The Influence of Emotional Closeness on Moral Judgment In Moral Dilemma Paradigm

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 806-814
Author(s):  
Liu Wen ◽  
Zhan Ze ◽  
Wu Baopei
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. McManus ◽  
Abraham M. Rutchick

With the imminent advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs) comes a moral dilemma: How do people assign responsibility in the event of a fatal accident? AVs necessarily create conditions in which “drivers” yield agency to a machine. The current study examines how people make attributions of blame and praise in this context. Varying the features of AV technology affected how responsible a “driver” (who purchased the vehicle) is perceived to be following a deadly crash. The findings provide support for agency and commission as crucial bases of moral judgment. They also raise questions about how morally contradictory actions are perceived and underscore the need for research examining how moral responsibility is distributed among multiple potentially culpable agents. Pragmatically, these findings suggest that regulating (or declining to regulate) how AVs are programmed may strongly influence perceptions of moral and legal culpability.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-12
Author(s):  
Ryo Oda

One evolutionary theory of morality, examined here, is based on theories of kin selection while another has proposed that moral judgment is based on a Kantian rule-based system. Using the Trolley Problem, Kurzban et al. (2012) asked subjects to decide whether they would kill one person to save five others, varying the relationship of the subject with the others involved. They revealed that nearly half of the subjects reported that they would be unwilling to push one stranger to his/her death to save five brothers in a footbridge version of the Trolley Problem. In the present study, I tried to replicate this somewhat surprising result in Japanese participants, to investigate the robustness of the finding. I also examined how participants anticipated and favored the moral judgment of other people. If a Kantian decision was made according to the coordination system suggested by Kurzban et al. (2012), a Kantian decision, rather than a Hamiltonian decision, would be anticipated and favored as the decision of people generally. The results seem to support the discussion of Kurzban et al. (2012), that the computational system that delivers Kantian moral judgment functions to coordinate condemnation decisions.


1987 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. Pratt ◽  
Gail Golding ◽  
Patricia Kerig

Recent work on aging and moral judgment has investigated the claim that older adults may show a regression in their average stage level of moral judgment, compared with younger groups. A second line of work has suggested that at least some elderly adults may be more reflective in their thinking regarding moral and ethical issues (e.g. Kohlberg, 1973). The present research was designed to investigate these issues with respect to hypothetical and real-life moral judgment. Subjects were 60 adults in three age groups: 18-24 years, 30-45 years, and 60-75 years. Each responded to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview and to the personal moral dilemma task of Gilligan. Measures of stage level and of reported use of perspectivetaking processes, as well as analyses of the content of personal dilemmas, were obtained. Results showed no average stage level differences between the age or sex groups. Hypothetical stage scores were significantly higher than real-life scores overall. There were no age differences in reported role-taking processes on hypothetical dilemmas, though there were sex differences, with men more likely to report adopting a third-party, observer role. Finally, older subjects produced significantly more varied reflections on their personal dilemmas.


1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Blum Chap

This was a cross-sectional study of the effects of age, sex, and moral dilemma content on adult moral reasoning. Hypothetical dilemmas were presented to sixty men and women, thirty of whom were elderly and thirty in early middle age. With education controlled there were no age or sex differences in moral maturity. Dilemma content had a significant effect on moral judgment, with a tendency for each age group to use a higher level of judgment when the situation described was age-appropriate, i.e., relevant to that group's stage of life. There was a significant age difference on a measure of spontaneous role taking: old persons made more definitive moral judgments than the younger adults, who attempted to reconcile the various points of view represented in a dilemma.


Author(s):  
Sylvia Terbeck ◽  
Jaysan Charlesford ◽  
Heather Clemans ◽  
Emily Pope ◽  
Aimee Lee ◽  
...  

Research on morality has focused on differences in moral judgment and action. In this study, we investigated self-reported moral reasoning after a hypothetical moral dilemma was presented on paper, and moral reasoning after that very same dilemma was experienced in immersive virtual reality (IVR). We asked open-ended questions and used content analysis to determine moral reasoning in a sample of 107 participants. We found that participants referred significantly more often to abstract principles and consequences for themselves (i.e., it is against the law) after the paper-based moral dilemma compared to the IVR dilemma. In IVR participants significantly more often referred to the consequences for the people involved in the dilemma (i.e., not wanting to hurt that particular person). This supports the separate process theory, suggesting that decision and action might be different moral concepts with different foci regarding moral reasoning. Using simulated moral scenarios thus seems essential as it illustrates possible mechanisms of empathy and altruism being more relevant for moral actions especially given the physical presence of virtual humans in IVR.


i-com ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Stellmach ◽  
Felix Lindner

Abstract This study investigates the effect of uncertainty expressed by a robot facing a moral dilemma on humans’ moral judgment and impression formation. In two experiments, participants were shown a video of a robot explaining a moral dilemma and suggesting a decision to make. The robot either expressed certainty or uncertainty about the decision it suggests. Participants rated how much blame the robot deserves for its decision, the moral wrongness of the chosen action, and their impression of the robot in terms of four scale dimensions measuring social perception. The results suggest that the subpopulation of participants unfamiliar with the moral dilemma assigns significantly more blame to the uncertain robot as compared to the certain one, while expressed uncertainty has less effect on moral wrongness judgments. The second experiment suggests that higher blame ratings are mediated by the fact that the uncertain robot was perceived as more humanlike. We discuss implications of this result for the design of social robots.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Bago ◽  
Balazs Aczel ◽  
Zoltan Kekecs ◽  
John Protzko ◽  
Marton Kovacs ◽  
...  

Much research on moral judgment is centered on moral dilemmas in which deontological perspectives (i.e., emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with utilitarian judgements (i.e., following the greater good defined through consequences). A central finding of this field Greene et al. showed that psychological and situational factors (e.g., the intent of the agent, or physical contact between the agent and the victim) play an important role in people’s use of deontological versus utilitarian considerations when making moral decisions. As their study was conducted with US samples, our knowledge is limited concerning the universality of this effect, in general, and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors of moral judgments, in particular. Here, we empirically test the universality of deontological and utilitarian judgments by replicating Greene et al.’s experiments on a large (N = X,XXX) and diverse (WEIRD and non-WEIRD) sample across the world to explore the influence of culture on moral judgment. The relevance of this exploration to a broad range of policy-making problems is discussed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia F. Christensen ◽  
Albert Flexas ◽  
Margareta Calabrese ◽  
Nadine K. Gut ◽  
Antoni Gomila

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans IJzerman ◽  
Pierre-Jean Laine

Do colored backgrounds lead to polarized judgments? Zarkadi and Schnall (2012) found in their Study 1 that, indeed, exposing participants to a black-and-white (versus other colored) background polarized participants’ judgments in a moral dilemma task. This study supported a moral intuitionist model of moral judgment and lent further support to so-called Conceptual Metaphor Theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). We replicated the effect in three high-powered preregistered studies (total N = 846). We successfully replicated the same result of ZS1 in one study (Study 2), but were unable to replicate the effect in two other studies (Studies 1 and 3). A meso-analysis including both our 3 replications and the original study showed no significant effect of background color on moral judgment. We infer that, based on the wide confidence interval of the original study and the lack of evidence in the replication studies, there is no relationship between color of background and polarized judgments. We call for highly-powered within-designs to study the relationship between color and moral judgment. Materials, data, and code available at https://osf.io/8ksqj/.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Vezirian ◽  
Hans IJzerman ◽  
laurent begue ◽  
Elisa Sarda

Do colored backgrounds lead to polarized judgments? Zarkadi and Schnall (2013) found in their Study 1 that, indeed, exposing participants to a black-and-white (versus other colored) background polarized participants’ judgments in a moral dilemma task. This study supported a moral intuitionist model of moral judgment and lent further support to so-called Conceptual Metaphor Theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).After a large pilot study (n = 12,322) that failed to replicate this effect, we conducted two strict preregistered replications relying on Bayesian sequential analyses. First study ran on a French-speaking sample (min N = 300, max N = 450) indicated that our data supports the [presence/absence] of an effect and/while data from the second study ran on an English-speaking sample (min N = 300, max N = 450) [also/while] [does not support/supports] the presence/absence of an effect. This research [confirms/failed to confirm] the effect of the background color on a moral dilemma evaluation and indicates that color may [not be/be determinative] in moral judgement formations. [There is thus strong evidence for the link between polarized color and judgments/There is therefore no evidence for the effect and we think that this line of research is a dead end].


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