scholarly journals Whose stories are told and who is made responsible? Human-interest framing in health journalism in Norway, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S.

Journalism ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 146488492110415
Author(s):  
Tine Ustad Figenschou ◽  
Kjersti Thorbjørnsrud ◽  
Daniel C Hallin

Human-interest narratives are journalistic tools to captivate and engage the audience, influence public opinion and bring revenue to media organizations. This paper analyses how human-interest narratives are used in contemporary health journalism across media systems and health systems. Based on a comparative content analysis of Norwegian, Spanish, U.K. and U.S. newspapers (2016–2017), it studies how human-interest stories are contextualized, health problems explained and responsibility attributed. The article reveals a complex picture of the role of human-interest stories in health coverage. In line with expectations, the study finds that human-interest stories do tend to emphasize individual biomedical treatment of illness and to privilege idealized victims who fit the routines of dominant media dramaturgy. In contrast to theories that consider personalization of news as an individualization of responsibility and dumbing down of public debate, however, the study finds that human-interest narratives are also used to explain health as a structural phenomenon and a collective responsibility, appealing to political intervention and accountability of health authorities. Such claims are more prominent in European human-interest health stories and less frequent in the more strongly commercialized U.S. health and media system.

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215824402110101
Author(s):  
Xheni Simaku

The global society which we live in nowadays makes us rethink about media system, global dynamics, and the operation of the influences that these dynamics have on national media systems. Starting from the book by Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, and under the Polarized Pluralist Model they proposed, the aim of this work is to compare Turkish and Italian journalists’ professionalization. This research has been conducted under the concept of professionalization that these authors suggested in their work and, more specifically, under the Polarized Pluralist Model, in which Hallin and Mancini recognize countries like Italy have the main characteristics described by the model; Turkey can also be included. The main goal of this work is to underline not only the similarities but also the differences that are encountered in these two countries in the journalistic professionalization. The methodology used is in-depth interviews with 10 journalists: five Italian and five Turkish journalists chosen from the biggest journals in their respective countries. Main topics taken into consideration were autonomy, clientelism, and professionalization in journalism based on ethics values. Even if the Polarized Pluralist Model seems to fit in both countries from a macro perspective, with the in-depth interviews, it is clearly seen that different cross-national nuances come out.


2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312199953
Author(s):  
Paul K Jones

Political communication studies has a long tradition of ‘crisis talk’ regarding the fate of public communication. Now, however, the field itself faces a kind of existential crisis as its core assumptions of ‘normal’ political communication are daily undermined. This ‘liberal normalcy’ shares much with orthodoxies in populism studies, most notably a tendency to bracket out demagogic communication, both in historical fascist regimes and democracies. Yet correcting these failings is not simply a matter of rejecting liberal models for left-populist ones. Rather, both fields need to broaden their historical parameters and deepen their theoretical frameworks. The article draws on the Weberian conception of modern demagogy and its revision in the wake of 'modern media' by Shils and Adorno. It further argues that a critical reworking of Hallin and Mancini’s media systems approach could benefit both fields. For Hallin and Mancini’s socio-historical use of Weberian ideal-typification complements Worsley’s never-completed plan for an ideal-typification of modes of populism and demagogic leadership.


2021 ◽  
pp. 194016122199966
Author(s):  
Philipp Bachmann ◽  
Mark Eisenegger ◽  
Diana Ingenhoff

High-quality news is important, not only for its own sake but also for its political implications. However, defining, operationalizing, and measuring news media quality is difficult, because evaluative criteria depend upon beliefs about the ideal society, which are inherently contested. This conceptual and methodological paper outlines important considerations for defining news media quality before developing and applying a multimethod approach to measure it. We refer to Giddens' notion of double hermeneutics, which reveals that the ways social scientists understand constructs inevitably interact with the meanings of these constructs shared by people in society. Reflecting the two-way relationship between society and social sciences enables us to recognize news media quality as a dynamic, contingent, and contested construct and, at the same time, to reason our understanding of news media quality, which we derive from Habermas' ideal of deliberative democracy. Moreover, we investigate the Swiss media system to showcase our measurement approach in a repeated data collection from 2017 to 2020. We assess the content quality of fifty news media outlets using four criteria derived from the deliberative ideal ( N = 20,931 and 18,559 news articles and broadcasting items, respectively) and compare the results with those from two representative online surveys ( N = 2,169 and 2,159 respondents). The high correlations between both methods show that a deliberative understanding of news media quality is anchored in Swiss society and shared by audiences. This paper shall serve as a showcase to reflect and measure news media quality across other countries and media systems.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edda Humprecht ◽  
Laia Castro Herrero ◽  
Sina Blassnig ◽  
Michael Brüggemann ◽  
Sven Engesser

Abstract Media systems have changed significantly as a result of the development of information technologies. However, typologies of media systems that incorporate aspects of digitalization are rare. This study fills this gap by identifying, operationalizing, and measuring indicators of media systems in the digital age. We build on previous work, extend it with new indicators that reflect changing conditions (such as online news use), and include media freedom indicators. We include 30 countries in our study and use cluster analysis to identify three clusters of media systems. Two of these clusters correspond to the media system models described by Hallin and Mancini, namely the democratic-corporatist and the polarized-pluralist model. However, the liberal model as described by Hallin and Mancini has vanished; instead, we find empirical evidence of a new cluster that we call “hybrid”: it is positioned in between the poles of the media-supportive democratic-corporatist and the polarized-pluralist clusters.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (6(57)) ◽  
pp. 215-229
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Tereshchuk

In the newly shaped post‑WWI Europe the CEE region was an integral part of the pan‑European media system. The iron curtain that split Europe into two parts in the bipolar period, inevitably led to the emergence of two separate media systems, i.e. the Western European one and the one driven by the USSR (and existing predominantly in Eastern‑European states). These systems were institutionalized by the establishment of separate broadcasting alliances and corresponding TV programme exchange networks. At the same time, in the context of the Cold War, the CEE region was a key target of Western broadcasting with the aim to counter Soviet propaganda and political influence. This factor reinforced by the willingness of the CEE countries to preserve their European identity caused the socialist media system (as well as other Soviet integration projects) to remain artificial and to be rejected in the region. It was clearly confirmed at the beginning of the post‑bipolar period, when, after the collapse of the socialist camp and the USSR, the Soviet‑driven International Radio and Television Organization ceased to exist, and the CEE countries integrated into the European Broadcasting Union, unleashing their desire to “return to Europe”. At the same time, in the context of a policy aimed at preserving control over the post‑Soviet space, Russia makes efforts which could be regarded as an attempt to restore (preserve) the common media space in the post‑Soviet territories. In the paper the CEE region is regarded in the broadest way, including all states which were in socialist bloc, and appropriate former European Soviet republics.


Politik ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Signe Ravn-Højgaard

This article discusses the potential impact of Greenlandic independence on Greenland’s media system and suggests initiatives necessary for maintaining strong Greenlandic media in the future. Using Manuel Puppis' (2009) theory of the characteristics of small media systems, the Greenlandic media system is described. It is shown that it is built with the following aim in mind: the media should support the Greenlandic society by being independent and diverse, strengthening the Greenlandic language, and providing quality journalism that can heighten the public debate. However, as a small media system it is vulnerable to global tendencies where legacy media lose users and advertisers to digital platforms like Facebook and streaming services. The article argues that the vulnerability of the Greenlandic media system could increase if independence leads to a tighter public economy, impeding the media's ability to support Greenlandic society and culture. An interventionist media regulation could, therefore, be a prerequisite for a strong Greenlandic media system that can act as a unifying and nation-building institution.


Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110414
Author(s):  
Maxim Alyukov

Authoritarian regimes attempt to control the circulation of political information. Scholars have identified many mechanisms through which actors can use broadcast and digital media to challenge or sustain authoritarian rule. However, while contemporary media environments are characterised by the integration of older and newer forms of communication, little is known about how authoritarian regimes use different media simultaneously to shape citizens’ perceptions. In order to address this issue, this study relies on focus groups and investigates Russian TV viewers’ cross-media repertoires and their reception of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It argues that some citizens evaluate state-aligned television narratives as more credible when they are reinforced by similar narratives in digital media. Citizens’ reactions to this synchronisation are predicated on their type of media use. For not very active news consumers, the reliance on digital media can verify the regime’s narratives in television news. Others can escape the synchronisation effect by actively searching online for additional information or not using digital media for news. These findings show how authoritarian regimes can utilise the advantages of hybrid media systems to shape citizens’ perceptions and specify the conditions under which citizens can escape the effects of the regime’s simultaneous use of different media.


2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (5) ◽  
pp. 744-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sjifra E de Leeuw ◽  
Rachid Azrout ◽  
Roderik S B Rekker ◽  
Joost H P Van Spanje

Abstract Historical classifications of journalistic traditions are the backbone of comparative explanations for political news coverage. This study assesses the validity of the dominant media systems framework and proposes and tests a novel framework, which states that a history of authoritarianism affects today’s coverage. To facilitate a clean cross-national comparison, we focus on the same person and measurement in 12 Western democracies, that is, the use of the pejorative terms “sexist,” “racist,” “dictator,” and equivalents to describe Donald Trump. Our manually validated automated content analysis (2016–2018; N = 27,830) shows that content varies along with countries’ media and authoritarian history: pejoration is more common in countries with a polarized pluralist media system and former authoritarian countries than elsewhere. Newspapers’ ideology does not matter, irrespective of countries’ level of political parallelism or experiences with authoritarianism. Combined, we provide new methodological and theoretical handles to further comparative communication research in Western democracies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adaobi Vivian Duru

This study used the 2014 Ebola outbreak as a case study to compare news coverage of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) between the Polarized Pluralist media system and the Liberal media system. This investigation revealed that partisan frames, emphasis on local and international efforts and use of health expert sources all differed across the two media systems. These differences suggest that social, political and economic attributes of media systems affect how news is shaped. When an event of international significance occurs, such as a disease outbreak, the characteristics that make up a media system will influence how issues are covered and presented to the public. Giving the current globalized nature of news, the findings in this study has implications for international news flow.


2020 ◽  
pp. 194016122092693
Author(s):  
Arjen van Dalen

Partisan identities do not only shape people’s political attitudes, but also their perceptions of real-world developments. This is evident from the partisan economic perception gap: Government supporters have more positive economic perceptions than opposition supporters, especially when the economic situation is ambiguous. Recent research has shown that the size of this partisan gap varies across different contexts and that the state of the economy and working of political institutions are important moderators. Still, little is known about the influence of another important contextual variable: the degree of partisanship in the media system. Based on a theoretical discussion of partisan-motivated rationalization and the information environment, the paper tests the hypothesis that, due to selective exposure and exposure to more partisan content, people in partisan media systems have more polarized economic perceptions. A multilevel analysis of representative surveys in twenty-six European countries in 2014 shows that the partisan perception gap is, indeed, larger in countries with more polarized media systems, after controlling for other relevant country characteristics. People with the highest level of media consumption are most affected by media-party parallelism. The findings are relevant for worldwide discussions about posttruth politics, as they show that the media environment influences gaps in people’s perceptions of real-world developments.


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