scholarly journals “We are Human Beings, and We Value Human Life”: Glock and Diamond on Mental Capacities and Animal Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikel Burley

How should a philosophical inquiry into the moral status of (nonhuman) animals proceed? Many philosophers maintain that by examining the “morally relevant” psychological or physiological capacities possessed by the members of different species, and comparing them with similar capacities possessed by human beings, the moral status of the animals in question can be established. Others contend that such an approach runs into serious moral and conceptual problems, a crucial one being that of how to give a coherent account of the natural sense of concern for profoundly cognitively impaired human beings if moral status is assumed to depend on features that centrally include cognitive capacities. The present article discusses this debate with reference to Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers whose respective approaches, on the face of it, diverge dramatically. With a primary focus on Hans-Johann Glock and Cora Diamond, and a secondary focus on recent work by Alice Crary, I argue that, despite an overt disavowal of the kind of approach favoured by Diamond and Crary, Glock’s affirmation that we simply do “value human life” brings him closer to that approach than he acknowledges.

Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-501
Author(s):  
Mikel Burley

AbstractPhilosophy as well as anthropology is a discipline concerned with what it means to be human, and hence with investigating the multiple ways of making sense of human life. An important task in this process is to remain open to diverse conceptions of human beings, not least conceptions that may on the face of it appear to be morally alien. A case in point are conceptions that are bound up with cannibalism, a practice sometimes assumed to be so morally scandalous that it probably never happens, at least in a culturally sanctioned form. Questioning this assumption, along with Cora Diamond's contention that the very concept of a human being involves a prohibition against consuming human flesh, the present article explores how cannibalism can have an intelligible place in a human society – exemplified by the Wari’ of western Brazil. By coming to see this, we are enabled to enlarge our conception of the heterogeneity of possible ways of being human.


Author(s):  
Gisela Giner Rommel

La llamada era o siglo de la biotecnología, y con ella, una nueva realidad genética artificial, va abriéndose camino inexorablemente. La misma supone nuevas formas de dominio de la vida natural y humana sin precedentes. El hombre puede ya alterar nada menos que el curso de la evolución de las especies. Es fácil adivinar entonces por qué la genética traspasa su propio ámbito científico: se encuentra ineludiblemente cargada de dilemas éticos de toda índole, y unida al mundo filosófico y moral por su urgente necesidad de respuestas. La primera gran reflexión que la genética plantea a la ética es de tal calibre, que zozobra los cimientos de la propia tradición filosófica occidental y su concepción de la dignidad humana. Si el hallazgo del genoma humano lleva consigo una propensión de la visión de la realidad humana exclusivamente cientificista y biológica, procediendo a realizar una verdadera «sacralización de la ciencia» ¿Supone ello el derrumbe, la invalidación de la condición ética y libre del hombre? ¿Debemos renunciar a una visión del mismo como un ser digno y reducirlo a un animal más? ¿Debemos, en definitiva, dar carpetazo al humanismo, poniendo en tela de juicio la calidad moral del hombre? ¿Cerrar entonces los espacios de la ética o la filosofía, declarando que todos los aspectos que encierran la condición humana se consumen en una explicación científica? ¿Cómo afrontar otros posibles ataques a dimensiones de la dignidad humana como la libertad, la igualdad, la intimidad? ¿Precisan de disciplinas distintas, como la filosofía y el derecho, en busca de soluciones que exceden del campo científico y a los que éste no puede dar respuestas? Ante los nuevos poderes y responsabilidades que trae consigo el progreso científico, la explicación ética y la científica no deben sino reencontrarse. Apostar por el control ético del rumbo del proceso científico y tecnológico a través del paradigma de la dignidad humana se torna imprescindible. En definitiva, tratar de llevar a cabo el sueño del progreso universal, real, en el que la genética constituya un eslabón, un peldaño más en su consecución efectiva no puede darse sin intervención de la reflexión ética.This is definitely the age of biotechnology and with it comes a new artificial genetic reality. Biotechnology gives us never seen before control over plant, animal and human life. Mankind may now even be able to change the course of evolution in all living creatures, no less. That is why it is easy to understand that the science of genetics transcends its own domain; it is unavoidably confronted with ethical dilemmas of all kind and it is compelled to turn to philosophy and morality because of its need to find answers urgently. The first question raised by genetics is of such a magnitude that it overturns the basis of the Western philosophical tradition and its concept of human dignity. If the decoding of the human genome leads to an exclusively scientific and biological vision of human reality, to what you could call a «sacralisation of science», then what happens to free will, to man as an ethical being? Should we henceforth refuse to consider Man as a creature of Dignity and reduce him to just another animal? Should we, in short, abandon all humanistic idealism and question even the morality of human beings? Should we forget about ethics and philosophy and agree that all the aspects, implicit in the human condition, can find a scientific explanation? But how then should we deal with other attacks that may be made against such dimensions of human dignity as liberty, equality and privacy? Will there be no need for other disciplines, such as philosophy and law, to find solutions to problems which exceed the field of science and for which science has no answers to give?. In the face of all the new powers, potential and responsibilities brought about by scientific progress, ethics and science should not become adversaries. Ethical control over the course of scientific and technological progress based on the paradigm of human dignity is becoming essential. To summarise, it will be impossible to realise the dream of true progress, in which the science of genetics is but one step, without answering ethical questions.


The phenomenon of war occupies one of the leading places in socio-philosophical and cultural studies. War also has an ambiguous position in human life. On the historical map we see the ongoing waves of armed conflicts, which inevitably lead to fatal consequences for countries, peoples and human beings. War mainly appears in the form of horrors and tragedies. However, in philosophical studies, war is considered from different angles. Philosophers often emphasize the ambiguity and multidimensionality of war. In this work, the authors analyze the phenomenon of war, given a certain “attractiveness” and even the “necessity” of this phenomenon for humans. The authors also summarize the available range of answers to the question of where the desire for violence comes from, that is, the so-called “thirst for war”. It is this desire that gives rise to a constant stay of people in a state of war. The results of this study show that war is indeed an important phenomenon, which can also be considered one of the fundamental attributes of human nature. Analyzing various approaches that explain the causes of war (naturalistic, psychological, economic, etc.) the authors note that the source of any armed conflict is precisely the “militancy” in the very essence of homo sapiens. Human beings must constantly fight for their existence. And such a struggle often takes various forms, which can be considered as concrete variants of the same phenomenon. This phenomenon at the theoretical and philosophical level is fixed in the concept of war. Despite the natural sense of horror that the word “war” evokes at the level of everyday consciousness, pain and hope, death and freedom, faith in human and the justice of the universe, as well as a willingness to fight for this justice, are simultaneously hidden under this “ language shell”. All these internally contradictory meanings are united within the framework of the philosophically processed concept of war, and are also embodied in many different “wars” that a person constantly wages due to his / her specific “being structure”. Human, therefore, is a “warring creature,” or, as the authors propose to denote this feature, “homo militaris”.


2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (243) ◽  
pp. 622
Author(s):  
Nilo Agostini

Novas tecnologias estão mapeando o código genético, decifrando assim as informações contidas no DNA humano. A biomedicina vê-se, com isso, ante novos paradigmas, com a emergência de uma nova concepção terapéutica. Á bioética, por sua vez, tem um lugar de destaque, neste vasto campo, ao acionar a reflexão ética a respeito da vida; chega a definir delimitações protetoras, buscando poteger o ser humano de desvios diversos e mesmo ameaçadores; aponta para a necessidade imperiosa de servir ao bem-estar da humanidade. Á contribuição cristã parte do valor incomparável da vida humana para acolher os beneficios trazidos e evitar extrapolações no uso das biotecnologias. O elemento norteador é sempre a busca do bem integral do ser humano.Abstract: New technologies are mapping the genetic code and thus deciphering the information contained in the human DNA. With the emergence of a new therapeutic concept, biomedicine finds itself in the face of new paradigms. Bioethics, in its turn, is given a prominent role in this vast field, as it sets in motion the ethical reflection about life; defines protective limits that seek to guard human beings against difrent — and even threatening — detours; and it points to die fundamental need to act in the service of the welfare of Mankind. The Christian contribution bases itself on the incomparable value of human life to welcome the benefits of the new biotechnologies but also to prevent extrapolations in their application. Here, our North is, always, the good of the whole human being.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Ebert

Do you remember Harambe, the 17-year-old silverback who was shot dead after a boy fell into the gorilla enclosure at the Cincinnati Zoo, Cecil, the lion who was shot with an arrow by an American dentist in Zimbabwe, and Marius, the giraffe who was killed and fed to other animals at the Copenhagen Zoo?Every once in a while, a news story about the human-caused death of an animal sparks global outrage, briefly lights up the comments sections on the internet, and reminds us of the inconsistency in how think about non-human animals. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, we kill approximately two thousand animals for food per second, not including fish and other marine animals. All of these animals have rich emotional lives that matter to them, and what we do to them is as bad, and often much worse, than what was done to Harambe, Cecil, and Marius. Most farm animals are raised in filthy and unnatural conditions, and are subject to routine mutilations and other mistreatment. They are transported in ways that are at best unpleasant and at worst horrific, and they die violent deaths. Yet, most of us – while expressing our moral indignation about the treatment of Harambe, Cecil, and Marius – rarely spare a thought for the animals we eat.Morally speaking, there does not seem to be much of a difference between what happened in Cincinnati, Zimbabwe, and Denmark and what happens in factory farms and slaughterhouses in every part of the world, every day. If anything, there was a better reason to kill Harambe – namely, to avert danger from a child – than there is to kill animals for food. We do not need to consume animal products to live a healthy and fulfilled life. In fact, careful studies have found that a well-balanced plant-based diet decreases the chances of suffering from diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and some cancers, and benefits the environment.The way we think about and treat non-human animals is deeply confused, and scholars are in a unique position to provide some clarity. The Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics hence decided to dedicate two special issues to the relationship between human beings and other animals, and asked me to be the guest editor. This is the second of the two special issues, and contains the following five articles:The number of fish killed annually by the fishing industry, even on the most conservative estimate, is more than ten times larger than the number of terrestrial animals killed annually for food, and yet animal advocates largely focus on the latter in their efforts to reduce animal suffering. Bob Fischer (“Wild Fish and Expected Utility”) does the math and argues that considerations of expected utility call that focus into question. He concludes that animal advocacy organizations owe an explanation of why they are not directing more of their resources to fish.Akande Michael Aina and Ofuasia Emmanuel (“The Chicken Fallacy and the Ethics of Cruelty to Non-Human Animals”) challenge the common view that non-human animals are mere resources that we can use as we please, and ask whether Peter Singer’s ethics of animal liberation is a plausible alternative. They think it is not, in part because it denies moral status to non-sentient life, and take another approach that draws from Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. They argue that cruelty to non-human animals, with whom they claim we are on an equal moral footing, betrays our trusting and neighborly relationship with them.Iván Ortega Rodríguez (“Animal Citizenship, Phenomenology, and Ontology: Some reflections on Donaldson’s & Kymlicka’s Zoopolis”) provides a brief summary of the position Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka defend in their ground-breaking book Zoopolis, and argues that they are mistaken in failing to consider an important metaphysical difference between human beings and other animals. While human and non-human animals share a common environment, only human interaction constitutes what he calls a “world.” That difference, however, does not undermine the case for animal rights but rather strengthens it.Rhyddhi Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics and India: Understanding the Connection through the Capabilities Approach”) takes a critical look at a wide range of legal provisions in Indian law designed to protect non-human animals. She argues that, despite such provisions, nonhuman animals continue to suffer greatly at the hands of human beings in India, which is partly due to the lack of a comprehensive ethical vision. She suggests that the capabilities approach can provide such a vision, and concludes by making a number of policy recommendations to improve animal welfare in India.Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) complete their argument for the claim that our treatment of non-human animals is a matter of justice, the first part of which can be found in the previous issue of this journal.I thank the contributors for choosing this journal to share their exciting ideas, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for their cooperation and trust.If you, dear reader, are new to the academic debate over the moral status of non-human animals, and if the two Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics special issues on animal ethics have made you curious, as I hope they did, I would like to recommend to you two classics of the animal ethics literature: Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review/Random House, 1975); and Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).I hope you will enjoy reading through this issue, and I am sending you my warm regards.Rainer Ebert Guest Editor, Bangladesh Journal of BioethicsDepartment of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, South AfricaEmail: [email protected] Webpage: http://www.rainerebert.com


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (253) ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
José Wiliam Corrêa de Araújo

A modernidade atrelou o ser humano ao dogma da racionalidade instrumental e aos mecanismos da economia de mercado. Conseqüentemente, hoje somos ameaçados pelo modo de pensar quantitativo, produtivista e impessoal a serviço do projeto de dominação da natureza e da sociedade. Vivemos hoje uma realidade de mundo que se caracteriza por uma ética apenas do provisório e da imediatez, que considera o comportamento utilitarista do ser humano como o móvel de toda atividade econômica. Nossa época está pedindo uma nova consciência do lugar do ser humano no mundo. As relações sociais hoje a nível mundial são de grande destrutividade da natureza e de grande exclusão social. Ante os desafios ambientais torna-se urgente resgatar novas experiências paradigmáticas que revelem a dignidade de toda criatura. É preciso uma nova compreensão do próprio ser humano, um modo diferente de construir o discurso ético, com uma visão de mundo que reconheça o valor inerente da vida não-humana.Abstract: Modernity has harnessed human beings to the dogma of instrumental rationality and to the mechanisms of the market economy. Consequently, we are now threatened by a quantitative and impersonal way of thinking geared only to production and in the service of a project to control nature and society. We experience a world reality that has as its main characteristic an ethics that seeks only provisional and immediate aims and that considers human beings’utilitarian behaviour as the prime motive of all economic activity. Our times are demanding a new awareness of the human being’s place in the world. International social relations promote nature’s destruction and great social exclusion. In the face of environmental challenges we must develop new paradigms that will bring to the fore the dignity of all creatures. And we need a new understanding of the human being him/herself, a different way of building the ethical discourse with a worldview that recognizes the inherent value of the non-human life.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamil Mamak

Proponents of welcoming robots into the moral circle have presented various approaches to moral patiency under which determining the moral status of robots seems possible. However, even if we recognize robots as having moral standing, how should we situate them in the hierarchy of values? In particular, who should be sacrificed in a moral dilemma–a human or a robot? This paper answers this question with reference to the most popular approaches to moral patiency. However, the conclusions of a survey on moral patiency do not consider another important factor, namely the law. For now, the hierarchy of values is set by law, and we must take that law into consideration when making decisions. I demonstrate that current legal systems prioritize human beings and even force the active protection of humans. Recent studies have suggested that people would hesitate to sacrifice robots in order to save humans, yet doing so could be a crime. This hesitancy is associated with the anthropomorphization of robots, which are becoming more human-like. Robots’ increasing similarity to humans could therefore lead to the endangerment of humans and the criminal responsibility of others. I propose two recommendations in terms of robot design to ensure the supremacy of human life over that of humanoid robots.


Author(s):  
Isaac Boaheng

The issue of acceptance of euthanasia (assisted death) in the face of affirming human dignity as the preservation of the image of God in human beings is fiercely debated over the world. Different (Christian and non-Christian) ethicists hold different positions in the debate. Some of the key questions in the debate include how moral is it to legalize euthanasia in the face of the doctrine of Imago Dei? Should the quality of a person’s life overrule the sanctity of human life? This paper examines the arguments for and against the legalization of euthanasia and then considers how the doctrine of the Imago Dei should inform one’s decision to accept or reject euthanasia. With the African religio-cultural worldview as a contextual framework, the study contends that even though the preservation of physical life is not the ultimate goal of Christianity (since physical death is inevitable), human life should not be shortened deliberately for any reason. Therefore, it is morally wrong to take anybody’s life under any circumstance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Ebert

Philosophers and ethicists have long neglected moral questions that arise from our interaction with non-human animals. Most assumed that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals, and that it is therefore morally permissible to use non-human animals as a source of food, clothing, and entertainment, and for scientific purposes. In recent decades, however, that assumption has been challenged, and the moral status of non-human animals is now the subject of a lively and controversial academic debate.Advances in sciences, particularly the advent of evolutionary theory, made us realize that human beings and other animals are more similar than different, and force us to rethink our place in nature. We are no longer justified in thinking of ourselves as the crown of creation. We now understand that we are just one species among others, and we must ask ourselves anew – with an open and critical mind and without bias – which values and principles should guide our interaction with non-human animals, and how we should weigh our interests against those of other animals.Recognizing this important trend in moral thinking, the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics invited me to edit a special issue on animal ethics. The interest was so great that one issue became two, of which this is the first. I am grateful to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for giving me the opportunity to serve as a guest editor, and for their assistance during the editing process. I also thank our contributors for choosing this journal to publish their excellent work, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.This, the first special issue on animal ethics contains the following five articles:Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) challenge the widely held belief that non-human animals are not included within the scope of the principles of justice, and suggest that the interests of non-human animals sometimes take precedence over the interests of human beings. The implications of their argument for our interaction with other animals are profound: E.g., it is a matter of justice and fairness to prevent avoidable and unnecessary animal suffering, rather than a mere matter of compassion.Eric X. Qi (“Special Relations, Special Obligations, and Speciesism”) develops an account of the moral significance of special relations, and uses it to argue for a modest form of speciesism that steers a middle ground between anti-speciesism and crude speciesism. Unlike anti-speciesists, he maintains that species co-membership grounds special moral obligations among the members of the same species. In contrast to crude speciesists, however, he holds that our special obligations to fellow human beings do not warrant that we always attach more weight to their interests than to the comparable interests of non-human animals.Yamikani Ndasaukaand Grivas M. Kayange (“Existence and Needs: A case for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals”) argue that the existentialist view that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals rests on a weak foundation. They consider a number of arguments that have been made in support of this view and conclude that none of them holds up to critical scrutiny. They then suggest that human beings and other animals in fact deserve equal moral consideration, and – drawing from Martin Heidegger and Abraham Maslow – ground that claim in two important commonalities between them.Sreetama Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency”) explains how the postmodern approach to animal ethics departs from the traditional approach, particularly its emphasis on the principles of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and draws attention to the pernicious hierarchy of domination that separates human beings from other animals. Building on the insights of postmodernism, she takes first steps towards a new, non-anthropocentric paradigm, in the hope to achieve a sustainable balance between human interests and the interests of non-human animals.Gabriel Vidal Quiñones (“Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism: A path towards a Meaning Ethics”) takes a critical look at Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, and argues that the conceptual resources of utilitarianism only allow for an incomplete moral understanding of our relationship with other animals. What is lacking, he suggests, is an ethical vision. He argues that, without an ethical vision, human action threatens to degenerate into mere automatism without meaning. He proposes a “meaning ethics” that he thinks is better equipped to help us decide how we ought to treat other animals.I hope you, dear reader, will enjoy reading through this remarkable collection of articles as much as I enjoyed putting it together. Maybe you will even be inspired to do some thinking of your own about issues of animal ethics and put your thoughts down on paper. If so, I sincerely hope that you will choose the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics to publish your article.Warm regards and best wishes for the new year,


el-'Umdah ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Miftah Ulya

Emotional anger is an urgent and has an essential role in living human life, besides he is also praiseworthy as well as the nature and attitude to watch out for, because anger is also the most active role in things that are self-preservation, family, and other social communities. Anger emotions arise as a result of feelings of displeasure with people other than themselves, or certain objects that are closely related to the personality and inner experience experienced by someone. In the Qur'an the expression "human emotion" is very closely related to human behavior personally related to information aspects of the past, present or future. In the Koran no less than 13 times in the form of unequal derivatives, where anger is depicted and seen in human attitudes and behaviors that sometimes appear on the face, can be detected in verbal and nonverbal forms, angry with fa'ali, angry with the qalb fil , angry in terms of quelling evil and angry in terms of human expectations that are not achieved.Humans are required to know and minimize the nature of anger because of the impact it has on the lives of human beings both psychologically, sociologically and psychologically. But through the media remember Allah Almighty, through purification media with the nature of Husn al-zhan, patience, gratitude, forgiveness is a solution in controlling human angry emotions


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