REFORMING THE CREDIT SYSTEM IN THE USSR IN THE PERIOD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-194
Author(s):  
Yury F. Likholetov ◽  
Igor A. Grigoriev

Introduction. In modern Russia, even today, the process started back in the 1990s continues to gain momentum – the emergence of state-monopoly capitalism. This phenomenon always includes such a feature as centralization in the economic and political spheres of public life. The concentration in the hands of the state of the mechanism for the regulation of economic processes in a country is not always negative. There are enough examples in history to prove this thesis. The purpose of this article is to show a positive example of competent centralization of the economic sector, referring to the experience of reforming the credit system in the Soviet Union during the period of industrialization. The authors of the article strive to demonstrate an example of an effective mechanism for maneuvering means, as well as to evaluate the results of this process. Materials and methods. This research is based on traditional methods used in Russian historical science: problem-chronological, systemic, and comparative-historical. Results. The reform of the credit and banking sector carried out in the Soviet Union was a logical conclusion to the centralization of the country’s internal economic management system, which enabled the state to take a more precise approach to planning, distribution and, most importantly, to accounting for funds. Discussion and Conclusion. The result of the reform was that all financial flows concentrated in the hands of the state proceeded in the order strictly established by the party, in accordance with a single political line. In turn, this made it possible to create a base for maneuver with the means that went to strengthen the defense – industrial complex and qualitatively re-equip the army. The development of centralization, in fact, became the basis for the further development of the military economy with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Dunlop

A book published by the author in 1993 contained a lengthy chapter on the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union. This article builds on and updates that chapter, making use of a trove of newly available documents and memoirs. The article discusses many aspects of the coup attempt, but it particularly seeks to explain why the coup failed and what the implications were for the Soviet Union. The events of December 1991 that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union were the direct result of changes set in motion by the failed coup. The major state and party institutions that might ordinarily have tried to hold the country together—the Communist Party apparatus, the secret police, the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of Defense, and the state administrative organs—all were compromised by their participation in the coup. As a result, when events pushed the Soviet Union toward collapse there was no way of staving off that outcome.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-51
Author(s):  
Jason Beckett

Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) has recently begun to garner significant interest among the military and strategic defence communities. While nebulous and difficult to define, the basic object of SIW is to render an adversary's information systems inoperative or to cause them to malfunction. While information is the key, the means, and the target of SIW, real world damage is the intention and effect. It is, nonetheless, an area which has been almost completely ignored by positive international law. The purpose of the present article is to begin to resolve this lacuna by analysing the applicability to, and effect of, international humanitarian law (IHL) on SIW. The author makes recommendations as to possible alterations and improvements to IHL to resolve this lacuna. [In] 1956 when Khrushchev said: “We will bury the West.” What he was really saying was that the military industrial complex of the Soviet Union would win out over the military industrial complex of the West – and note that it's industrial. What Khrushchev didn't understand was that 1956 was the first year in the United States that white-collar and service employees outnumbered blue-collar workers. […] The industrial complex, military or not, was at its end point.Alvin Toffler, Novelist and Social Theorist


1984 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Evangelista

The authors of three recent books attempt to account for Soviet military developments by exploring a wide range of possible explanations. In Soviet Strategic Forces, Berman and Baker adopt a“requirements“approach; they argue that the Soviet strategic posture has developed mainly in response to threats generated by the West. Andrew Cockburn, in The Threat, maintains that internal factors—in particular, bureaucratic politics and the workings of the military-industrial complex—are responsible for Soviet weapons decisions. David Holloway's more eclectic explanation, in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, describes both the internal and external determinants of Soviet military policy. The evolution of Soviet regional nuclear policy, and particularly the deployment of the SS-20 missile, can be accounted for by several different explanations—indicating a problem of overdetermination of causes. One way to resolve this problem is by adopting a framework developed by James Kurth to explain U.S. weapons procurement. It suggests that the“modes of causation” for Soviet weapons decisions are generally the opposite of those for American decisions. This generalization is consistent with what an analysis based on the relative strengths of state and societal forces in the two countries would predict.


2018 ◽  
pp. 203-206
Author(s):  
Anthony Rimmington

Knowledge of Stalin’s historical biological warfare network is crucial to making sense of the vast offensive biological warfare program launched by the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It is also a crucial aid to a full understanding of Russia’s current biological defense program. Nearly the entirety of the core infrastructure that was created during Stalin’s leadership remains in place today. The Shikhany proving ground, in existence since the 1920s, remains at the heart of Russia’s network and the three BW facilities created by Stalin at Kirov, Ekaterinburg and Sergiev Posad remain in full operation. As well as having originally created much of Russia’s existing physical military biological infrastructure, Stalin’s BW program is also likely to have resulted in the development by the military of technology for the manufacture of a range of new bioweapons. This technology presumably underwent further development during the offensive program launched in the 1970s by the Soviet Union and was eventually inherited by Russia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Maxim V. Evstratov

The article examines the issue of carrying out Stalinist repressions against the officers of the late 1930s. Separate problematic plots associated with repressions in relation to the command and control and political composition of the Red Army are highlighted. Mass repressions began in the early 1930s. thanks to falsified charges related to the Viasna case. Based on special research literature, the article reveals the reasons and consequences of the peak of repressions against the military, which fell on the period of the disclosure of the so-called «military conspiracy» in 1937. The background of the conspiracy itself was connected with the fact that around J.V. Stalin there were two large opposing forces, consisting of eminent military men, who had different views on the further development of the army. As a result, the «leader» supported KE Voroshilov’s group, and MN Tukhachevsky’s associates were repressed. The article notes that about 40 thousand people from among the commanders suffered from the repressions of 1937-1938. In 1939, by order of JV Stalin, the mass coverage of repression was suspended, as a result, 11,178 people were reinstated in the army. Any interrelated events inevitably have a cause-and-effect relationship. Many historians, discussing the failures of the Soviet Union in the first year of the Great Patriotic War, come to the conclusion that the professionally formed army, which led to successes during the Civil War, was largely destroyed by the internal policy of the state, which was directly related to the repression of the end 1930s. The massive repressions carried out against the commanding and commanding personnel in the pre-war years inflicted great losses on the Red Army. Events of the 1930s became the main reason for personnel problems in the Red Army, which entailed tragic consequences during the Great Patriotic War.


Author(s):  
Urszula Grzyb

Science and technology was thought to be one of the main assets of the Russian Federation, the basis for an economic recovery once it was no longer submitted to central planning. It was expected that this wealth of knowledge bequeathed from the Soviet Union would give rise to a boom in the creation of innovation companies and that foreign investment would flow in large amounts into the science sector, but both these expectations did not materialise.In Russia the first science park (science parks created by universities are called by the Russian name technoparks) was established in Tomsk in 1990 by higher education, scientific institutions and industrial enterprises jointly. Federal programmes provide support to the existing technoparks, but this support is rather meagre. Due to the industrial crisis and to the severe cutbacks in federal financing, the scientific institutions, more than 70% of which were in 1990 still connected with the military industrial complex, are nowadays experiencing a serious crisis. The number of scientific workers decreased more than twofold between 1989 and 1994 and continues to fall. Nowadays the innovation centres have a more commercial profile and, therefore, are more selective in the choice of the tenants as they have to become self-sufficient and repay the debts arising from re-construction of their premises.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Allyson S. Edwards

Scholars of Boris Yeltsin’s Russia argue that it was a period of demilitarisation. Research largely focuses on militarisation in terms of its physical dimensions and by investigating subjects, individuals and institutions with a direct link to the military. These scholars instead attribute the success of Russian militarism in the post-Soviet period to Vladimir Putin. However, this is not entirely the case. This thesis challenges the assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted a break in the militarisation of society, arguing that the focus of current literature is too narrow to provide a comprehensive understanding of Russian militarism at this time. Instead, the research investigates Russian militarisation during the 1990s through a cultural lens by examining the prominent discourses across four societal domains: media, education; social welfare; and commemoration. Two discourses of a militaristic nature prevailed, including the moral obligation and civic duty of Russian people to protect the fatherland, and Russia as a besieged fortress. These narratives underpin Russian identity and have contributed towards the survival of Russian militarism beyond regime change. The thesis examines political documents, including laws, notes and letters, from the State Archive of the Russian Federation and the Yeltsin Centre, Russian newspapers and Russian school historical textbooks from the Russian State Library to answer the following questions: what top-down mechanisms militarise society? What discourses are prominent in the four societal domains and in what way do they contribute towards the militarisation of society? How do the discourses within the different societal domains fit into (and add to) current literature on the state of militarism and militarisation in Post-Soviet Russia? The thesis found that the rituals of the Putin era were rooted in Yeltsin’s Russia, and that through a cultural lens, societal militarisation can be seen to persist without a strong military apparatus.


Author(s):  
Saken Aralbay ◽  
Gaziz Telebaev ◽  
Оmirbek Bekezhan ◽  
Assem Sagatova ◽  
Kamchat Abdrahmanova

Analysis of the influence of the ideas of Marxism on the national values of the Kazakh people in the Western and Soviet Union were founded by K. Marx and his ideological partner F. Engels. Although the ideas of Marxism were intended to resolve the economic and social contradictions that occurred in Western countries, they belonged to this view. And the communist ideology, formed on the basis of Marxism, bypassed Western culture and radically changed the national values of the Kazakh state within the Soviet Union, the culture of thinking. Identification of the main mistakes in the ideas of Marxism and the consequences of one-sided scientific concepts took place in further development. In this article the author analyzes the Soviet government on the way of creating a formation of communism with the definition of one-sided scientific factors that took place in the ideology of Marxism and the state of Kazakhstan that was part of Soviet Union and its cultural essence. The author proves that the main mistake in the ideology of Marxism is that the problems of national values remain outside the process of society; ideologists turned a blind eye to this problem and as a result, have lost the existing opportunities


Author(s):  
Vitaliy Chorny

The article analyzes the background and the timeline of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939–1940, which allowed Finland, the only one from the former colonies, to preserve sovereignty. Therewith the article considers the actions of Soviet Russia, and subsequently the USSR on the restoration of the empire from its collapse in 1917 and the end of the Second World War. It is concluded that the actions of the metropolis have not undergone significant changes both in form and content. Therefore the Winter War experience gives reason to generate adequate, and if necessary – asymmetric responses to the challenges facing Ukraine today. The author substantiates the idea that the core of the renewal of Ukrainian society should be the military reform. It will allow to revive a powerful defense-industrial complex. And this, in turn, will contribute to restoring the industrial potential of our state. At the same time, as a result of military reform, there should appear a “new model of the army” in Ukraine, and new approaches to the Russian-Ukrainian war should emerge.


Author(s):  
N.P. Knekht ◽  

The author tries to outline the ways to build a new, deeper ontology of the Soviet Union as a dynamic interaction of human and «non-human» actors that create the specifics of the «natureculture » of late socialism. The article examines the influence of the military-industrial complex on the geography and life of people. Starting from the concept of «performative shift» (Alexey Yurchak), the author shows that the Soviet map reflects a specific changing technoscientific object located on the border of Nature and Society.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document