scholarly journals Alasdair MacIntyre as an Aristotelian Economic Sociologist: Reading After Virtue with Dependent Rational Animals

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-35
Author(s):  
Caleb Bernacchio

Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory presents a complex argument that spans numerous academic disciplines and combines empirical and theoretical analyses. Its radical conclusion has inspired activists and social critics from all sides of the ideological spectrum. Critics and commentators have questioned MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral philosophy and the plausibility of the concluding prescription, concerning the need to create new forms of community. But it has less often been asked in what sense the book presents a unified perspective. In other words, how do the premises of MacIntyre’s argument, presented and defended throughout the text, warrant the conclusion? In this article, I partially formalize the main argument of After Virtue, discussing the grounds for each premise, and explaining how they ground the book’s radical conclusion. In doing this, I argue that economic sociology, specifically Karl Polanyi’s theory of the modern market economy, plays a large role in supporting MacIntyre’s claims. After presenting the main argument of the text, I draw upon the social theory elaborated in Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, specifically its theory of the relationship between vulnerability, dependence, and virtuous networks of giving and receiving, while briefly noting recent sociological criticisms of Polanyi, to argue that we have reason to be skeptical of MacIntyre’s empirical claims concerning the vicious character of modern social structures in After Virtue.

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Zbróg

The aim of the article is to present the theory of social representations which is not well-known in the Polish pedagogy and which may constitute an interesting theoretical and methodological perspective for the study of the educational discourse. The theory itself is interdisciplinary and therefore may be useful in research carried out within various academic disciplines both in the humanities and social sciences. Theoretical analyses will also concern the possibilities of conducting research of educational discourse within the framework of the social representation theory with the application of the collective biography writing which may be perceived as the critical discourse analysis.


Author(s):  
Fen LIN

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.In the dominant discourse of the "human–machine relationship," people and machines are the subjects, with a mutually shaping influence. However, this framework neglects the crux of the current critical analysis of AI. It reduces the problems with new technology to the relationship between people and machines, ignoring the re-shaping of the relationship between "people and people" in the era of new technology. This simplification may mislead policy and legal regulations for new technologies. Why would a robot killing cause more panic than a murder committed by a human? Why is a robot's misdiagnosis more troubling than a doctor's? Why do patients assume that machines make more accurate diagnoses than doctors? When a medical accident occurs, who is responsible for the mistakes of an intelligent medical system? In the framework of traditional professionalism, the relationship between doctors and patients, whether trusted or not, is based on the premise that doctors have specialized knowledge that patients do not possess. Therefore, the authority of a doctor is the authority of knowledge. In the age of intelligence, do machines provide information or knowledge? Can this strengthen or weaken the authority of doctors? It is likely that in the age of intelligence, the professionalism, authority and trustworthiness of doctors require a new knowledge base. Therefore, the de-skilling of doctors is not an issue of individual doctors, but demands an update of the knowledge of the entire industry. Recognizing this, policy makers must not focus solely on the use of machines, but take a wider perspective, considering how to promote the development of doctors and coordinate the relationship between doctors with different levels of knowledge development. We often ask, "In the era of intelligence, what defines a human?" This philosophical thinking should be directed toward not only the difference between machines and people as individuals, but also how the relationship between human beings, i.e., the social nature of humans, evolves in different technological environments. In short, this commentary stresses that a "good" machine or an "evil" machine—beyond the sci-fi romance of such discourse—reflects the evolution of the relationships between people. In today's smart age, the critical issue is not the relationship between people and machines. It is how people adjust their relationships with other people as machines become necessary tools in life. In the era of intelligence, therefore, our legislation, policy and ethical discussion should resume their focus on evolutionary relationships between people.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 41 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Rohdearni Wati Sipayung

This novel  has many basic values of human, and the writer wants to share about the social value of this Novel. Although this novel tells of a witch, as we know that the stories of about witches, it may be difficult to find which part is the social value. But the writer wants to find the part that is a social value, because in every story there must be a positive value that can be taken by the reader. The social value of Cooperation, cooperation within a group can make the job easier. The social value of care. Human beings we should care about each other, helping each other and pay attention. The social value of bravery, in life we must have the courage because, as we know there are still many people who are afraid to face the people.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-122
Author(s):  
Josef Früchtl

Vertrauen hat zunächst einmal eine fundamentale Funktion in der sozialen Sphäre. Dementsprechend fungiert es als philosophischer Terminus vor allem in der Politischen, der Sozial- und der Moralphilosophie. Aber auch in der neueren Soziologie und Psychologie ist es zentral. Im Verweis darauf kann man das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Zuschauer und Leinwandheld als parasozial bezeichnen, als eine Als-ob- Interaktion. Für die neuere Filmphilosophie spezifisch interessant ist demgegenüber das ontologische Vertrauen. Statt es mit Deleuze im Sinne einer Kino-Metaphysik zu erklären, scheint es angemessener, die verschiedenen fachspezifischen Antworten noch einmal unter Kants Spielkonzept zusammenzubinden. Ästhetische Erfahrungen bestärken uns in der Einstellung, so zu tun, als ob wir in die Welt Vertrauen haben könnten. At first trust plays a fundamental role within the social sphere. Accordingly, trust serves as philosophical term above all in Political, Social, and Moral Philosophy. But it is also central in recent Sociology and Psychology. Referring to these disciplines, the relationship of trust be- tween viewer and hero on the screen can be called ›parasocial‹, as-if-interaction. In contrast, ontological trust is of particular interest for recent philosophy of film. Instead of explaining it, following Deleuze, in terms of a metaphysics of cinema it seems to be more adequate to com- bine the different subject-specific answers in Kant’s concept of play. Aesthetic experiences then are encouraging us in the attitude to act as if there could be trust in the world.


Labyrinth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Kathi Beier

In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all. 


Author(s):  
Tony Watson

A conversation in which we hear an individual ‘working on their identity’ in negotiation with a researcher is used to develop a broadly applicable conceptual scheme for the study of identities and organizations. The crafting of concepts is an essential part of all scientific endeavour but it is often done less well than it might in studies of identity-related issues in organizations. To improve the quality of conceptualization in this area the organizational sociologist must be clear and explicit about their methodological assumptions. A valuable way of doing this is by adopting a Philosophical Pragmatist epistemology focusing on ‘the way the social world works’ alongside an ontological processual/relational conception of the nature of organizations and the nature of human beings. Working within these assumptions, a four-fold conceptual scheme is put forward, this encouraging researchers to examine the interplay between self-identity, social-identities, identity work, and personas. A typology of social-identities (sociological discursive phenomena) is also presented to increase the power of the basic scheme, all of this being intended to be helpful to researchers interested in the relationship between human identities and organizations.


Author(s):  
Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman

This chapter argues against the familiar consensus that Barth’s relationship to modern moral philosophy is oppositional. It demonstrates that Barth appropriates the central insights of his philosophical predecessors and incorporates them into his ethics, even as he anticipates one of the most fruitful developments in contemporary moral philosophy: Stephen Darwall’s ‘second-personal ethics’. Rather than casting autonomy as sin, he recasts obedience to the Word of God as a form of autonomy. Barth incorporates the rational form of Kantian self-legislation and the social form of Hegelian mutual recognition into his account of subjective reception of revelation. Because Barth does not separate the sovereignty of revelation from the sociality of the church’s interpretation of Scripture and confession of faith, we—Barth’s readers—must not separate his account of hearing the Word of God from his account of hearing the divine command. In fact, we should take his account of the subjective reception of revelation as his most fulsome and winsome account of practical reason.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-238
Author(s):  
William J. FitzPatrick

Abstract Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich ‘biocultural theory’ of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by ‘adaptive plasticity’. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.


1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-250
Author(s):  
Charles Butterworth

This is a "work in progress" presentation based on mearch I am nowconducting about the development of Islamic political philosophy duringthe classical period of Islam. My contention is that a better understandingof that tradition puts the current debate about Islamic fundamentalism orresurgence into a new perspective. Behind the sensational, popular demandsfor greater adherence to the strictures of the revealed law of Islamlies an issue of fundamental importance: how divine revelation is to beunderstd and interpreted for political guidance. Those who developedIslamic political philosophy spoke directly to this issue and did so in amanner that merits the attention of contemporary Muslim activists, scholarsinterested in Islam, and thoughtful human beings in general. Theythought clearly about the relationship between religious belief andpolitical practice because they addressed the issue ditectly and withoutpreconceptions. Consequently, whatever our religious and cultural origins,we can benefit greatly from their teaching.One of my goals is to refocus current social science scholarship whileengaging Muslim scholars in debate on topics they deem urgent. Lately,there have been many, perhaps too many, reports and prognostics concerningthe success of resurgent Islam as well as the challenges it posesto Middle Eastern and western regimes. Such studies invariably talkabout, rather than with, those calling for greater attention to Islamic preceptsand practices; they presuppose and reinforce an attitude of "us" and"our valued' vetSUS "them" and "their values." Such a posture not onlyfosters antagonism and misunderstanding, it also ignores the way Muslimsare now addressing this complex phenomenon.Indeed, for almost a decade, Muslims trained in the West have beeninvestigating how western learning, especially the social sciences, illuminatestraditional Islamic sciences and vice versa. This task addresses, atthe highest level, the issue behind the call for application of the Shari'ahand offers the best Contemporary possibility of achieving some kind ofintercultural understanding. It offers those interested in western and Islamicculture a unique opportunity to delve mare deeply into another cultureand thereby understand the other and their own culture better.Another goal is to investigate how philosophers within the classicalperiod of Islam understood revelation and its outward manifestationprophecy-to influence political life. While mast scholars recognize the ...


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