Bastiat as a Social Scientist

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Leroux

AbstractThis article argues that, notwithstanding views to the contrary, Frédéric Bastiat (Bayonne, 1801; Rome, 1850) was indeed a man of science. Thus, in several of his essays he showed that political economy can attain a level of scientific rigor comparable in many respects to that of the natural sciences. Subscribing to the principle of methodological individualism, he offered some persuasive explanations for why people believe in a multitude of things. After examining science as Bastiat conceived it, we shall look at two important examples, mechanization and rational voting.

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 229-252

The article deals with characteristic features of economic anthropology"s rhetoric of reciprocity and analyzes the factors that affected its formation. The authors consider two principal interpretations of reciprocity in economic anthropology that were formed under the influence of its two main founders - Malinowski and Mauss. The characteristic features of their two types of rhetoric are discussed together with the purposes for which they were used. Two different intentions were pivotal for the work of these researchers and their followers: first, to establish economic anthropology as a positivistic science; and second, to use the analysis of archaic societies as evidence for their critique of a capitalistic economy.To achieve the first task they actively used rhetoric borrowed from the natural sciences, and especially from biology as well as from economic theories that were another social science also striving for a more rigorous positivism. For the second task they turned to the rhetoric of political economy and used arguments based on a dialectical opposition between commodity exchange and gift exchange. The most prominent example of such dialectical rhetoric is in the works of Chris Gregory and Karl Polanyi in which gift exchange was interpreted as a metaphor for a utopian alternative to capitalistic commodity exchange. Because the rhetoric of economic anthropology from its inception to the present has been profoundly influenced by the language of general economic theory, the article examines the genesis of the rhetoric of economics as a science. This leads to an analysis of how the language of economics was affected by the rhetoric of the natural sciences, then of psychology and finally of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 140 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-222
Author(s):  
Marek Louzek

This article presents Max Weber as an economist and as a social scientist. Weber’s relations to economics, philosophy and sociology are discussed. Max Weber has more in common with economists than it might seem at first sight. His principle of value neutrality has become the foundation of the methodology of social sciences, including economics. The second point shared by Max Weber with standard economics is methodological individualism. The third point which a modern economist can learn from Max Weber is the concept of the ideal type.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1066-1084
Author(s):  
Boris V. SALIKHOV

Subject. The article focuses on the updating of individualism as a natural ontology of modern liberal economy. Objectives. The aim is to explore the possibility of realizing the real potential of the paradigm of individualism, which may have various forms of manifestation, and may position itself as a new, qualitatively holistic and productive "being". Methods. The methodological perspective and the disciplinary matrix of the study are based on the use of creative potential of the dialectics of "essence and phenomenon", as well as the possibilities of logical and epistemological analysis of modern functional models of socio-economic development. I perform a content analysis of modern domestic and foreign sources of data. Results. It is possible to verify the controversial nature of the judgment about the obsolescence of the neoliberal paradigm of methodological individualism, where it is necessary to distinguish between the dysfunctional monetary-plutocratic form of individualism and the essence of individualism as such, which contains unrealized creative potential of a possible new "being". I offer an approximate outline of the new qualitative integrity of the individualistic concept, where the spiritual-moral and value-semantic attractor becomes the "center of gravity". Conclusions. At present, the individualism needs fundamental updating. The scientific and practical significance of the article’s provisions consists in the attempt to continue the discussion within the search for the most effective model of socio-economic development, the formation of a new subject field, and concretization of the phenomenology of methodological individualism as an ontology of modern political economy analysis.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Sezgin Selvi ◽  
Selcuk Besir Demir

This qualitative study was conducted to compare the perceptions of students with gifted intelligence and studentswith those of normal intelligence about social science and social scientists. The data obtained from 23 giftedintelligent and 23 normal participants within the same age group was analysed using content analysis and resultswere represented with a straight and systematic language. A significant part of normal participants confused socialscience teacher with social scientist. Both groups find a social scientist happy. Social scientist was represented asyoung and dynamic, was thought without hindrance as well. As a common finding, gender is significant for bothgroups and males were distinguished. They do not sufficiently recognise social scientists. However, normalintelligence participants confuse social sciences with the natural sciences and they give names of both naturalscientists and inventors instead of social scientists.


1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Claude Ake

Since the two critiques [Iain McLean, Samual Postbrief, ‘"The Scientific Status of Political Science” — Two Comments,’ II (1972), 383–8] have little in common, I shall answer them separately beginning with McLean's. The main difficulty with McLean's argument is that he assumes that we know, or can know, that there cannot be a science of politics or, better still, laws of political behaviour as rigorous as the laws of the natural sciences. His assumption is supported by familiar arguments: men are not as passive and as homogeneous as silver nitrate; men have free will and could wilfully go against the predictions of the social scientist if only to show him that their behaviour cannot be predicted.


2021 ◽  
pp. 67-109
Author(s):  
Hub Zwart

AbstractAlthough Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strictly speaking never used the term, “dialectical materialism” refers to the philosophy of science and nature developed in (and on the basis of) their writings, emphasising the pivotal role of real-world socio-economic conditions (e.g. labour, class struggle, technological developments). As indicated by their correspondence (Marx & Engels, 1983), their collaboration represented a unique intellectual partnership which began in Paris in 1844 and continued after Marx’s death, when Engels took care of Marx’s legacy, notably the sprawling mass of manuscripts which he managed to transform into Volume II and III of Capital. While their joint effort (resulting in no less than 44 volumes of collected writings known as the Marx Engels Werke, published by Dietz Verlag Berlin) began as co-authorship, they eventually decided on a division of labour (with Marx focussing on Capital), although reading, reviewing, commenting on and contributing to each other’s writings remained an important part of their research practice. As a result of this division of labour, while Marx focussed on political economy, Engels dedicated himself to elaborating a dialectical materialist philosophy of nature and the natural sciences, resulting in works such as the Anti-Dühring and his unfinished Dialectics of Nature (published posthumously), although Engels (a voracious intellectual) wrote and published on may other topics as well, so that his output can be regarded as a dialectical materialist encyclopaedia in fragments. Again, although I will start with an exposition of dialectical materialism, my aim is not to contribute to scholarly discussions on dialectical materialism. My focus is on the how and now, and my aim is to explore how to practice dialectical materialism of technoscience today (cf. Žižek, 2014/2015, p. 1; Hamza, 2016, p. 163).


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-158
Author(s):  
Adem Levent

Political economy, which developed as a study of wealth and ethics on the basis of the natural law philosophy and the British utilitarian philosophy which is a branch of natural law philosophy, has turned into economics with the marginalist revolution. The marginalist revolution has aimed at scientific “certainity” as in natural sciences, by excluding the concepts of class, institutions and history. This transformation gave the discipline a mature scientific theory appearance instead of a loose social theory form. This transformation is also consistent with the liberal character of the discipline. With that transformation, economics, on one hand, gained the most powerful scientific form among social sciences and on the other hand, it narrowed its borders. Institutional economics, one of the schools of heterodox economics, is seriously opposed to the transformation of the discipline. Both by choosing capitalism as an analysis object and by staying apart from or critical towards this capitalism institutional economics judges the liberal nature of formal economics. Institutional economics considers the economy as an institutionalized process. It accepts the market as given not natural. Economics also covers a wider area than the market. In this case, according to institutional economics, the definition of economics as science will expand and change. Economics will move away from the narrow patterns of scientific economics and reappear as political economy. In this study, it is claimed that conceiving institutional economics as political economy constitutes an opportunity to evaluate contemporary capitalism and to understand the basic tendencies of the this capitalism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 177-195
Author(s):  
Keith Tribe

The first undergraduate economics programme was created in Cambridge, but before his appointment Alfred Marshall was employed as a tutor by Balliol College Oxford. This chapter explains why, if Marshall had remained in Oxford, and even if he had succeeded the incumbent Professor of Political Economy, he would not have been able to achieve in Oxford what he did in Cambridge, after his appointment there in late 1884. The reason for this lies in the curricular differences between Oxford and Cambridge—in Oxford, Classics was the primary degree for much of the nineteenth century, with a minor Mathematics path—and also the relationship between college and university. In Cambridge, lecturing on the various Triposes was organised at the level of the university, by Special Boards of Study; arguments could therefore be made in university debates that could then result in university-wide changes. In Oxford, by contrast, lecturing was organised directly by colleges among themselves, cutting out the prospect of discussion at the level of the university itself. This and other differences between Oxford and Cambridge militated against the kind of innovations possible in Cambridge, with for example the establishment of the Natural Sciences Tripos in the 1870s.


Author(s):  
Luigi Pasinetti

Riassunto. –L’economia politica è, tra le scienze umane, quella che maggiormente sperimenta l’attrazione verso i metodi quantitativi e in particolare verso la matematica e la statistica. Recentemente questa attrazione si è fatta ancor più forte che in passato, al punto che non è raro trovare, tra gli economisti, dei teorici che amerebbero vedere l’economia considerata come un ramo della matematica applicata. Ma sarebbe davvero utile convogliare l’economia tra le scienze naturali o addirittura spingerla al ruolo di un ramo della matematica applicata? Una attenta riflessione porta ben presto alla constatazione che il rapporto tra economia e matematica è molto più complesso di quanto possa sembrare a prima vista. L’autore sottolinea che ci sono almeno quattro caratteristiche che differenziano l’economia politica dalle scienze naturali: l’oggetto di studio; la finalità della ricerca economica tesa ad influenzare l’oggetto di studio; la sua caratteristica di disciplina per certi aspetti positiva e per altri aspetti normativa; il coinvolgimento dei giudizi di valore. Per illustrare queste differenze e inquadrare la dimensione autonoma dell’economia politica, l’autore ricorre ad una rassegna critica delle opinioni di alcuni economisti di rilievo, che hanno dedicato contributi all’argomento qui in discussione. Specifici riferimenti vengono fatti a Marshall, Keynes, Hicks, Morishima e – tra gli economisti maggiormente presenti nelle nostre discussioni – a Sraffa e Sen, ai quali ultimi l’autore si sente più vicino.***Abstract. – Among the human sciences, economics is the one experimenting a high degree of attraction towards quantitative methods and, in particular, towards mathematics and statistics. In our times, this attraction is even stronger than in the past, so that it is customary to find, among economists, theoreticians aiming at presenting economics as a branch of applied mathematics. Is it really useful to include economics among the natural sciences, or even to consider it as a branch of applied mathematics? A careful reflection leads quickly to the awareness that the relations between economics and mathematics are much more complex than one can see at first sight. The Author underlines that there are at least four characteristics which differentiate political economy from natural sciences: the object of study; the purpose of economic research (which has an influence on the object of study); its characteristic of being a discipline which is both positive and normative; the dependence on value judgements. To illustrate such differences, and to focus on the autonomous dimension of political economy, the Author critically reviews the opinions of some famous economists, who contributed to the subject under discussion. Specific references are made to Marshall, Keynes, Hicks, Morishima and – among the economists more relevant to the present discussion – Sraffa and Sen, to whom the Author feels closer than to the others.


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