scholarly journals Policy-Combination Oriented Optimization for Public Transportation Based on the Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wentao Zhu ◽  
Mengwei Chen ◽  
Dianhai Wang ◽  
Dongfang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Public Transportation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Travel Cost ◽  
Comfort Level ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Transit Assignment ◽  
Dynamic Interactions ◽  
Effective Performance ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Government

This research aims at detecting the interactions between policy maker and travelers when making public transport policy and strategies to optimize relevant policy combination. In the two scenarios of whether to set a bus lane or not, travel cost functions of bus and car are proposed, respectively, with the in-vehicle comfort level of passengers considered. By introducing the bottleneck model and transit assignment model, travelers’ behaviors are revealed according to different travel mode. Focusing on minimizing the total cost of the system (TSC), Stackelberg game model is built to describe the dynamic interactions between the government, the bus company, and travelers. Finally, kriging surrogate method is proposed on account of numerical simulation to find solution to the game model and propose the optimal policy combination and resource allocation. The results show an effective performance: under the assumption that the travel distance is 20km, the optimized policy combination can reduce TSC by 8.59% and 9.82% in two scenarios, respectively, and reduce travel cost per person by 10.28% and 15.85%, respectively.

The Analysis of Government Re-Regulation Caused by Externality of Building Energy-Saving

2012 ◽  
Vol 446-449 ◽  
pp. 2267-2271
Author(s):  
Ting Wang ◽  
Qian Li ◽  
Hong Liang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Building Energy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Building Energy Saving ◽  
The Government

In this paper, aiming at the problem of “market failure” in the building energy-saving field, we discuss the principle of externality in this field and analyze how the externality of building energy-saving leads to the rent-seeking behavior of building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers using the economic theory. Based on the Game theory, we analyze the revenue and cost of unproductive activities between building energy-saving regulation department and building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers, how the government supervises and regulates corruption which comes from unproductive activities, and the tripartite game model of the rent-seeking behavior in the domain of energy-saving is built. On the basis of the establishment and solution of the tripartite game model，we put forward effective countermeasures and methods for government re-regulation.

Analysis of Game Theory Application in the Land Acquisition of Major Projects in China's Urban Area

2013 ◽  
Vol 773 ◽  
pp. 738-743
Author(s):  
Yao Ni ◽  
Wen Ze Yue
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Urban Area ◽  
Land Acquisition ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
The Government

In this paper, the author utilizes the game theory to analyze the interest expression, game strategies and the inter-game relation of stakeholders including government, developers, land-contributing units and citizens in the major projects. Then the game model is built to focus on the game relations between the government and landcontributing units as well as citizens, aiming to identify factors that promote the balance. Finally, the game solutions are proposed.

Optimisation of government subsidies in infrastructure public-private partnerships

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wang ◽  
Xueqing Wang ◽  
Lu Wang ◽  
Henry Liu ◽  
Michael Sing ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Project Performance ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Willingness To Participate ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Government

Purpose This study aims to develop a Stackelberg Game Model for seeking the optimal subsidy plans with varying levels of government financial capability (GFC). Furthermore, the scenario-based analysis is conducted and will enable governments to identify a comprehensive subsidy plan as follows: improve project performance and optimise social welfare. Design/methodology/approach A Stackelberg Game Model is developed to optimise the effectiveness of subsidies on the performance of public-private partnerships (PPPs). Findings According to the scenarios that are generated from the model, governments that are confronting with limited public budgets could reduce the intensity of performance incentives and increase the participation-oriented subsidy. Whilst a participation-oriented subsidy can stimulate private organisations’ willingness to participate in infrastructure PPPs, a performance-oriented subsidy is capable of facilitating the projects’ performances. Intuitively, the performance-oriented subsidy enables the private entities of PPPs to improve their efforts on the projects to realise higher profits. However, the participation-oriented subsidy is unable to affect the level of their effort spent on the projects. To satisfy both parties’ expectations in a PPP, the performance-oriented subsidy needs to be prioritised for a purpose of enabling higher quality outputs. Practical implications The game model developed in this study contributes to the literature by offering new insight into the underlying mechanism of governments and private entities, in terms of their decision-making for subsidy planning and contributions (i.e. resource allocation and spending) during the life-cycle of PPPs. This research enriches the government subsidy model by revealing the effects of the GFC and clarifies the impacts of two different schemes of subsidy on the performance of PPPs. Originality/value The government has been conventionally viewed as being omnipotent to provide PPPs with a wide range of subsidies. However, the subsidies are not unlimited, due to GFC. In addressing this void, this study has modelled the impacts of government subsidy plans with a consideration of GFC-related constraints. The combined effects of the participation- and performance-oriented subsidies on the project performance of PPPs have been examined.

Cloud Provider's Response to Multiple Models of Attack Behaviors

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-333
Author(s):  
Xu Liu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Di ◽  
Jinqing Li ◽  
Huamin Yang ◽  
Ligang Cong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Multiple Models ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cloud Provider ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Attack Behavior ◽  
Behavior Model ◽  
Protection Strategy ◽  
Behavior Models ◽  
Optimal Protection

Background: User behavior models have been widely used to simulate attack behaviors in the security domain. We revised all patents related to response to attack behavior models. How to decide the protected target against multiple models of attack behaviors is studied. Methods: We utilize one perfect rational and three bounded rational behavior models to simulate attack behaviors in cloud computing, and then investigate cloud provider’s response based on Stackelberg game. The cloud provider plays the role of defender and it is assumed to be intelligent enough to predict the attack behavior model. Based on the prediction accuracy, two schemes are built in two situations. Results: If the defender can predict the attack behavior model accurately, a single-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy; otherwise, a multi-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy. Conclusion: The numerical results prove that the game theoretic model performs better in the corresponding situation.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8271
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Zihao Chen ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Programming Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Stochastic Demands ◽  
Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

scholarly journals Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3236
Author(s):  
Gan Wan ◽  
Gang Kou ◽  
Tie Li ◽  
Feng Xiao ◽  
Yang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Good Combination ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Offline Channels

Due to the popularization of the concept of “new retailing”, we study a new commercial model named O2O (online-to-offline), which is a good combination model of a direct channel and a traditional retail channel. We analyze an O2O supply chain in which manufacturers are responsible for making green products and selling them through both online and offline channels. The retailer is responsible for all online and offline channels’ orders, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a fixed fee. We construct a mathematical function model and analyze the greenness and pricing strategies of centralized and decentralized settings through the retailer Stackelberg game model. Due to the effects of the double marginalization of supply chain members, we adopt a simple contract to coordinate the green supply chain. The paper’s contributions are that we obtain pricing and greening strategies by taking the cooperation of offline channels and online channels into consideration under the O2O green supply chain environment.

Game Analysis on Problem of Food Safety in the Agricultural Products Supply Chain

2010 ◽  
Vol 20-23 ◽  
pp. 1040-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Hua Shi ◽  
Zi Lai Sun ◽  
Kun Jing Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Basic Material ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Survival And Development ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Material Conditions

Food is the most basic material conditions of survival and development of human society, its security situation is relation to the health and safety of consumer directly. This paper analyze the reasons of causing problems of food quality and safety in the agricultural products supply chain from the perspective of the game theory as well as the government incentive and regulatory mechanisms affect the decision-making of farmers and food producers respectively. In the game between crop growers - farmers and food producers, the government play the outsider role and should give farmers subsidies to encourage them to grow high-quality green crops, as far as possible to ensure food safety from the source. In the game between producers and regulators, the government, as the game participant, should be asked to improve the supervision efficiency and the control ability to prevent unqualified food products entering the market.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Dynamics Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Xigang Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Recovery Ratio ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Product Sale ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

The paper discusses the government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) between two competing manufacturers and a recycler in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under asymmetric information. According to the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three decision-making models are built: (1) decentralized dynamics game model without RPM, (2) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM, and (3) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases product sale price, while it decreases the WEEE buy-back price and the WEEE recovery ratio, besides the profit of recycler. To some extent, it cannot motivate WEEE recycling. (2) Recovery ratio RPM improves the WEEE recovery ratio and lowers the product sale price; it also benefits manufacturer-1’s and recycler’s profits and consumers’ surplus. So it strongly proved effectiveness in guiding WEEE recycling. (3) In any case, the product sale price of manufacture-1 is lower than that of manufacturer-2. Similarly, the WEEE buy-back price and WEEE recovery ratio with H type are higher than those of L type, respectively. Apparently, it is suggested that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling and remanufacturing can gain competitive advantages; meanwhile, the recycler with high fixed cost has the scale advantages. (4) The competition can benefit improving WEEE recovery ratio. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results. According to the main conclusions, we propose that taking active part in recycling and remanufacturing WEEE and choosing the recycler with high fixed cost to cooperate are the wise choices for manufacturers. The recycler should expand fixed recovery cost investment, which will contribute to getting the scale effect; the government needs to balance the carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM so as to cut down environmental pollution and guide the CLSC into WEEE recycling and remanufacturing. The most important carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be set appropriately in case of discouraging members of CLSC recycling WEEE.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

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