APPENDIX A Guide to the Canadian Government and to the National Security and Intelligence Community

2021 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Canadian Government

The Troubled Inheritance: The National Security Agency and the Obama Administration

2010 ◽  
pp. 241-256
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Aid
Keyword(s):  
Data Processing ◽  
National Security ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Coordinator ◽  
Signals Intelligence

This article discusses the National Security Agency under the Obama Administration. Upon his inauguration on January 20, 2009, Obama inherited from the Bush administration an intelligence community embroiled in political controversies. Of the sixteen agencies of the intelligence community, the National Security Agency (NSA) faced the greatest scrutiny from the new Obama administration and the Congress. NSA was the largest and the most powerful member of the U.S. intelligence community. Since its formation in 1952, NSA has managed and directed all U.S. government signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. It is the collector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT) and the primary processor of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). And since 1958, NSA has been the coordinator of the U.S. government's national electronics intelligence (ELINT) program. It has also the task of overseeing the security of the U.S. government's communications and data processing systems, and since the 1980s, NSA has managed the U.S. government's national operation security (OPSEC) program. In this article, the focus is on the challenges faced by the NSA during the Bush administration; the role played by the NSA during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in confronting a series of thorny legal and policy issues relating to NSA's eavesdropping program.

To Make a Choice You Should Know The Option Physiological and Psychological Contribution of the Female Component in National Security and Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-51
Author(s):  
Sabrina Magris
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
The World ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Female Component ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Ways Of Being

The paper addresses the importance of the role of women in Intelligence and National Security with the specific purpose to highlight the quality of female contribution in all different domains. The world is changing and in this change, Intelligence risks being left behind as never before. An epic evolution and change are underway that will upset ways of being and ways of thinking. All this not suddenly and all this without realizing it if not after the fact. The world is changing, women “are gain the upper hand” taking over also numerically and it is not realized that a change must happen in the field of Intelligence with a space left to women, not because they are women but because of their abilities. In all domains, from strategic to an operational one. Blindness to change that many Agencies are having. And those who are making changes often do so because they are obliged by the rules but not by evaluating the concrete capability of individuals. Two factors risk being explosive if no action is taken. The paper highlights the physiological and psychological contribution of the female component in the National Security and Intelligence work, and why diversity is scientifically important to successfully conduct operational and strategic tasks. It also describes the existing lack of models, how to enlarge the interest of young girls to join the Intelligence Community, and a look into the near future regarding the training and the recruitment processes with specific regards to women.

scholarly journals Does Canada have anything in the way of a strategic warning intelligence culture (and does it need one)?

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
John Gilmour
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
National Security ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Timely Manner ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Operational Issues ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Threat Environment

During the Cold War, Strategic Warning Intelligence (SWI) was a necessary and recognized function within the intelligence community given the threats posed by conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Western Europe and Soviet ballistic missiles. With the end of the Cold War, the focus of intelligence shifted to tactical or operational issues against known threats, and the SWI function and expertise atrophied as a result. With today’s expanding and more complex threat environment, this article examines whether SWI capacities should be reintroduced in order to apprise decision makers of trending threats to national security, albeit based on faint signals, so the necessary policy decisions can be made and prioritized to mitigate said threats in a timely manner.

New Zealand

2021 ◽  
pp. 156-170
Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
National Security ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Advisory Panel ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Sensitive Material ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
The One ◽  
Limited Scope ◽  
Regular Review

As the smallest and most centralized in the Five Eyes community, New Zealand’s intelligence and security community, and the system that holds it accountable, is an outlier. New Zealand’s proximity to Australia is reflected in parallels in intelligence accountability between the two Tasman allies. On the one hand, its relatively smaller size is reflected in certain unique attributes of intelligence accountability, such as its limited scope and access to sensitive material. On the other hand, its more modest size has been beneficial in driving innovation that has subsequently been adopted elsewhere, notably the double lock system for warrants. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the New Zealand’s National Intelligence Community, the particular strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in New Zealand, its rather distinct national security threats, as well as New Zealand’s modest, centralized yet innovative intelligence accountability architecture: the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, which has an Advisory Panel that is an attribute unique to New Zealand, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. New Zealand’s experience draws attention to economies of effort to be harnessed for scarce resources on the big collectors and assessor rather than other government clients that only receive intelligence. New Zealand also differs from other Five Eyes parliamentary intelligence committees in granting only limited access to sensitive operational matters or information. Mandatory regular review of legislation offers an opportunity to assess for efficacy and propose comprehensive improvements to innovate agencies and practices.

A Look at the Intelligence Establishment

Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. 17-19
Author(s):  
Paul W. Blackstock
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
National Security ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Original Work ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Intelligence System ◽  
Vanderbilt University

Under a new title, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has thoroughly revised and up-dated his original work, Central Intelligence and National Security, which first appeared in 1958. The result is a highly readable, well-informed survey of the intelligence community (including a new chapter on the British intelligence system), plus penetrating essays on the nature of intelligence, its relationship to national policy and decision-making, surveillance by Congress, and the related problems of administration and executive control.

Pathologies of Intelligence Producer-Consumer Relations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rovner
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Accurate Analysis ◽  
Effective Policy ◽  
Intelligence Support ◽  
Computational Resources ◽  
Substantial Rise

The shift in America’s national security priorities has significantly changed the foreign intelligence needs of US policymakers in recent years. Due to the substantial rise of transnational threats, intelligence requirements have become increasingly numerous and varied, necessitating ever closer communication between consumers and producers to facilitate the production of relevant and timely intelligence. Producer-consumer relations is the glue which pulls together the intelligence cycle; for what happens at the interface of policy and intelligence ultimately determines the success or failure of the entire intelligence endeavor. Efforts to reform intelligence analysis have been motivated by the assumption that accurate analysis naturally leads to effective policy decisions. From this perspective, computational resources have primarily been devoted to the collection and assessment of empirical data in an effort to provide consumers with increasingly accurate predictions. The perennial issues facing the intelligence community can be roughly summarized as follows: the intelligence professional must guard against politicization and uphold his analytical integrity while at the same time maintaining close enough contact with policymakers to provide personalized and relevant intelligence support. Scholars argue that what the producer-consumer relationship needs is not radical change but some amelioration. The general reform objective should be to deepen the incorporation of intelligence throughout the policymaking process, to improve the two-way understanding of policy requirements, and to ensure that the intelligence community maximizes and maintains its unique expertise.

Crises and 'pivot' will boost US intelligence agencies

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Public Scrutiny

Subject The US intelligence community in a year after purported reforms. Significance On December 29, an agreement between the United States, Japan and South Korea to share intelligence on North Korea went into effect. This ended a year in which the US intelligence community was the subject of broad domestic public scrutiny in the light of continued fallout from former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden's leaks to a Senate report on the CIA's use of torture. The White House's support for reforms has been watched by tech and telecoms businesses that have lost considerable revenue from reputational damage as a result of the growing awareness of requirements on them of US intelligence activities. Impacts The Obama administration will rely on the US intelligence community as its main counterterrorist instrument. A Republican Congress will be less likely to support intelligence reforms, though only marginally so. There is no indication that the balance of power on intelligence issues between the executive and legislative branches has shifted.

US communications privacy concerns will outlast Obama

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Privacy Issues ◽  
Signals Intelligence

Subject US interagency procedures for sharing signals intelligence. Significance The administration of President Barack Obama is in the final stages of issuing new rules governing the sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) among federal agencies involved in national security. These rules, which the intelligence community has long expected, would clarify how the federal government may share communications-based intelligence, such as wiretaps and intercepts, among diverse agencies, and -- critically -- set boundaries on the use of such intelligence by agencies that did not originally collect it. Impacts The next administration -- whether Republican or Democratic -- will probably be less responsive to privacy groups in this area. The Obama administration's focus on executive orders governing emerging technologies has set precedent but offers few lasting restrictions. Privacy issues will hinder US international trade negotiations, further derailing TTIP talks for the foreseeable future.

scholarly journals Budget Funding Priorities and Development Prospects of the US Artificial Intelligence

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-93
Author(s):  
Y. Selyanin
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
National Security ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Existing Problems ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Development Prospects

The US Government has initiated a large-scale activity on artificial intelligence (AI) development and implementation. Numerous departments and agencies including the Pentagon, intelligence community and citizen agencies take part in these efforts. Some of them are responsible for technology, materials and standards development. Others are customers of AI. State AI efforts receive significant budget funding. Moreover, Department of Defense costs on AI are comparable with the whole non-defense funding. American world-leading IT companies support state departments and agencies in organizing AI technologies development and implementation. The USA's highest military and political leadership supports such efforts. Congress provides significant requested funding. However leading specialists criticize the state's approach to creating and implementing AI. Firstly, they consider authorized assignments as not sufficient. Secondly, even this funding is used ineffectively. Therefore Congress created National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) in 2018 for identifying problems in the AI area and developing solutions. This article looks at the stakeholders and participants of the state AI efforts, the budget funding authorization, the major existing problems and the NSCAI conclusions regarding the necessary AI funding in FYs 2021-2032.

Part VI Providing and Obtaining Assistance, A Providing Assistance, 20 Anti-terrorism Legislation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peddie Jonathan
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Serious Crime ◽  
Proceeds Of Crime ◽  
The One ◽  
Terrorist Acts ◽  
Criminal Conduct

The previous two chapters looked at the notion that the management of proceeds of crime and counter-terrorism have ceased to be independent legislative endeavours for governments, and increasingly form an inter-dependent set of measures together with other, international initiatives including the various international sanctions regimes. This chapter, and the ones that follow, look at the identification of illegal conduct, restraint, recovery of proceeds and close scrutiny and prosecution of perpetrators, and intelligence-led management of the threat to the UK’s economic and national security interests. On the one hand, terrorism amounts to criminal conduct to which the provisions of POCA 2002 apply as they do to the proceeds of any criminality, and there is clear interplay between the relevant regimes. Yet, on the other hand, the legislation considered in this chapter creates specific powers concerning those involved in terrorist acts, those who promote and facilitate it and the methods through which such individuals may be starved of financial means. The chapter looks at the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; and the Terrorism Asset Freezing etc Act 2010. It then considers the role of the wider UK enforcement and intelligence community. Finally, it takes a look at the Serious Crime Act 2007.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document