scholarly journals Capitalism as an Economic System Research: Power, Technological Change, and Innovation

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-158
Author(s):  
Adem Levent

Political economy, which developed as a study of wealth and ethics on the basis of the natural law philosophy and the British utilitarian philosophy which is a branch of natural law philosophy, has turned into economics with the marginalist revolution. The marginalist revolution has aimed at scientific “certainity” as in natural sciences, by excluding the concepts of class, institutions and history. This transformation gave the discipline a mature scientific theory appearance instead of a loose social theory form. This transformation is also consistent with the liberal character of the discipline. With that transformation, economics, on one hand, gained the most powerful scientific form among social sciences and on the other hand, it narrowed its borders. Institutional economics, one of the schools of heterodox economics, is seriously opposed to the transformation of the discipline. Both by choosing capitalism as an analysis object and by staying apart from or critical towards this capitalism institutional economics judges the liberal nature of formal economics. Institutional economics considers the economy as an institutionalized process. It accepts the market as given not natural. Economics also covers a wider area than the market. In this case, according to institutional economics, the definition of economics as science will expand and change. Economics will move away from the narrow patterns of scientific economics and reappear as political economy. In this study, it is claimed that conceiving institutional economics as political economy constitutes an opportunity to evaluate contemporary capitalism and to understand the basic tendencies of the this capitalism.

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-127
Author(s):  
Dmitry Shustrov

The idea of supra-constitutionality was formulated in the science of constitutional law in the second quarter of the 20th century and associated with the names of M.Hauriou and K.Schmitt, who for the first time noticed the possibility of the existence of norms that are higher than the constitution. This article is an attempt to give the doctrine of supra-constitutionality an actual theoretical and dogmatic meaning in the context of the study of the material limits of constitutional changes. The doctrine of supra-constitutionality claims to play an important role in explaining that unchangeable norms can exist in constitutional law and that they cannot be excluded, changed, limited, overcome, affected by the other sources of constitutional law, including the constitution itself. Supra-constitutionality is viewed as a characteristic of unchangeable constitutional norms that constitute the material limits of constitutional changes. Supra-constitutionality presupposes the existence of norms that surpass the rest of the constitutional norms and predetermine their content through the definition of what can, should and should not be included in the constitution or excluded from it. The basis of constitutional supra-constitutionality is the argument of hierarchical differentiation. In addition to recognizing unchangeable constitutional norms as supra-constitutional, the article raises the question of the existence of natural law and international law supra-constitutional norms. Natural law supra-constitutional norms have an external and non-positive character. They are not enshrined in the constitution, but stem from a reasonably understood concept of what is due in the most civilized societies, which is determined by the constitutional court. International law supra-constitutionality is understood as the superiority of the norms of international law over the constitution. It has an external and positive character. International law supra-constitutionality can cause political objections from opponents of the absolute rule of international law. Supra-constitutional constitutional, natural and international law norms can come into conflict with each other. The paradox of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality lies in the fact that it creates a hierarchy of norms within the constitution itself, distinguishing between simple and supra-constitutional constitutional norms, or distinguishes certain non-positive norms that are outside the constitution, as having priority over the constitution, or puts some norms of international law over all norms of national law, including the constitution. The purpose of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality is to preserve the inviolable fundamental (natural or generally recognized) values, which justifies its logical flaws and paradoxicality.


Author(s):  
Inge Hinterwaldner

It can be shown that the different conceptions of ‘simulation’ (the one of culture critique on the one hand and the denomination of technical applications on the other) that seem to be incompatible with each other can be reconciled on a single spectrum. Its basis in models, its replacement of reality, its lack of reference and of precession of the referent are some pejorative characteristics often emphasized in media philosophy with regard to simulations, for which the sciences applying computer simulations have no use for. It helps crossing over the views that first seem opposite to each other, but that turn out to be compatible if its root in reality is recognized and thus the representational logic is accepted at least according to the intention. The chapter combines ideas of the 'simulacrum' retrieved in the natural sciences with traces of cybernetic thinking in media studies. The whole study builds on a definition of computer simulation in the technical sense as the involvement with and the act of execution f a dynamic mathematic or procedural model that projects, depicts, or recreates a system or process.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 675-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Elder-Vass

AbstractEconomics has tended to neglect giving, and thus both its important contemporary economic role and its potential contribution to alternative, non-market systems. To remedy this, it will need to draw on the broad debates on the nature of the gift that have developed in and across the other social sciences. This paper addresses several of these by asking how we should define the terms gift and giving. It rejects definitional associations of giving with obligation, reciprocity and the development of social relationships. Such definitions exclude many phenomena commonly understood as giving and underpin misguided attempts to analyse gifts in contemporary late-modern societies in terms derived from anthropological discussions of very different societies. Instead, the paper develops a definition of the gift based on contemporary giving institutions. A more open, contemporary definition of the gift helps to sensitise us to the continuing importance of gift institutions in social and economic life.


Author(s):  
Николай Шавеко ◽  
Nikolai Shaveko

The monograph is devoted to the identification of the main provisions and features of the philosophy of law R. Stammler, definition of communication proposed by R. Stammler legal doctrine with the preceding and contemporary legal doctrines and its significance for the subsequent development of the theory and philosophy of law. R. Stammler – founder and outstanding representative neokantianism philosophy of law and science flow "revived" natural law, speaking with their own conception of the methodology of the social Sciences and played a key role in the development of natural law doctrine, introducing into science the concept of "proper law" (natural law with changing content) and suggesting the formula of the legal ideal "society of freely wanting people". In addition, Mr. stammler one of the first made deeply researched academic critique of Marxism and anarchism. His teaching on the law, jurisprudence and legal ideal of R. stammler had a significant impact on the development of Russian philosophy of law.


Philosophy ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCISCO VERGARA

The prestigious French publisher Presses Universitaires de France has recently brought out (November 1995) a new French edition of Elie Halévy's well known book The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, first published in France in three volumes as La formation du radicalisme philosophique (1901–1904) and translated into English in 1926. The prevailing opinion on this book is that it gives an excellent account of English utilitarianism. Thus, in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Talcott Parsons speaks of it as the ‘virtually definitive analysis of utilitarianism’ More recently Donald Winch, in his introduction to the Penguin edition of John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy, describes Halévy's book as: ‘Still the best study of the ideas and activities of the school taken as a whole’.In this short essay I express a very different opinion. I show that Halévy, who qualifies utilitarianism (with obvious disgust) as ‘a plebeian or rather bourgeois morality’, as ‘much too simple’, completely misunderstood the writings of the English and Scottish utilitarian philosophers.Halévy's understanding of Utilitarianism and the Principle of UtilityThere is no clear or precise definition of utilitarianism in Halévy's book, but he obviously understood it to be a descriptive theory, and took the ‘principle of utility’ for a psychological law explaining human behaviour: ‘the fundamental principle of the doctrine is that pleasure is the natural end of human actions’, ‘The principle of utility [...] meant that all men naturally incline towards pleasure and flee from pain’.


1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell

The philosophy of primary and secondary qualities is in a state of some confusion. There is no agreement as to the basis upon which the two classes of quality may be distinguished—a host of features, as diverse as perceptible by more than one sense and belonging to the definition of matter, are offered as the mark of the primary. There is not even agreement on which qualities belong to which group. Shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary, while colours, smells, and the like (I) are favoured secondary candidates. But for large numbers of qualities, for example being acidic, malleable, rust-proof—or, among perceptible qualities, glistening and vibrating—we are offered no effective guidance.Inevitably, in such a situation, we are without clear answers to the questions; Why should any distinction be made between primaries and secondaries? Must all qualities be the one or the other? To the solution of which problems does the distinction serve as a preliminary step? What special relationship is there between primary qualities and scientific theory, or between secondary qualities and peculiarities in perception?


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (05) ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Denis Bakhtiyorovich Sadullaev ◽  

The subject of this research is the concept of reduction in the logic and methodology of science. On the one hand, reduction is understood as a relationship between a term and its defining expression within a scientific theory, on the other hand, as a relationship between two theories. Since the expansion of the theory occurs due to the introduction of new terms into its vocabulary with the help of nominal definitions, reduction is an operation opposite to the definition: due to reduction, terms are removed from the dictionary of the theory. Moreover, the theory itself is defined in accordance with the set-theoretic approach as a class of sentences that are closed with respect to derivability. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that it examines the semantic and epistemological aspects of the formal definition of reduction. In particular, the explication of the reduction relation between the two theories is based on the concept of functional equivalence of theories. It has been established that the list of basic terms of the theory can only be specified conventionally. All terms introduced with the help of nominal definitions turn out to be reducible. Consequently, a distinctive feature of a theoretical term is the possibility of its reduction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 13-44
Author(s):  
Alexis Gros ◽  

The present paper constitutes an attempt to articulate, systematize, and further develop the implicit traces of a phenomenological critical theory that, according to Michael Barber’s reading, are to be found in Schutz’s thought. It is my contention that a good way to achieve this aim is by reading Schutz against the background of novel, phenomenologically and hermeneutically informed accounts of Critical Theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, such as Hartmut Rosa’s. In order to achieve the stated objective, I will proceed in four steps. First (1), I will briefly reconstruct the mostly negative reception of phenomenology, the interpretive social sciences, and Schutz by both the Frankfurt School and contemporary critical social theory. Second (2), I will present Barber’s alternative reading of Schutzian phenomenology as entailing an implicit ethics and a rudimentary critical theory based thereon. Third (3), I will sketch out Rosa’s formal model of Critical Theory as an heuristic means for articulating Schutz’s unspoken social-critical insights. Finally (4), establishing a dialogue between Barber’s reading of Schutz and Rosa’s account, I will provide a preliminary articulation of Schutz’s rudimentary critical theory.


Author(s):  
Milja Kurki

It is time for International Relations (IR) to join the relational revolution afoot in the natural and social sciences. To do so, more careful reflection is needed on cosmological assumptions in the sciences and also in the study and practice of international relations. In particular it is argued here that we need to pay careful attention to whether and how we think ‘relationally’. Building a conversation between relational cosmology, developed in the natural sciences, and critical social theory, this book seeks to develop a new perspective on how to think relationally in and around the study of IR. This book asks: What kind of cosmological background assumptions do we make as we tackle international relations today and where do our assumptions (about states, individuals or the international) come from? And can we reorient our cosmological imaginations towards more relational understandings of the universe and what would this mean for the study and practice of international politics? The book argues that we live in a world without ‘things’, a world of processes and relations. It also suggests that we live in relations which exceed the boundaries of the human and the social, in planetary relations with plants and animals. Rethinking conceptual premises of IR, Kurki points towards a ‘planetary politics’ perspective within which we can reimagine IR as a field of study and also political practices, including the future of democracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 562-577
Author(s):  
Fernando González Rey

Historically, psychology has given little attention to the ontological definition of its main theoretical representations and has consequently avoided the epistemological and methodological challenges that new theoretical constructions should have implied. This fact, to some extent, has resulted from the rupture between psychology, particularly American psychology (Note: I refer to American psychology not only because it was characterized by this theoretical orientation, but also because at the beginning of the 20th century American psychology came to have a position of leadership in world psychology, due both to its level of organization as well as to its growing number of publications.), and philosophy and the other social sciences since the beginning of the 20th century. In fact, American psychology is strongly oriented toward being recognized as a natural science. In following that goal, methodology has been an object of special attention to the detriment of theory and epistemology. That “methodolatry,” has defined the trend in psychology of considering above on methodology as scientific, independent of the problems to be studied and of its requirements in terms of knowledge production. In fact, the methodology of psychology has oriented itself up until the present toward five main ontological definitions of what psyche is: behavioral, cognitivist, semiotic operational, linguistic, and discursive, with emotions being understood as epiphenomena within each of these representations.


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