The DBO theory of action and distributed cognition

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuukka Kaidesoja

The DBO (Desires, Beliefs and Opportunities) theory of action proposed by analytical sociologists aims to provide an action-theoretical basis for building explanatory theories in sociology. Peter Hedström claims that the DBO theory is realistic because it does not make assumptions that are known to be false or seriously incompatible with the current scientific understanding about the nature of human action and cognition. This article nevertheless aims to show that the DBO theory is not only incomplete but also that its background assumptions are unrealistic, in the sense that they do not fit with the distributed nature of action-related cognition, which has recently become a growing topic of interest in cognitive sciences. The author also indicates that the neglect of the distributed and embodied aspects of cognition in the DBO theory leads to various biases in the process of constructing mechanism-based explanations in social sciences. Finally, an alternative approach to action theory is sketched on the basis of this critique.

Author(s):  
Mark Siderits

This essay develops the theory of action presupposed by Buddhist Reductionists. Their account uses the theory of two truths to reconcile the folk theory of human action with the Buddhist claim that there are no agents. The conventional truth has it that persons are substance-causes of actions, and the willings that trigger actions are exercises of a person’s powers in light of their reasons. According to the ultimate truth, there are no persons, only causal series of bundles of tropes. An action is a bodily or mental event in one such series that has the occurrence of a prior intention event as its cause. Facts about causally connected psychophysical elements explain the utility, and thus the conventional truth, of claims about persons as agents. This two-tier account of human agency makes possible a novel approach to making attributions of moral responsibility compatible with psychological determinism.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dániel Havrancsik

TThe paper surveys A. Schütz’s proto-sociological theory that carried on Weber’s sociological program by expanding it through Husserl’s constitutive phenomenology. The theory will be explicated through a focus on its phenomenological aspect. Schütz’s phenomenology is based on two elements. Firstly, it uses a phenomenological variant of action theory, namely the idea that argues for the given nature of intersubjective relationships. Secondly, it uses the criticism of Husserl’s tenets on intersubjectivity. Schütz’s theory about the relation of everyday and scientific understanding is influenced by expectations of social science. Therefore his theory transcends the limitations of other phenomenological theories that defy application in the area of social sciences. In addition, his model can has its own place in philosophical phenomenology. The paper, finally, surveys those trends in sociology that have carried on Schütz’s approach and managed to mingle aspects of phenomenology and sociology.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Mazzuca ◽  
Matteo Santarelli

The concept of gender has been the battleground of scientific and political speculations for a long time. On the one hand, some accounts contended that gender is a biological feature, while on the other hand some scholars maintained that gender is a socio-cultural construct (e.g., Butler, 1990; Risman, 2004). Some of the questions that animated the debate on gender over history are: how many genders are there? Is gender rooted in our biological asset? Are gender and sex the same thing? All of these questions entwine one more crucial, and often overlooked interrogative. How is it possible for a concept to be the purview of so many disagreements and conceptual redefinitions? The question that this paper addresses is therefore not which specific account of gender is preferable. Rather, the main question we will address is how and why is even possible to disagree on how gender should be considered. To provide partial answers to these questions, we suggest that gender/sex (van Anders, 2015; Fausto-Sterling, 2019) is an illustrative example of politicized concepts. We show that no concepts are political in themselves; instead, some concepts are subjected to a process involving a progressive detachment from their supposed concrete referent (i.e., abstractness), a tension to generalizability (i.e., abstraction), a partial indeterminacy (i.e., vagueness), and the possibility of being contested (i.e., contestability). All of these features differentially contribute to what we call the politicization of a concept. In short, we will claim that in order to politicize a concept, a possible strategy is to evidence its more abstract facets, without denying its more embodied and perceptual components (Borghi et al., 2019). So, we will first outline how gender has been treated in psychological and philosophical discussions, to evidence its essentially contestable character thereby showing how it became a politicized concept. Then we will review some of the most influential accounts of political concepts, arguing that currently they need to be integrated with more sophisticated distinctions (e.g., Koselleck, 2004). The notions gained from the analyses of some of the most important accounts of political concepts in social sciences and philosophy will allow us to implement a more dynamic approach to political concepts. Specifically, when translated into the cognitive science framework, these reflections will help us clarifying some crucial aspects of the nature of politicized concepts. Bridging together social and cognitive sciences, we will show how politicized concepts are abstract concepts, or better abstract conceptualizations.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Consequentialists have long debated (as deontologists should) how to define an agent’s alternatives, given that (a) at any particular time an agent performs numerous “versions” of actions, (b) an agent may perform several independent co-temporal actions, and (c) an agent may perform sequences of actions. We need a robust theory of human action to provide an account of alternatives that avoids previously debated problems. After outlining Alvin Goldman’s action theory (which takes a fine-grained approach to act individuation) and showing that the agent’s alternatives must remain invariant across different normative theories, I address issue (a) by arguing that an alternative for an agent at a time is an entire “act tree” performable by her, rather than any individual act token. I argue further that both tokens and trees must possess moral properties, and I suggest principles governing how these are inherited among trees and tokens. These proposals open a path for future work addressing issues (b) and (c).


1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 557-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. B. LASSEN

This paper develops the functional part of a theory of action semantics for reasoning about programs. Action notation, the specification language of action semantics, is given an evaluation semantics, and operational techniques from process theory and functional programming are applied in the development of a versatile action theory. The power of the theory is demonstrated by means of action semantic proofs of functional program equivalences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gubara Hassan

The Western originators of the multi-disciplinary social sciences and their successors, including most major Western social intellectuals, excluded religion as an explanation for the world and its affairs. They held that religion had no role to play in modern society or in rational elucidations for the way world politics or/and relations work. Expectedly, they also focused most of their studies on the West, where religion’s effect was least apparent and argued that its influence in the non-West was a primitive residue that would vanish with its modernization, the Muslim world in particular. Paradoxically, modernity has caused a resurgence or a revival of religion, including Islam. As an alternative approach to this Western-centric stance and while focusing on Islam, the paper argues that religion is not a thing of the past and that Islam has its visions of international relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states or abodes: peace, war, truce or treaty, and preaching (da’wah).


Author(s):  
Martha Whitesmith

Belief, Bias and Intelligence outlines an approach for reducing the risk of cognitive biases impacting intelligence analysis that draws from experimental research in the social sciences. It critiques the reliance of Western intelligence agencies on the use of a method for intelligence analysis developed by the CIA in the 1990’s, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). The book shows that the theoretical basis of the ACH method is significantly flawed, and that there is no empirical basis for the use of ACH in mitigating cognitive biases. It puts ACH to the test in an experimental setting against two key cognitive biases with unique empirical research facilitated by UK’s Professional Heads of Intelligence Analysis unit at the Cabinet Office, includes meta-analysis into which analytical factors increase and reduce the risk of cognitive bias and recommends an alternative approach to risk mitigation for intelligence communities. Finally, it proposes alternative models for explaining the underlying causes of cognitive biases, challenging current leading theories in the social sciences.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Patricia Carolina Barreto Bernal

Pensar en la administración como un conjunto de conocimientos organizados y sistemáticamente construidos para explicar la especificidad de una disciplina ha sido un esfuerzo aun no terminado de más de un siglo de autores que desde finales del siglo XIX hasta estas primeras década del siglo XXI han venido construyendo el discurso teórico de la administración. El presente artículo hace un pequeñorecorrido por los diferentes intentos de organización de dicho conocimiento desde la reflexión de los tres componentes que constituyen una epistemología a saber: su objeto de estudio, su cuerpo teórico y su relación con las demás ciencias sociales para el desarrollo de un método. A partir de dichos elementos, en la tercera parte del artículo se arriesga una propuesta de construcción epistemológica en elconocimiento administrativo acudiendo a la filosofía integradora de la teoría de la complejidad. La metodología seguida para realizar el artículo fue la de revisión documental y concluye que la potencialidad de la administración como práctica social y conjunto de herramientas de gestión y dirección puede ser pensada como un campo epistemológico flexible y abierto a las relaciones de transdisciplinariedad que se presuponen necesarias para una comprensión integral y dinámica de larealidad.PALABRAS CLAVEPensamiento administrativo, epistemología, teoría de las organizaciones, acción humana. ABSTRACTThinking about administration as an ensemble of organized and systematically constructed knowledge in order to explain the specificity of a discipline has been an unfinished effort of more than a century of authors who since the late XIX century until the first decades of the XXI century, have been constructing the theoretical discourse of administration. The current paper makes a brief tour through thedifferent attempts of organization of such knowledge, from the three components reflection which compose an epistemology as follows: its object of study, its theoretical body and its relationship with other social sciences for the development of a method. From these elements, in the third part of the paper, it is taken the risk of making a proposal of epistemological construction in the administrative knowledge,turning to the conciliatory philosophy of the complexity theory. The methodology used to carry out the paper was the documentary review, and it concludes that the potentiality of administration as a social practice and a set of management and leadership tools could be thought as a flexible epistemological field, open to the relations of transdisciplinarity which are presupposed to be necessary for anintegral and dynamic comprehension of reality.KEYWORDSManagement thinking, epistemology, organizational theory, human action. 


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janusz Maciaszek

By manipulation one can understand an abuse of the influence on other people. As the term ‘abuse’ is vague and unclear, one cannot decide in every instance whether it is an abuse of influence or whether the influence on other people is justified. In the paper I distinguish three types of actions consisting in exercising influence on other people. The theoretical basis for this typology is Donald Davidson’s theory of action, and in particular his notion of reason of action and practical syllogism. The first type of influence consists in modification of rather constant beliefs, preferences, and values. The typical example of an action of this type is brain-washing, The second type of action is modification of short-term attitudes, e.g. beliefs about the environment, wishes and preferences in special situations, etc. The typical example is advertising. In the third type the manipulator does not try to modify attitudes but he intends to provoke “acratic” actions, i.e. actions being the result of week will. The typology permits, at least partially, to precise what the abuse consists in for every type of influence.


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