scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Newsvendor Model and Analysis under Multiplicative Random Demand

CONVERTER ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 565-586
Author(s):  
Yi Wang, Jian Hu, Xiaohui Yuan, Yang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Elasticity ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Newsvendor Model ◽  
Random Demand

In this paper, we investigate the performance of green supply chain newsvendor model under multiplicative random demand. In our model, the green supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer acts as a leader, which decides the variables: production quantity, wholesale price and green-level; the retailer acts as a follower, decides on the retail price. Centralized and decentralized optimal solutions are obtained to optimize the manufacturer's production, stocking and green-level decision while anticipating the retailer's price optimization decision. Through research, it is found that the stocking factor decreases with the increasing price elasticity and is not affected by the green-level elasticity; Lower price elasticity will increase the optimal selling price of the green product, while green-level elasticity has no effect on the price; Larger price elasticity or green-level elasticity will increase the optimal green-level of the green product; Lower price elasticity or higher green-level elasticity will increase the overall profitability of the supply chain; Profit sharing between manufacturer and retailer under the decentralized model only depends on price elasticity and green-level elasticity; The greater price elasticity, the more beneficial to the retailer, the greater the green-level, the more beneficial to the manufacturer.

scholarly journals How Different Government Subsidy Objects Impact on Green Supply Chain Decision considering Consumer Group Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Group ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.

scholarly journals Investigating a green supply chain with product recycling under retailer's fairness behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Chirantan Mondal ◽  
Bibhas C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Product Recycling ◽  
Forward Channel

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Due to the rapid increment of environmental pollution and advancement of society, recently many manufacturing firms have started greening their products and focusing on product remanufacturing. The retailing firms are also taking several efforts for marketing those products and thinking more about the fairness of the business. Keeping this in mind, this study investigates the effect of recycling activity and the retailer's fairness behavior on pricing, green improvement, and marketing effort in a closed-loop green supply chain. In the forward channel, the manufacturer sells the green product through the retailer while in the reverse channel, either the manufacturer or the retailer or an independent third-party collects used products. The centralized model and six decentralized models are developed depending on the retailer's fairness behavior and/or product recycling. The optimal results are derived and compared analytically. The analytical results are verified by exemplifying a numerical example. A restitution-based wholesale price contract is developed to resolve the channel conflicts and coordinate the supply chain. Our results reveal that (ⅰ) the manufacturer never selects the third-party as a collector of used products under fair-neutral retailer, (ⅱ) the fairness behavior of the retailer improves her profitability but it diminishes the manufacturer's profit, and (ⅲ) if the manufacturer does not pay much transfer price, then the collection through the third-party is preferable to the fair-minded retailer.</p>

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Dynamic Game and Coordination Strategy of Multichannel Supply Chain Based on Brand Competition

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Tracking System ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
Adjustment Speed

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.

scholarly journals Game Analysis and Coordination of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Components Reuse Strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9681
Author(s):  
Xiaomin Zhao ◽  
Xueli Bai ◽  
Zhihui Fan ◽  
Ting Liu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Elasticity ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Game Analysis

This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain that covers three key members: Manufacturer, new components supplier, and recycled-components supplier. Considering the power of each member in the chain, we use game theory to analyze the optimal decision and coordination, particularly investigating the economic value of components reuse strategy. The results show that, in a decentralized setting, the value of components reuse highly depends on the attributes of the products. For the products with low price elasticity, reuse strategy is only beneficial to the recycled-components suppliers. Further investigation shows the manufacturer can use wholesale price contracts to coordinate and improve the supply chain’s performance.

Supply Chain Contracting with Linear Utility Function

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ningning Wang ◽  
Jibao Gu ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Jinfeng Yue
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Newsvendor Model ◽  
Supply Chain Contracting ◽  
Linear Utility ◽  
Linear Utility Function ◽  
Linear Setting

The supply chain contracting has traditionally been based on the profit maximization assumption. Recent research has shown that some behavior factors may influence the decision making of supply chain members. The authors utilize a linear utility function to depict such behavior factors and incorporate these into the newsvendor model. The linear utility function provides sufficient flexibility to better capture people's various behavior factors. By supposing the agents are concerned with behavior factors, the authors first investigate how the factors affect the supply chain under wholesale price contract, and find that they do not influence coordination condition, but can adjust the distribution of profits. Then they extend their study to other four common contracts with a similar method and systematically demonstrate that the behavior of agents in such a linear setting has no effect on the conditions of coordinating supply chain.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

scholarly journals Competitive pricing strategies of multi channel supply chain under direct servicing by the manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit Sarkar ◽  
Brojeswar Pal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
The People ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Competitive Pricing

Internet and its accessible devices (e.g., mobiles, computers) are the unmitigated blessings to the people. Nowadays, internet connectivity almost eliminates all kinds of blockades for the verification of authentication, comparison of prices, and services for a product. Consequently, the market has been becoming more competitive compared to decision making.  In this paper, we construct a multi-channel supply chain (MCSC) frameworks with traditional channels as well as a direct channel (DC), where the manufacturer provides services to the customers for both the cases. Then the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailers are examined. The optimal pricing decisions and services are discussed and also compared the profits with one another under various cases (Stackelberg Settings, Strategic Alliance, and two types of NO Improved Service). Then the sensitivity of the service cost coefficients and the cross-channel price coefficients on the profits for each player and the supply chain is analyzed. We find out the best profitable strategies under the parameters such as service costs and the positive effects of the service on the demand rate. We also mark out the optimum level of the services so that the profit will be maximized for each player. Finally, we define an interval such that if the service costs belong to that interval, then the selling price of the DC would be lesser than the wholesale price. These findings help companies such as automobiles, electronic goods, etc. to implement the best strategies to increase their profit.

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