Efficient use of subsidies in the financing of water and wastewater investments

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 197-207
Author(s):  
A.J. Almagro

Compliance with the European Union (EU) standards in the provision of water supply and wastewater services, as set forth in the relevant EU Directives, may require a significant investment effort for some countries and more specifically the new Member States. In order to ease this effort, these countries have the possibility of receiving subsidies from the European Commission to finance their investments. Using as a reference the standard methodology applied by the European Commission to define its intervention rate in a project, this paper focuses on the economic rationale and risks behind the investment subsidies in the sector. The questions asked are (a) what is the economic justification of this kind of investment subsidy and who are the target beneficiaries; (b) what factors may cause these subsidies to reach other economic agents; and (c) what measures would prevent those unexpected transfers of taxpayer resources. The results of the analysis indicate that, although the underlying methodology is economically sound, there is a significant risk that part of the subsidies may end up benefiting economic agents other than those originally targeted. However, this risk can be easily mitigated with some basic checks and balances during the calculation of the intervention rate. The views expressed in this paper are strictly personal.

Author(s):  
Diana Panke

In the European Union (EU), there are two consultative committees, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Both, the EESC and the CoR are involved in EU decision-making but lack formal competencies to influence European secondary law directly. Instead of having votes or veto rights concerning EU directives or regulations, the two consultative committees provide recommendations to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In addition to providing advice to the two EU legislative chambers, the two consultative committees can also approach the European Commission and give input into the drafting of EU policies at the very early stage.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter discusses the four major European Union institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Court. The provisions dealing with the EU institutions are split between the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Directly elected by the European citizens, the Parliament constitutes not only the most democratic institution; it is also the most supranational institution of the EU. Ultimately, each of the EU institutions is characterized by its distinct composition and its decision-making mode. Importantly, the EU is not based on a strict separation of functions between its institutions but follows a ‘checks and balances’ version of the separation-of-powers principle. This means that various EU institutions share in the exercise of various governmental functions.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122
Author(s):  
Ewa Kaczan-Winiarska

The Austrian government is extremely sceptical about the accession negotiations which are conducted by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union with Turkey and calls for the negotiation process to end. Serious reservations of Vienna have been raised by the current political situation in Turkey under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as by the standards of democracy in Turkey, which differ greatly from European standards. Serious deficiencies in rule of law, freedom of speech and independence of the judiciary, confirmed in the latest European Commission report on Turkey, do not justify, from Vienna’s point of view, the continuation of talks with Ankara on EU membership. In fact, Austria’s scepticism about the European perspective for Turkey has a longer tradition. This was marked previously in 2005 when the accession negotiations began. Until now, Austria’s position has not had enough clout within the European arena. Pragmatic cooperation with Turkey as a strategic partner of the EU, both in the context of the migration crisis and security policy, proved to be a key factor. The question is whether Austria, which took over the EU presidency from 1.7.2018, will be able to more strongly accentuate its reservations about Turkey and even build an alliance of Member States strong enough to block Turkey’s accession process.


Author(s):  
Sébastien Brisard ◽  
Guglielmo Cantillo ◽  
Ramona Grimberger ◽  
Victoria Hanley-Emilsson ◽  
Rebeka Hevesi ◽  
...  

Council of the European Union v. European Commission, Case C-409/13, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 April 2015European Commission v. Vanbreda Risk & Benefits, Case C‑35/15 P(R), Order of the Vice-President of the Court, 23 April 2015Geoffrey Léger v. Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes, Établissement français du sang...


Author(s):  
José van

The epilogue sketches a few scenarios on potential geopolitical consequences of the global paradigm shift toward multiple online platform “spheres.” Currently, the neoliberal US-based platform ecosystem dominates. This ecosystem revolves around the promotion of individualism and minimal state interference, leaving checks and balances to the market. On the other end of the ideological spectrum is the Chinese ecosystem, in which the autocratic regime controls the platform ecosystem via regulated censorship of tech corporations. Squeezed between the US and the Chinese models is the European Union, whose member states neither own nor operate any major platforms in either ecosystem. For European democracies to survive in the information age, its cities, national governments, and supranational legislature need to collaborate on a blueprint for a common digital strategy toward markets and public sectors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Eva Eckert ◽  
Oleksandra Kovalevska

In the European Union, the concern for sustainability has been legitimized by its politically and ecologically motivated discourse disseminated through recent policies of the European Commission and the local as well as international media. In the article, we question the very meaning of sustainability and examine the European Green Deal, the major political document issued by the EC in 2019. The main question pursued in the study is whether expectations verbalized in the Green Deal’s plans, programs, strategies, and developments hold up to the scrutiny of critical discourse analysis. We compare the Green Deal’s treatment of sustainability to how sustainability is presented in environmental and social science scholarship and point out that research, on the one hand, and the politically motivated discourse, on the other, do not correlate and often actually contradict each other. We conclude that sustainability discourse and its keywords, lexicon, and phraseology have become a channel through which political institutions in the EU such as the European Commission sideline crucial environmental issues and endorse their own presence. The Green Deal discourse shapes political and institutional power of the Commission and the EU.


Polymers ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 1229
Author(s):  
Alberto Di Bartolo ◽  
Giulia Infurna ◽  
Nadka Tzankova Dintcheva

The European Union is working towards the 2050 net-zero emissions goal and tackling the ever-growing environmental and sustainability crisis by implementing the European Green Deal. The shift towards a more sustainable society is intertwined with the production, use, and disposal of plastic in the European economy. Emissions generated by plastic production, plastic waste, littering and leakage in nature, insufficient recycling, are some of the issues addressed by the European Commission. Adoption of bioplastics–plastics that are biodegradable, bio-based, or both–is under assessment as one way to decouple society from the use of fossil resources, and to mitigate specific environmental risks related to plastic waste. In this work, we aim at reviewing the field of bioplastics, including standards and life cycle assessment studies, and discuss some of the challenges that can be currently identified with the adoption of these materials.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652110273
Author(s):  
Markus Gastinger ◽  
Andreas Dür

In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the literature.


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