scholarly journals Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ohne Verteilungsgleichheit

1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schramme

AbstractAlternative approaches in the discussion of distributive justice differ in their answers to the question „equality of what“? In this essay I intend to ask instead ,why equality?" The article rejects several arguments in favour of distributive equality, mainly on the grounds that they confuse two different kinds of justice, namely ,formal’ justice (equal respect) and distributive justice. The ideal of distributive equality is based on comparisons but equal respect does not necessarily involve relational considerations. Subsequently I will consider equality of opportunity which appears on first sight to be the most promising account. However, I will point out that this approach is not convincing as an attempt to give everyone the chance to live a good life. Finally I will submit that only a theory of absolute needs is adequate.

2021 ◽  
pp. 0961463X2098781
Author(s):  
Petr Kubala ◽  
Tomáš Hoření Samec

This article focuses on the topic of the young adult’s cleft habitus influenced by a housing affordability crisis in the Czech Republic and examines how this situation affects the young adult’s relation to the imagination of a temporally structured life course and synchronization of life spheres (housing, family, and work). This article is based on qualitative in-depth interviews conducted in the four cities most affected by the house and rent price increase. The general question addresses if and how social inequalities, sharpened by the current housing affordability crisis, affect the process of narrative life course coherence creation (the connection of past, present, and future) in relation to an orientation toward a vision of “the good life.” We furthermore complement the already existing ideal types of the young adult’s relation toward time— confident continuity and cautious contingency—with two other two types— cautious continuity and total contingency—defined on the basis of our data. We argue that the ability of young adults to envision a coherent future is related to the feeling of secured housing and that the idea of the good life is depicted to a large extent through the ideal of homeownership, although the precarity of the housing market makes homeownership harder to reach for those from unprivileged backgrounds.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-185
Author(s):  
Tomasz Mazur

The essay discusses popular rationalistic interpretation of stoic spiritual practices as rational control over nonrational aspects of human life. On the course of analyzing ancient stoics texts and recommendations concerning a good life the essay proves that the word “controlling” is not really proper translation of stoic intentions. Much better picture is of reason that takes care of condition of body and soul, or of reason that follows body and soul. Stoic reason is a tool for understanding and nursing nod controlling. Thus the ideal for stoic life is not reason but harmony, which is the best way of translating ancient Greek word tonos.


1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley A. Jacobs

Recently, in Canada both the Federal Government and various provincial governments have introduced a series of measures intended to address gender inequalities in the workplace. These measures are of two basic types. Employment equity policies involve the implementation of affirmative action programmes designed to encourage the hiring and promotion of more women in, for example, the civil service. Pay equity policies have sought to institutionalize the principle of equal pay for work of equal value or, to use the American terminology, comparable worth. The aim of this paper is to resurrect the presently out of fashion view that the principles of affirmative action and comparative worth that underlie employment equity and pay equity can be defended on the grounds that they contribute to the realization of an ideal of equality of opportunity between men and women in Canadian society. This view, although once prevalent among those concerned with gender issues, has been pushed aside, largely because of doubts about the visionary depth of the ideal of equality of opportunity. It has been replaced instead by an ideal of equality of results which emphasizes the goal of reducing the gender wage gap. It is my intention here to formulate a principle of equality of opportunity that can incorporate recent feminist legal and political philosophy in a way that offers a promising way to analyze issues posed by gender inequalities in the workplace and, as a result, provide a clear rationale for the recent employment equity and pay equity initiatives in Canada.


1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Koggel

Affirmative action generates so much controversy that very often proponents and opponents both fail to understand the other’s position. A recent work by Michel Rosenfeld convincingly argues that the incommensurability of the opposing sides is based on fundamental disagreements about the meaning of such concepts as equality and justice: “the affirmative action debate is not between persons who are ‘pro-equality’ and others who are ‘anti-equality’. Both the most ardent advocates of affirmative action and its most vehement foes loudly proclaim their allegiance to the ideal of equality.” Within a liberal framework, two conceptions of equality are commonly defended—formal and substantive equality of opportunity. Both conceptions assume background conditions of the scarcity of goods, a need to compete for educational, social and economic benefits, and the value of rewards for fair competition as a means to individual self-development and self-realization. In the first section, I outline each conception briefly, summarize the sorts of affirmative action each defends, and show that the irreconcilability of the opposing sides is ultimately grounded in different conceptions of the self. I then go on to argue that both conceptions limit our understanding of selves and ultimately constrain attempts to achieve equality in a context in which individuals are also members of groups with identities formed in historical contexts of discrimination.


1987 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

The paper attempts two tasks. The first is to provide a characterization of the social democratic approach which sets it in contrast to liberal democratic theories. This is pursued by contrasting the different interpretations of the ideal of equal respect which are associated with the two approaches. The second task is to establish that the social democratic approach is, if not clearly superior, at least worth considering further. This task is pursued by the attempt to vindicate three assumptions which the social democratic approach must make about the state.


1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary A. Hums ◽  
Packianathan Chelladurai

This study examined the development of an instrument to assess the views held by NCAA male and female coaches and administrators concerning the principles of distributive justice used in the allocation of resources in athletic departments. The steps in the development of the instrument, including the use of a panel of experts, a pilot study, and a confirmatory study, are presented. Scenarios were developed describing situations involving either distribution or retribution of three different resources within athletic departments; money, facilities, or support services. The eight allocation principles listed under each scenario were (a) equality of treatment, (b) equality of results, and (c) equality of opportunity; contributions based on (d) productivity, (e) spectator appeal, (f) effort, and (g) ability; and (h) need. Subjects were asked to rate the justness of each allocation principle in each scenario and to choose which allocation principle they would implement in that scenario.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
Alexa Zellentin

Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter the justification of state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating the implementation of these regulations.


Author(s):  
Koneru Ramakrishna Rao

This chapter focuses on Gandhi’s vision of governance. The Mahatma envisioned the ideal form of governance as Ramarajya. By Ramarajya, Gandhi meant a form of government which involves the empowerment of people at grassroots, equality of opportunity, decentralization of administration, cooperative participation of people, and democratic self-governance. The chapter discusses various steps taken since Independence by the Congress and governments by other parties to implement Gandhi’s ideas on Panchayat Raj and, more recently, the new initiatives of the government headed by Narendra Modi such as the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission), Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (Model Village Plans), and the Smart City initiative. However, the author mentions that these initiatives need to be based not on Western application of sophisticated information technology, but on promoting face-to-face relations between people and on developing instrumentalities to breathe rural ethos into urban life.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-83
Author(s):  
Justin Thacker

Abstract This paper outlines the problem of inequality in economic, social, biblical and theological terms. It discusses three concepts of equality before making a relatively novel proposal of its own. The first, equality of outcome, is dismissed for failing to pay sufficient attention to the inequities it engenders and its failure to take seriously the issue of personal responsibility. The second, equality of opportunity, is shown to be more promising but this is critiqued for its propagation of a hierarchy of socially desirable goods. Sen is correct to argue that variegated definitions of the good life imply that any simple concept of equality of opportunity is insufficient. In contrast, this paper draws attention to the idea of justice as participation and in the process reframes this to define and argue for an equality of participation concept in which the equalisandum is located in relationships rather than outcomes, opportunities or capabilities.


Author(s):  
Philippe Van Parijs

This concluding chapter argues that any conception of justice relevant today must combine two elements, both strongly rooted in European traditions, but neither of them exclusive to them: equal respect for the diversity of conceptions of the good life that characterises pluralist societies and equal concern for the interests of all members, present and yet to come, of the society concerned. This concern, moreover, must be responsibility-sensitive — distributive justice is not a matter of outcomes but of opportunities — and it must be efficiency-sensitive, a fair distribution need not be a strictly equal distribution, but rather one that sustainably maximises the condition of the worst off. Justice, in brief, means real freedom for all, the greatest real freedom for those with least of it. Therefore, justice means global justice.


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