scholarly journals Mechanisms, good and bad

Author(s):  
Harold Kincaid

The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal – between cause and effect – and mechanisms that are vertical – they realize in lower-level terms causal properties –: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal.

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 308-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report ( Kerr, 1998 ). In the present article, I discuss 3 forms of HARKing: (a) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (b) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (c) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These 3 types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these 3 types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.


2021 ◽  
pp. 343-366
Author(s):  
Andrew Zangwill

This chapter is an exploration of Anderson’s philosophy of science based on the contents of his article in a British newspaper, “Four Facts Everyone Ought to Know about Science.” These are: (1) science is not democratic; (2) computers will not replace scientists; (3) statistical methods are missed and often misunderstood; and (4) good science has aesthetic qualities. Anderson aimed to alert the public about the inaccurate and misleading information they were constantly subjected to by uncritical journalists, agenda-driven political pundits, social critics of science, religious fundamentalists, and publicity-seeking professional scientists. He describes science as an interconnected web and discusses Bayesian statistics.


Author(s):  
Mary Kirk

This chapter explores the ways in which the dualistic notion of gender is at the core of many fundamental ideas in the philosophy of science. The ways in which we have learned to perceive, think about, teach/learn, and conduct research in science and IT are deeply informed by a dualistic, gendered framework: science is associated with maleness, and nature with femaleness. This primary split supports a philosophy of science that envisions “good science” as purely rational and objective (male), devoid of emotion and subjectivity (female). These core values of a dominator society contribute to a climate that is not likely to be hospitable to those who are gender-socialized as women. In the end, I call for a new perspective on our philosophy of science and technology that embodies partnership values and ask: How might we proceed to reexamine our assumptions about science and technology to make the shift from a dominator to a partnership perspective? These ideas are explored in the following sections: (1) science is male; nature is female; (2) the myth of objectivity; (3) there’s no crying in science; and (4) envisioning a partnership philosophy of science (democratizing science and technology, redefining what makes good science, and examples of partnership science and IT).


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 24-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Padam Nepal

Lawrence Cox (1999) has argued that the established perspectives on social movements operate with an inadequately narrow conception of the ‘object’ that is being studied and thus tends to ‘reify’ “movements” as usual activity against essentially static backgrounds, and in its place, he advocates a concept of social movement as the more or less developed articulation of situated rationalities. Following Cox, therefore, the present study perceives social movements as articulations of situated rationalities by perceiving them as a tactical, dialectical response to the harsh realities of the political system. This would help us capture the essential dynamic and transformative aspects of the movement. Any social movement, and for that matter, environmental movements are characterized by the presence of agencies and structural components, which, however, are not a priori and static. They are rather dynamic and get changed and transformed in the course of the movement. Precisely for this reason, the environmental movements can at best be comprehended by way of locating and analyzing the dynamism and transformations of the movements produced by the dialectical interaction of the various components and parameters of the movement over a span of time. Hence, the present paper aims to evaluate the dynamics and transformations of the environmental movements in India, taking the case of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, and, adopting a strategic relational approach within the agent-structure framework as its framework of analysis. For the present purpose, however, we have taken only two variables, namely, Ideology and Leadership and attempted the analysis of their contributions in producing movement dynamics.Hydro Nepal: Journal of Water, Energy and Environment Issue No. 4, January, 2009 Page 24-29


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report (Kerr, 1998). In the present article, I discuss three forms of HARKing: (1) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (2) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (3) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These three types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these three types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.


Author(s):  
Dmitry Bakhteev

The author analyzes criminalistic mindset from two standpoints — as a set of guidelines and as a flexible system of tools for studying the crime incident — and notes that the process of investigating and solving crimes is represented in the cognition of the person studying it as a dynamic system developing from cause to effect. Thus, there is a transition from the a priori (fragmented) probability of evidential information to the a posteriori, reliable probability. The author stresses the importance of the analysis and synthesis mechanism of the investigator’s thinking, which allow them to avoid investigation mistakes or other distortions of information perception. Each consequence has a corresponding concrete cause, although one cause could lead to multiple consequences. Thus, the causality of a crime and the appearance of its traces are perceived in detail, i.e., the investigator studies the mechanism of how the crime was committed through the trace picture of crime consequences and chooses the most probable of all possible causes. The author points out the importance of verifying the obtained information because material information is subject to destructive physical and chemical processes, while the ideal information — to cognitive distortions of perception, memory and reproduction. However, even when the trace information is distorted, the cause-and-effect relations remain intact. The author stresses the significance of the version process in the establishment of the cause-and-effect relations. He also discusses the random factors present in the process of crime investigation and solution, which, on the one hand, have a negative impact on this process and, on the other, make it possible to resolve problem situations characterized by a lack of information. Randomness is most evident in the investigative situations of problematic or risky nature. It is noted that randomness acts as a strictly subjective feature dependent on the specifics of the criminalistic mindset of the subject of cognition, not on the features of the objective reality; the characteristics of randomness could differ at different levels of examining a problem. The author analyzes the structure of the consequences of random search as a decision-making method in the conditions of insufficient information: it is possible to continue random search, to update the version or to transform the investigative situation from the simple into the complex or vice versa.


Author(s):  
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist’s decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual’s private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically ‘morally forbidden topics,’ but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy S. Teller

Climate change is expected to shift seasonality in Tanzania, while smallholder farmers' livelihoods and the economy rely upon the success of rainfed agriculture. However, we should not a priori assume doomsday climate vulnerability scenarios of drought and devastation in the rural global South nor, on the other hand, that farmers will optimally employ local knowledge for effective adaptation. Drawing from qualitative fieldwork in two Tanzanian communities, I question these grand narratives of devastation and local adaptive capacity and introduce an approach that brings inequality to the center. Poorer nations are most vulnerable to climate change, but they are not homogenous and neither are the smallholder farmers living within them. I present evidence on the crucial context-specific dimensions of socio-ecological vulnerability for these smallholder farmers—1) water resources and access to them; 2) agricultural knowledge, including farmers' own knowledge and their interactions with sources like government-run agricultural extension and NGOs; and 3) existing drought-coping strategies—and the heterogeneity among farmers across these dimensions. Ultimately, this case demonstrates how climate change can reproduce existing inequalities within nations by drawing upon how farmers currently respond to drought as evidence. I present the difficult and somewhat bleak contexts within which the farmers are coping, but also illustrate the agency that farmers exhibit in response to these conditions and the adaptive capacity they possess. Finally, I call for more sub-national research on climate and inequality by sociologists and draw connections among within-nation inequality, climate change, and agricultural development initiatives.


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