ◽  
Edward D. Blandford

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated a generic safety issue (GSI-191) assessing debris accumulation and resultant chemical effects on pressurized water reactor (PWR) sump performance. GSI-191 has been investigated using reduced-scale separate-effects testing and integral-effects testing facilities. These experiments focused on developing a procedure to generate prototypical debris beds that provide stable and reproducible conventional head loss (CHL). These beds also have the ability to filter out chemical precipitates resulting in chemical head loss. The newly developed procedure presented in this paper is used to generate debris beds with different particulate to fiber ratios (η). Results from this experimental investigation show that the prepared beds can provide reproducible CHL for different η in a single and multivertical loops facility within ±7% under the same flow conditions. The measured CHL values are consistent with the predicted values using the NUREG-6224 correlation. Also, the results showed that the prepared debris beds following the proposed procedure are capable of detecting standard aluminum and calcium precipitates, and the head loss increase (chemical head loss) was measured and reported in this paper.


1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-123
Author(s):  
Linda O. Hecht

Due to the concern for safety the nuclear power industry in the United States has fostered the use of reliability analysis to assess system performance and the impact of system failure on overall plant safety. The need for system and component failure rate data has been recognized and has spurred such efforts as NPRDS (Nuclear Power Research Data System) and IEEE's Std 500 (The Reliability Data Manual). Reliability modeling techniques have been developed for application to nuclear systems and are presently being considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for licensing purposes.


Author(s):  
Terry L. Dickson ◽  
Shah N. Malik ◽  
Mark T. Kirk ◽  
Deborah A. Jackson

The current federal regulations to ensure that nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events were derived from computational models that were developed in the early to mid 1980s. Since that time, there have been advancements in relevant technologies associated with the physics of PTS events that impact RPV integrity assessment. Preliminary studies performed in 1999 suggested that application of the improved technology could reduce the conservatism in the current regulations while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license extension considerations. Based on the above, in 1999, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project, with the nuclear power industry as a participant, to re-evaluate the current PTS regulations within the framework established by modern probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques. During the last three years, improved computational models have evolved through interactions between experts in the relevant disciplines of thermal hydraulics, PRA, human reliability analysis (HRA), materials embrittlement effects on fracture toughness (crack initiation and arrest), fracture mechanics methodology, and fabrication-induced flaw characterization. These experts were from the NRC staff, their contractors, and representatives from the nuclear industry. These improved models have now been implemented into the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels: Oak Ridge) computer code, which is an applications tool for performing risk-informed structural integrity evaluations of embrittled RPVs subjected to transient thermal-hydraulic loading conditions. The baseline version of FAVOR (version 1.0) was released in October 2001. The updated risk-informed computational methodology in the FAVOR code is currently being applied to selected domestic commercial pressurized water reactors to evaluate the adequacy of the current regulations and to determine whether a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of the current regulations. This paper provides a status report on the application of the updated computational methodology to a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) and discusses the results and interpretation of those results. It is anticipated that this re-evaluation effort will be completed in 2002.


Author(s):  
D. J. Wren ◽  
N. Popov ◽  
V. J. Langman ◽  
V. G. Snell

AECL Technologies (AECLT), the 100%-owned US subsidiary of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), is currently the proponents of a pre-licensing review of the Advanced CANDU® Reactor (ACR™)* with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). A key focus topic for this pre-application review is the NRC acceptance of the computer codes used in the safety analysis of the ACR. These codes have been developed and their predictions compared against experimental results over extended periods of time in Canada. These codes have also undergone formal validation in the 1990’s. In support of this formal validation effort AECL has developed, implemented and currently maintains a Software Quality Assurance program (SQA) to ensure that its analytical, scientific and design computer codes meet the required standards for software used in safety analyses. This paper discusses the SQA program used to develop, qualify and maintain the computer codes used in ACR safety analysis, including the current program underway to confirm the applicability of these computer codes for use in ACR safety analyses.


Author(s):  
John Minichiello ◽  
Ernest B. Branch ◽  
Timothy M. Adams ◽  
Yasuhide Asada ◽  
Richard W. Barnes

The new rules for seismic piping design in Section III that were developed and included in the requirements in 1994 Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PV Code) generated considerable discussion within the industry and from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (USNRC). The USNRC initiated a review of the results of the previous EPRI/NRC experimental program and the Japanese industry started its own experimental program. To accommodate and address developments resulting from these efforts, the ASME, B&PV Code established a Special Working Group (SWG) to continue the review and study of the questions and information generated. This paper reports on the efforts of this SWG which resulted in refinements of the revised rules. These refinements have been accepted for inclusion in Section III of the ASME, B&PV Code.


Author(s):  
Terry Dickson ◽  
Mark EricksonKirk

The current regulations, as set forth by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to insure that light-water nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to planned reactor startup (heat-up) and shutdown (cool-down) transients are specified in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, which incorporates by reference Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code. The technical basis for these regulations contains many aspects that are now broadly recognized by the technical community as being unnecessarily conservative and some plants are finding it increasingly difficult to comply with the current regulations. Consequently, a goal of current NRC research is to derive a technical basis for a risk-informed revision to the current requirements that reduces the conservatism and also is consistent with the methods previously used to develop a risk-informed revision to the regulations for accidental transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS). Previous publications have been successful in illustrating potential methods to provide a risk-informed relaxation to the current regulations for normal transients. Thus far, probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses have been performed at 60 effective full power years (EFPY) for one of the reactors evaluated as part of the PTS re-evaluation project. In these previous analyses / publications, consistent with the assumptions utilized for this particular reactor in the PTS re-evaluation, all flaws for this reactor were postulated to be embedded. The objective of this paper is to review the analysis results and conclusions from previous publications on this subject and to attempt to modify / generalize these conclusions to include RPVs postulated to contain only inner-surface breaking flaws or a combination of embedded flaws and inner-surface breaking flaws.


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