Pemikiran Filsafat Islam Jawa Damardjati Supadjar

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sunandar Alwi

This article discusses the thoughts, methods, origins, and influences of Javanese Islamic philosophical thought Damardjati Supadjar. Born in Losari Village, Grabag District, Magelang Regency, March 30, 1940 died 17 February 2014 in Sleman Yogyakarta. The method of thinking is: unique, operational, and testified. The origin and influence of the philosophy of the process were greatly influenced by Whitehead, who developed himself by Damardjati Supadjar who became an (othak-athik gathuk) philosophy. Damardjati Supadjar thoughts about Javanese Islamic philosophy can be seen from the view of nature as sangkan paraning dumadi, which is about the origin and purpose of everything in the universe that comes from God and returns to Him. Humans as khalifatullah mongko ojo dumeh (forbidden from acting arbitrarily). In divinity there is sarira batara (kawula-gusti), that is, humans are only kumawula (servants) who have to melt in the leprosy (God). Then education is ngelmu iku kalakone kanthi laku behavior when the intention to get knowledge must be lived through behavior (the process of seeking knowledge). While morality is critical thinking on the basis of the teaching of acting to be a good human being.

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Husni Thamrin, M.Si

Anthropocentric paradigm has distanced humans from nature, as well as causing the humans themselves become exploitative in attitude and do not really care about the nature. In relation, ecological crisis also can be seen as caused by mechanistic-reductionistic-dualistic of Cartesian science. The perspective of anthropocentric is corrected by biocentrism and ecocentrism ethics, particularly Deep Ecology, to re-look at the nature as an ethical community. The concept of ecoculture is already practiced from the beginning by indigenous or traditional societies in elsewhere. The perspective of the human being as an integral part of the nature, and  the behaviour of full of resposibility, full of respect and care about the sustainability of all life in the universe have become perspectives and behaviours of various traditional people. The majority of local wisdom in the maintenance of the environment is still surviving in the midst of shifting currents waves by a pressure of anthropocentric perspective. There is also in a crisis because a pressure of the  influences of a modernization. While others, drifting and eroding in the modernization and the anthropocentric perspective.In that context, ecoculture, particularly Deep Ecology, support for leaving the anthropocentric perspective, and when a holistic life perspective asks for leaving the anthropocentric perspective, the humans are invited to go back to thelocal wisdom, the old wisdom of the indigenous people. in other words, environmental ethics is to urge and invite the people to go back to the ethics of the indigenous people that are still relevant with the times. The essence of this perspective is back to the nature, back to his true identity as an ecological human in the ecoreligion  perspective.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Katya Kozicki ◽  
Luis Gustavo Cardoso

This paper is an investigation of the reference made by Carlos Santiago Nino about Jorge Luis Borges, in the fifth chapter of his “Introduction to Legal Analysis”, in which he introduces the concept of verbal realism. The production by Borges mentioned by Nino is the poem “The Golem”, which tells the story of rabbi Judah Loew, who attempted to create another human being in his rituals. Thus, this study develops new considerations on the power of words to evoke things, and the common belief that words intrinsically relate to what they represent. In order to do that, the first objective of analysis is the immediate reference of Borges, the dialogue “Cratylus”, by Plato, together with other references, such as Goethe’s Faust, which has a similar narrative to the analyzed poem. The question raised is whether verbal realism offers definitions to constitute the universe built up by Borges. Hence, this article concludes that words, in normative contexts, are useful for summoning certain phenomena towards the events, and that verbal realism, then, has a dimension that Carlos Santiago Nino did not explore.


Adeptus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmara Wasilewska

Paradoxes in Jīva Gosvāmi’s concept of the soul, path to perfection and liberationThis article is devoted to the role and significance of paradoxes in the philosophical thought and mysticism of the sixteenth-century Bengali Vaishnava theologian Jīva Gosvāmi. He situates his system within the Vedanta school, where the main category distinguishing its branches and deciding on their specific character is the relation between the Absolute, the phenomenal world and the human being. In Gosvāmi’s school, this relation involves identity and distinctness (bhedābheda) of those categories at the same time, referred to by the word acintya (“inaccessible to reason”), which further stresses this ontological paradox. Although doctrinally the most important, it is not the only paradox in Gosvami’s thought. Adopting this core metaphysical thesis engendered many other aporias, including those concerning the nature of the soul, the concept of bhakti (loving devotion to a deity) and the idea of liberation (mukti), which Goswami then attempts to solve in his most important philosophical treatise – Ṣaṭsandarbha. Paradoksy w Dźiwy Goswamina koncepcji duszy, drogi do doskonałości oraz wyzwoleniaPrzedmiotem artykułu jest rola i znaczenie paradoksów w myśli filozoficznej i mistyce teologa wisznuizmu bengalskiego – Dźiwy Goswamina (XVI w.). Sytuuje on swój system w obrębie szkoły wedanty, w której główną kategorią odróżniającą jej nurty i decydującą o ich specyfice jest relacja pomiędzy absolutem a światem zjawiskowym i człowiekiem. U Goswamina będzie to relacja jednoczesnej tożsamości i odrębności (bhedābheda) powyższych kategorii, dookreślona słowem acintya – „niedostępna rozumowi” – co dodatkowo uwydatnia ten ontologiczny paradoks. Chociaż doktrynalnie najistotniejszy, nie jest to jednak jedyny paradoks w myśli Goswamina. Poprzez przyjęcie tej nadrzędnej tezy metafizycznej powstało bowiem wiele innych aporii, między innymi dotyczących natury duszy, problemu wcielenia, a także koncepcji bhakti (nabożnego oddania dla bóstwa) oraz wyzwolenia (mukti), które następnie Goswamin stara się rozwiązać w swoim najważniejszym traktacie filozoficznym – Szatsandarbhsze.


Author(s):  
Shams C. Inati

Ibn Bajja’s philosophy may be summed up in two words; al-ittisal (conjunction) and al-tawahhud (solitude). Conjunction is union with the divine realm, a union that reveals the eternal and innermost aspects of the universe. Through this union or knowledge, one is completed as a human being, and in this completion the ultimate human end, happiness, is achieved. Solitude, on the other hand, is separation from a society that is lacking in knowledge. Once united with the eternal aspects of the universe, one must isolate oneself from those who are not in the same state, who may therefore distract one from the supernatural realm through their ignorance and corruption.


Author(s):  
Shams C. Inati

The discussion of the human soul, its existence, nature, ultimate objective and eternity, occupies a highly important position in Islamic philosophy and forms its main focus. For the most part Muslim philosophers agreed, as did their Greek predecessors, that the soul consists of non-rational and rational parts. The non-rational part they divided into the plant and animal souls, the rational part into the practical and the theoretical intellects. All believed that the non-rational part is linked essentially to the body, but some considered the rational part as separate from the body by nature and others that all the parts of the soul are by nature material. The philosophers agreed that, while the soul is in the body, its non-rational part is to manage the body, its practical intellect is to manage worldly affairs, including those of the body, and its theoretical intellect is to know the eternal aspects of the universe. They thought that the ultimate end or happiness of the soul depends on its ability to separate itself from the demands of the body and to focus on grasping the eternal aspects of the universe. All believed that the non-rational soul comes into being and unavoidably perishes. Some, like al-Farabi, believed that the rational soul may or may not survive eternally; others, like Ibn Sina, believed that it has no beginning and no end; still others, such as Ibn Rushd, believed that the soul with all its individual parts comes into existence and is eventually destroyed.


Author(s):  
Peter Schuller

After exhorting us to wake up from our ‘daydreaming’ and revolutionize our modality of thought to that of conceptualization, Descartes seems to forget about this crucial matter of a discontinuous leap. So, too, it seems has the profession generally and this has infected philosophical research and teaching. It is urged here that discontinuous processes are crucial in the universe, in human life, in human thinking. Such ontological events cannot be handled by dualism, materialism or postmodernism. Concentration on such discontinuous processes is urged, an alternative is briefly indicated, and a criterion for ordering levels of human levels of reality is offered. It follows in the line of Cantor and Marx. It is suggested that a human being is a transfinite entity and that such an entity has many levels of being, among which are cognitive processes, imaginative processes and physical processes. A person is ‘not other than’ these without being ‘nothing but’ any of these.


Dialogue ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-441
Author(s):  
Douglas Browning

An adequate theory of the self must provide for the fact of human agency. I would like to show that (1) we can put together a theory of human agency from Whitehead's later writings, but that (2) this theory is not satisfactory. This discussion will be, first, expository and then critical of Whitehead's position. An elaboration of Whitehead's theory has two moments. For Whitehead, all factors of the universe are finally derivative from the ultimately actual things, which he calls actual entities. The fact of agency is no exception. The establishment of such agency is the job of what I shall call Whitehead's microscopic theory. We are interested here, however, in the human being as agent. A person, according to Whitehead, is not an actual entity, but a society of actual entities. Whitehead's theory of human agency may be called the macroscopic theory. After an examination of these theories, I shall conclude by briefly criticizing them in two ways. First, for Whitehead there are no acts but only processes. Second, an adequate theory requires a doctrine of the persistence of the agent which Whitehead is unable to provide.


Author(s):  
John G. Brungardt ◽  

The Catholic Church has increasingly invoked the principle of human dignity as a way to spread the message of the Gospel in the modern world. Catholic philosophers must therefore defend this principle in service to Catholic theology. One aspect of this defense is how the human person relates to the universe. Is human dignity of a piece with the material universe in which we find ourselves? Or is our dignity alien in kind to such a whole? Or does the truth lie somewhere in between? The metaphysics of creation properly locates the human being in the universe as a part, ordered to the universe’s common good of order and ultimately to God. Human dignity is possible only in a cosmos; that this is concordant with modern scientific cosmology is briefly defended in the conclusion.


KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-111
Author(s):  
Christophe Bouton

Abstract This paper deals with the problem of the emergence of time in three different ways, at the intersection of the history of philosophy and the history of science: 1) the emergence of time with subjectivity examined on the basis of Kant’s idealism; 2) the emergence of time with life, considered in the light of the work of Bergson; 3) the emergence of time with the Universe, in relation to the notions of ‘The Big Bang’ and ‘The Planck Wall’. It concludes that the idea of the emergence of time is inconsistent in a diachronic sense, and problematic in a synchronic sense. One meaning could, however, be accorded to this notion: with life, a new relation to time has emerged and has attained one of its most developed forms with the human being.


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