Correlation between Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Author(s):  
A. Arbatov

The article is devoted to the problem of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons reduction negotiations. Evaluation is made, to what extent nuclear states have performed their obligations under the first part of the Art.VI, the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The author analyzes the influence of the Great Powers' policy aimed at nuclear arsenals curtailing and reduction of the nuclear weapons' role in national and international safety assurance, as well as at carrying of nuclear war concepts and plans far off stage in international military and political relations, at enhancement of the worldwide "taboo" against any use of nuclear weapons directly or as a threat, at lowering the popularity of nuclear weapons in inside politics of many countries.

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
D. V. Stefanovich

“Strategic stability” as a characteristic of military and political relations with a low possibility of large-scale armed confl ict between great powers remains one of the basic notions of international security, especially in its nuclear missile dimension. At the same time, this notion also sets forth tangible state of strategic forces of two (or potentially more) nations and the framework of risk reduction and arms control measures preventing a nuclear war. The purpose of this study is to identify the main trends in this area and how strategic stability can be maintained and enhanced. To this end, I review the main offi cial doctrinal documents and statements in this area, international arms control treaties, trends in the development of the armed forces, and academic and expert publications. It is concluded that strategic stability can be preserved under increasing infl uence of a growing number of new factors, both political (including degradation of arms control regimes) and technological. Among the latter are modernization and development of means for delivery of nuclear warheads, growth of long-range precision-guided non-nuclear weapons potential, increase of antagonism in new environments. The experts point out the need for active work of the academic community and diplomats to fi nd new solutions ensuring maintenance of strategic stability in the future. Negative scenarios are outlined in the absence of such solutions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Peter Rautenbach

This article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. The reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its effects on nuclear deterrence need to be explored as there appears to be substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. This article found that hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. This may be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does this relate to nuclear war? In short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. Therefore, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use.


Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.


Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.


1964 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

The nuclear age has ushered in a novel period of history, as distinct from the age that preceded it as the modern age has been from the Middle Ages or the Middle Ages have been from antiquity. Yet while our conditions of life have drastically changed under the impact of the nuclear age, we still live in our thoughts and act through our institutions in an age that has passed. There exists, then, a gap between what we think about our social, political, and philosophic problems and the objective conditions which the nuclear age has created.This contradiction between our modes of thought and action, belonging to an age that has passed, and the objective conditions of our existence has engendered four paradoxes in our nuclear strategy: the commitment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear strategy which would avoid the predictable consequences of nuclear war; the pursuit of a nuclear armaments race joined with attempts to stop it; the pursuit of an alliance policy which the availability of nuclear weapons has rendered obsolete. All these paradoxes result from the contrast between traditional attitudes and the possibility of nuclear war and from the fruitless attempts to reconcile the two.


2021 ◽  
pp. 77-102
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hogg

AbstractThis chapter offers an interpretation of British regional civil defence activities in the 1950s. I argue that the persistent social impact of nationwide sociotechnical imaginaries of nuclear weapons cannot be fully understood without considering the localised social, geographical and discursive contexts in which civil defence was located and enacted. This chapter traces the ways in which a wider (officially maintained) sociotechnical imaginary appears to have been embedded in and intertwined with these localised contexts. After discussing the bespoke narrative scenarios created to frame civil defence exercises and offering analysis of their public representation, I focus on sites of leisure and forms of civic engagement linked to civil defence activity. Lastly, I turn to imaginative geographies to explore how sociotechnical imaginaries became localised in this era.


Author(s):  
Matthew Rendall

This chapter applies Stephen M. Gardiner’s model of the perfect moral storm to nuclear deterrence. Most damage from a major nuclear war would fall on third parties rather than the belligerents. Some would be present-day people in neutral countries and nonhuman animals, but future generations would be the largest group of victims. This makes ongoing reliance on large nuclear arsenals ethically indefensible. It presents many of the same problems, however, as global heating. One is that future damages are not salient to present-day publics and politicians. Another is that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of major war while greatly increasing the damage if it occurs. This affects the intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits. Nuclear deterrence is a ‘front-loaded’ good: its benefits arrive right away, whereas its costs will most likely arrive only in the future. Nuclear war is inevitable if states rely on it in perpetuity, but for a given generation, the likelihood may be small. “Business-as-usual” may thus be a good self-interested gamble for each generation until nuclear war actually occurs. Not surprisingly, it finds many defenders. The last part of the chapter considers possible solutions.


Author(s):  
Joseph Cirincione

The American poet Robert Frost famously mused on whether the world will end in fire or in ice. Nuclear weapons can deliver both. The fire is obvious: modern hydrogen bombs duplicate on the surface of the earth the enormous thermonuclear energies of the Sun, with catastrophic consequences. But it might be a nuclear cold that kills the planet. A nuclear war with as few as 100 hundred weapons exploded in urban cores could blanket the Earth in smoke, ushering in a years-long nuclear winter, with global droughts and massive crop failures. The nuclear age is now entering its seventh decade. For most of these years, citizens and officials lived with the constant fear that long-range bombers and ballistic missiles would bring instant, total destruction to the United States, the Soviet Union, many other nations, and, perhaps, the entire planet. Fifty years ago, Nevil Shute’s best-selling novel, On the Beach, portrayed the terror of survivors as they awaited the radioactive clouds drifting to Australia from a northern hemisphere nuclear war. There were then some 7000 nuclear weapons in the world, with the United States outnumbering the Soviet Union 10 to 1. By the 1980s, the nuclear danger had grown to grotesque proportions. When Jonathan Schell’s chilling book, The Fate of the Earth, was published in 1982, there were then almost 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled with a destructive force equal to roughly 20,000 megatons (20 billion tons) of TNT, or over 1 million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ anti-missile system was supposed to defeat a first-wave attack of some 5000 Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missile warheads streaking over the North Pole. ‘These bombs’, Schell wrote, ‘were built as “weapons” for “war”, but their significance greatly transcends war and all its causes and outcomes. They grew out of history, yet they threaten to end history. They were made by men, yet they threaten to annihilate man’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 88-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliza Gheorghe

The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen B. Toon ◽  
Alan Robock ◽  
Michael Mills ◽  
Lili Xia

Of the nine countries known to have nuclear weapons, six are located in Asia and another, the United States, borders the Pacific Ocean. Russia and China were the first Asian nations with nuclear weapons, followed by Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Most of the world's nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals or maintaining them at historic levels, but several of those in Asia—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—continue to pursue relentless and expensive programs of nuclear weapons development and production. Hopefully, the nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 between Iran, the European Union, and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be a step toward eliminating nuclear weapons throughout Asia and the rest of the world. As we will discuss below, any country possessing a nuclear arsenal is on a path leading toward self-assured destruction, and is a threat to people everywhere on Earth.


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