The Beginning of the Putin's Era (2000–2008)

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 117-127
Author(s):  
P. Cherkasov

Received 21.08.2020. The author of the article believes the beginning of the “Putin’s era” – the first two terms of his presidency (2000–2008) – to be generally successful for Russia. In eight years, the bases of the state shaken in the 1990s were strengthened, the threat of an intensive political struggle, which, however, lost much of its outdoor competitive nature, decreased, the economy became stronger, the living conditions of the population improved, the activity and influence of Russia in international affairs increased. This was largely due to the favorable global economic environment for Russia and, above all, high prices for energy resources, which were the main item of Russian exports. No less obvious were the personal achievements of President Putin, who managed to consolidate the unbalanced state, put an end to the pressure of oligarchs on authorities, restore the Kremlin’s control over regional elites, and extinguish hotbeds of separatism in Russia. He has built the very “vertical of power” for which his political opponents, both inside the country and abroad, will consistently criticize him. Having inherited Boris Yeltsin’s policy of developing cooperation with the West, Vladimir Putin at first continued to follow this path, but gradually became disillusioned with the sincerity of Western partners towards Russia. He was most concerned about the eastward expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure, its approach to Russian borders, and the West’s general reluctance to consider Russian interests. Putin openly expressed the accumulated claims against the United States and NATO in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. 2007 was a turning point in Putin’s foreign policy towards the West. Since then, the focus has been shifted to protecting Russia’s national interests. Within the country, for eight years, Putin had failed to create a modern, self-regulating and multi-level system of government. The destructive chaos of the 1990s was replaced by centralized “manual control” from the Kremlin, but it also worked with constant failures. The state apparatus, especially at the regional level, did not work effectively enough, and regional authorities often did not follow the orders of the President. The lessons of the first stage of the Putin’s era were: the reasonably required consolidation of the state, building the “vertical of power” often occurred at the expense of the civil society’s interests, the interests of consolidating and expanding democracy in Russia.

2018 ◽  
pp. 8-15
Author(s):  
Іvan Pobochiy

The level of social harmony in society and the development of democracy depends to a large extent on the level of development of parties, their ideological and political orientation, methods and means of action. The purpose of the article is to study the party system of Ukraine and directions of its development, which is extremely complex and controversial. The methods. The research has led to the use of such scientific search methods as a system that allowed the party system of Ukraine to be considered as a holistic organism, and the historical and political method proved to be very effective in analyzing the historical preconditions and peculiarities of the formation of the party system. The results. The incompetent, colonial past and the associated cruel national oppression, terror, famine, and violent Russification caused the contradictory and dramatic nature of modernization, the actual absence of social groups and their leaders interested in it, and the relatively passive reaction of society to the challenges of history. Officials have been nominated by mafia clans, who were supposed to protect their interests and pursue their policies. Political struggle in the state took place not between influential political parties, but between territorial-regional clans. The party system of Ukraine after the Maidan and the beginning of the war on the Donbass were undergoing significant changes. On the political scene, new parties emerged in the course of the protests and after their completion — «Petro Poroshenko Bloc», «People’s Front», «Self-help»), which to some extent became spokespeople for not regional, but national interests. Pro-European direction is the main feature of the leading political parties that have formed a coalition in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Conclusion. The party system of Ukraine as a result of social processes is at the beginning of a new stage in its development, an important feature of which is the increase in the influence of society (direct and indirect) on the political life of the state. Obviously, there is a demand from the public for the emergence of new politicians, new leaders and new political forces that citizens would like to see first and foremost speakers and defenders of their interests.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bryc

Russia attempts to revise a Western-led liberal world order. However, challenging the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia’s international standing. This strategy is undoubtedly ambiguous as Russia challenges the West, particularity the United States, and looks for a rapprochement at the same time.The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula what constituted breaking international law, andengagement into the war in the East Ukraine. Nevertheless, the milestone was not 2014, but 2008 when Russia had decided for the first time to use its militar yforce against Georgia and indirectly against the growing Western military and political presence in this post-Soviet republic. This game changer was hardly a surprise, because several signals of a desire to challenge the Western-led world order had appeared in the past at least twice in president Putin’s speeches in 2007 at Munich Security Conference and in 2014 during Valdai Club session in Sochi. This article seeks to provide a take in the discussion about the way Russia has been trying to reshape the post-Cold War order. This paper probes the notion that Russia has become a revisionist state trying to shape a post-Western world order. Besides, there are a few questions to be answered, first of all whether anti-Westernism is in fact its goal or rather an instrument in regaining more effective impact on international politics and how it may influence the post-ColdWar order despite its reduced political and economic potential.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the shift in global balance that began in the post-2007 economic crisis. For a considerable time before the 2008 crisis, the United States and most European states had been living on high levels of debt both national and individual, public and private. Manufacturing in the developed West, and its provision of secure jobs for many workers, was undermined by the new economic environment of globalization, as well as the growth of cheaper manufacturing in China and the other BRIC countries. A new epoch of financial capitalism, which had emerged since the 1980s, was in full swing by the start of the Noughties. The chapter first considers the post-2007 economic crisis, before discussing the continuing rise of China and Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. It concludes with an assessment of international reactions to China’s rise, including those of East Asia, international organizations, and Taiwan.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Nye

The first issue of Ethics & International Affairs was published in 1987, when the Cold War still dominated international affairs. It was appropriate at that time to launch the journal with an issue devoted in part to the theme “superpower ethics.” In his introduction to the topic Nye argues that the challenge of establishing an ethics for the United States and the Soviet Union is not met by any traditional Western system. Aristotle's “virtue,” Kant's “good intent,” and the “good result” of the consequentialists are inadequate to the task of determining right on the superpower playing field. In reference to this insufficiency, Nye sketches the arguments of the subsequent articles by Mazrui, Hassner, and Hoffman, each of whom offers an instructive picture of the state of superpower ethics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 198-211
Author(s):  
Bohdan YAKYMOVYCH

Assessing the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1921, and the proclaiming of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR) as the second most crucial phenomenon in the history of the Ukrainian people after the establishment of the Cossack State under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in the 18th century, the author of this study pays special attention to the mistakes of the political and army leadership of the Galicians, which caused the demise of the state in the Galicia-Bukovyna-Zakarpattia region. The author identifies three periods, during which it was possible to send the Polish occupiers away from the territory of the Eastern Galicia. It was the wasted time, disorientation in the Polish domestic contradictions, disarrangement of the rear, failure to enforce the Act of Unification of the ZUNR, and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), as well as the developments in the Dnieper region, caused the demise of the ZUNR. The latter found itself face to face with the might of the revived Polish state already in the second quarter of 1919. Just at that time, the Entente, with a neutral position of the United States, supplied the Poles with considerable forces and means throwing the Ukrainians at the paws of Poland, Romania, and White and Red Russia. Keywords West Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), Lviv, Peremyshl (Przemysl), Dmytro Vitovskyi, Hnat Stefaniv, Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Imelda Masni Juniaty Sianipar

On October 20, 2014, Joko Widodo or familiarly known as Jokowi was sworn in as the Seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian society supports Jokowi because He is simple, honest and populist. The presence of populist leaders in international politics often attracts the attention of Western countries, particularly the United States. Populist leaders are often considered as the authoritarian leaders, anti-democratic, anti-Western, anti-foreign and anti-market. Hugo Chavez from Venezuela and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from Iran are the examples. Chavez and Ahmadinejad are considered as threats by the United States because they challenge the United States led regional and global order. This article will examine the direction of Jokowi’s foreign policy. This article argues that Jokowi is a moderate populist leader. Jokowi is friendly to other countries including the West but still prioritize the national interests. Thus, Indonesia under Jokowi is not a threat to other countries and the West. In fact, they can work together to achieve their common national interests. Keywords: populism, foreign policy, Indonesia, jokowi, moderate populism


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-139
Author(s):  
Michael McFaul

Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Mariia A. Kobzeva

Today China actively participates in shaping the international political agenda, norms, and rules for interaction between states. This activity is a part of the PRC's policy to strengthen its international discourse power. Despite the fact that there are many studies of China's propaganda politics, discourse power remains outside the focus of researchers both in Russian and English-speaking communities. The term has varying interpretations and translations in non-Chinese academic literature. In this regard, the article examines the meaning of this term and answers questions – how, why, and for what purpose does the PRC implement its discourse power. The article analyzes research literature and documents in Russian, English, and Chinese languages regarding the discourse power, the origin, and the development of the term in Chinese discourse, and using it as a political task. The article studies the main departments and organizations responsible for the formation of the discourse power, as well as tools and mechanisms for its implementation. The author identifies “soft” and “hard” variants of China's discourse power, explains the difference in their goals and methods via giving examples from the PRC's foreign policy. The author concludes that the need for discourse power, which combines various methods of China's policy, is due to the acute internal political struggle, and the country's new ambitions in the international arena. The development of discourse power as a political phenomenon is fueled by the ideas of opposition to the “West”. In this regard, discourse power is becoming one of the most important counterweapons in competition between China and the United States.  


Author(s):  
Joseph Heller

This chapter shows the change in America’s attitude towards Israel, from opposition to de jure recognition of Israel’s military capabilities for the west during ther Korean war. While in 1948 secretary of state General Marshall warned against an enduring conflict with the Arabs, Truman recognized it de facto. However, the state department continued to treart Israel as a liability. Henry Byroade claimed that Israel should not be the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel was left outside of strategic western alliances because it was assumed that its membership might push the Arabs towards the Soviet Union. The notion that Truman’s administration was pro-Israel is a myth. Although Truman himself was sympathetic, the State Department and the Pentagon did not consider Israel an asset.


Author(s):  
Michael Mandelbaum

In the wake of the Cold War, both the United States and Western Europe had an unprecedentedly peaceful relationship with Russia. That relationship eventually ended, however, to be replaced by conflict, for two reasons. First was the unwise Western decision to expand the Western alliance, also known as NATO, to Russia’s borders despite having promised not to do so. Second were aggressive Russian policies toward its neighbouring countries. These measures were undertaken by President Vladimir Putin as a way of winning popular support for his dictatorial rule, which had begun to lose favor across the state due to its economic shortcomings.


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